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ABSTRACT 
This thesis puts forward the idea that crisis is a 'natural' aspect of 
capitalist development. It thus locates the causes of the current crisis 
in the structure of the post-war economy and exhonerates individuals -
workers, management and politicians - whose actions are seen as responses 
to economic conditions, and not their ultimate cause, 
Why doesn't the economy do its job properly? In the history of 
economics almost all the answers to this question sit on the continuum 
between 'too much free-trade' and 'too much state intervention'. The 
argument here attempts to transcend this controversy by demonstrating 
that the free-trade economy leads 'naturally' to both monopoly and 
crisis, and so eventually necessitates intervention, which itself cannot 
alleviate either tendency. 
A model is developed to show the situation under which balanced growth 
could conceiveably follow an uninterrupted path. When the model is 
applied to capitalist reproduction in a capitalist environment, however, 
economic expansion is seen to entail factors which become the causes of 
crisis. These include: underconsumption, over-accumulation of capital, 
disproportionality, and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. 
This multifactor causal model of crisis is then applied to explain the 
regular oscillations in the rate of accumulation - or the industrial 
cycle. Finally, the task of explaining why the current series of 
industrial cycles is articulated in a continuing downward trend is begun, 
This involves an account of the role of the movements of finance capital 
and of inflationary credit expansion in disenabling a proper recovery in 




In the period after the Second World War the leading nations of the 
capitalist world, including Australia and New Zealand, experienced a 
long-run and more or less uninterrupted trend of economic expansion. 
There were still fluctuations in national rates of growth, but these were 
unsynchronized and incidental to the general trend, and could in any 
case, it seemed, be effectively countered with Keynesian governmental 
intervention in the national economies of the developed world. 
The significance generally attributed to this period of history by 
those who lived through it was false on at least two counts. First, on 
the surface there was nothing to suggest that the social stability and 
well-being experienced by a large number of social groups was anything 
but permanent and burgeoning. Fifteen years ago this position became 
debateable, ten years ago it was stripped of all apparent tenability by 
economic events in the Western world, and today it has given way to its 
opposite among many social groups - pessimism and critical criticism of 
all existing and foreseeable social structures and arrangements. 
The second false appearance presented by the long post-War boom was 
that the more advanced countries showed to the less advanced their own 
future, and the same was supposed to apply to more and less fortunate 
social groups. The enormous progress of the West turned the attention of 
economic trouble-shooters to the underdeveloped and politically less 
stable regions. 'At home', the reformers also began to tackle the 
perceived problem of regional and sectional disparities. However, if we 
had, in the first place, taken up the hypothesis that the advanced groups 
and nations progressed at the expense of the others, then nothing would 
yet force us to reliquish this opinion. 
Thus, the good aspects of the long boom, which were assumed to be 
permanent were, in fact, temporary; and all the failings and drawbacks of 
capitalist development on a world scale which were thought to be 
temporary and reparable have not yet been alleviated or repaired. As the 
economic banes of over-production, contraction, unemployment, r1s1ng 
costs, idle capital, stagnation and decline are reflected in the problems 
and responses of the bourgeois state in the form of borrowing, deficit 
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financing, balance of trade problems, restructuralist policies, austerity 
programmes, legitimation difficulties and the flexing of the repressive 
apparatus, etc., what seemed incidental to the social development in 
general now appears inalienable, or at least a hundred times more 
difficult to shake off, and the stability which seemed inalienable has 
now proved to be incidental. 
This raises questions about the economic and social arrangements by 
which we live. In a word, why doesn't the economy do its job properly on 
a national or a world scale? 
Two types of answer are possible for this question depending on how we 
interpret it. The first treatment, taken up by all official economic 
science, is to ask what individual aspects of the economy deviated from 
the ideal model of the mixed-enterprise system and thus disenabled 
prosperous growth in the 1970s. So far as an answer can be arrived at in 
this inquiry, it is hoped to piece the system back together in an 
informed way and turn the ugly duckling back into a swan. 
The other way of asking the question does not interrogate any 
particular aspects of the post-War economy but examines the capitalist 
economy as such for an answer. Instead of asking why, for instance, the 
New Zealand economy could no longer act as a proper mixed-enterprise 
system after the long boom, we are now asking why this particular ~ of 
economy, i.e., the capitalist economy, cannot satisfy the general 
material needs of humanity for which it was 'commissioned'. In this case 
we are questioning the capitalist mode of economic organization in its 
purity, and not lamenting deviations from it. The question "why doesn't 
the economy do its job properly?" thus asks what it is about capitalism 
that makes it inherently unsuccessful in the balanced and even developed 
production and distribution of material wealth in different countries, 
regions, and social groups. 
The first formulation of the problem bore no fruit in the period after 
the generalized recession of 1974-75 and still offers little 
understanding of, or control over the economic phenomena of our times. A 
general declining trend exhibiting oscillations continues independent of 
economic planning and official economic science. Recovery is greeted with 
pleasant surprise, recession is met with mournful resignation, the same 
indicator at the same time may be taken to predict either of these, and 
the extrapolation of empirical trends is often more accurate than the 
application of the accumulated economic knowledge to the problem. 
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The major debate as to why the economy is not successful has not 
changed fundamentally in 150 years. It is the controversy between the 
free-traders and the state interventionists. One side explains the 
failure of the capitalist economy in terms of excessive government 
meddling in economic affairs at cross-purposes with the "natural" laws of 
the market. The other side accounts for this failure precisely by the 
lack of regulation, or the wrong sort. This crusty old debate is, 
however, as fruitless as the general perspective of which it is a part -
bourgeois economics. 
The transcendence of the free-trade/interventionism debate requires 
only the recognition that free trade, or competitive capitalism, leads 
naturally on the one hand to monopoly, the opposite of free trade, and on 
the other, to problems of reproduction of 'capital as a whole', and thus 
to state intervention and economic planning. (These propositions will be 
argued further below.) From this position it becomes clear that the 
problem is not with the way the system is adminestered, but with the 
nature of the system itself. In fact, it seems likely that the economic 
structure expresses itself through, or determines, the form of 
administration. The problem is thus structurally embedded in the system 
and is not due to independent or external causes. 
This brings us to the second formulation of the problem, which is the 
one taken up in this thesis. The question is, why doesn't capitalism 
perform those functions which an economic system surely exists to fulfil, 
viz., the satisfaction of material wants in the production and 
distribution of material wealth? Why does it take one step forward and 
two steps backward? How are crises structurally determined under 
capitalism? By defining the problem in this way, I do not mean to say 
that economic difficulties cannot arise on a capitalist basis for other 
reasons, that is, for reasons other than the capitalist basis. But it is 
immediately clear that these causes would be incidental to capitalist 
crisis, and would be a proper subject for the type of economic science 
developed in official schools. 
The investigation of capitalist crisis, which means for us the crisis 
arising out of the capitalist economy itself, could, even given this 
definition, still proceed in two ways. We can distinguish between an 
empirical and a theoretical mode of inquiry. An empirical investigation 
starts by looking at the crisis and its various expressions in the real 
world. It focuses on the concrete phenomena which make up the crisis, and 
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documents or measures trends in these. The empirical approach, however, 
meets with certain difficulties in understanding the crisis. In the first 
place, by looking directly at these phenomena we have already presupposed 
that we know what we are looking for. On the other hand, of course, it is 
highly unlikely that we will find agreement on the questions of whether 
there is a crisis, and in what it consists. In that situation it becomes 
clear that each person's opinion is no less based on intuition than 
anyone else's. 
Second, no matter how long we look at these phenomena we believe to 
make up the crisis, there is ultimately no reason to expect that one's 
powers of observation are so far superior to one's fellow observers as to 
see what has been missed by generations of economists. The phenomenal 
world has no special secrets from the normally observant person. The 
really difficult questions are whether some set of phenomena constitutes 
a crisis, which ones are in the set, and what are their causes, If the 
answers to these questions followed from observation alone, mankind would 
have understood and corrected the failings of the economic system long 
ago. 
Finally, when the bits and pieces of the crisis are treated 
individually and separately one from another, presumably to arrive 
inductively at the organizing principle behind them all, there is a 
danger that the connecting thread will never be found because in the 
process of examining each aspect of the crisis individual, separate 
determinations for them will be found. At that point we have returned to 
the bourgeois school, which sees the crisis, not as inhering in 
capitalism, but as the aggregate of problems in achieving "proper" 
capitalism. 
The only correct starting point is, then, the theoretical one. A 
theoretical analysis begins with assumptions about the nature of .the 
object of study and its development. Being conscious of the theoretical 
basis of our conclusions about the nature of the system of social 
production, elements of a crisis in it and the causes of these, we avoid 
the lacunae in the empirical approach. We do not "presuppose", but 
explicitly "theorize" the nature of society and of crisis. The causes of 
crisis emerge not only from the observation of concrete phenomena but 
from the significances and relations we attribute to them theoretically. 
We begin, in other words, with the connecting thread, or theory of 
crisis, and arrive at its individual links deductively. 
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This approach, of course, is not without its own problems. Foremost, 
we might note, is that the certitude of the theory depends on the 
validity of its assumptions. Even so, we are better off when we admit the 
theoretical underpinnings of observation, since we thereby move one step 
closer to self-consciousness and one step further away from unmindful 
commonsense intuitions about the social world. The fact remains, however, 
that, given the total consistency of our theory, if the 'hardcore' 
assumptions are wrong, the theory will be lacking. How are we to ensure 
that the assumptions on which we base ourselves are not mistaken? 
The answer to this question is that beyond certain limits we cannot 
substantiate, let alone prove, our assumptions right off. There are no 
instant standards of rationality where assumptions are concerned. In the 
last analysis, only the longer-run developments of the theory and their 
correspondence with reality can reflect favourably on the 'hardcore' 
propositions. Yet, even in the longer-run we must be prepared to accept 
that the apparently fruitless theory might suddenly yield explanations of 
hitherto counter-evidence. Such was the case with Newtonian mechanics, 
which transformed numerous anomalies into corroborating instances with 
consistent developments which accounted for these. On the other hand, a 
theory which consistently provides explanations of phenomena may reach an 
impasse and be unable to account for phenomena newly considered. Such 
was more recently the case with Mechanics in respect of its inability to 
account for the perihelion of the planet Mercury. 
The upshot of this is twofold. First, it is more likely that we will 
yield fruitful results if we take up an already existing theory, or slot 
into an on-going research programme, i.e., one that has at least had some 
opportunity to demonstrate its worth. Second, the choice between theories 
will not be completely rational and will therefore have other 
determinants beyond the realm of science. 
Given that as I have already stated, I wish to advance the idea that 
crisis is a natural aspect of capitalist development, the Marxist theory 
seems the logical vehicle for this, and indeed, both this thesis and its 
mode of advancement must logically arise from the same general 
assumptions and view of the world. 
The approach taken in this thesis comes out of all the considerations 
covered so far. Three broad points have been made: 1) that the crisis for 
us means the crisis arising out of capitalism, 2) that the starting point 
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must be a particular theoretical perspective, and 3) that that theory is 
Marxism. These points recommend the following order of presentation. I 
begin in Chapter II to set out the Marxist conception of the system of 
capitalist production. I try to cover everything that Marx saw as 
essential to capitalist society. Even here, in the presentation of the 
capitalist mode of production, a tendency toward decline is present - the 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall. 
The surprising thing about this tendency, however, is that it has not 
found more drastic expression in the history of capitalism. In Chapter 
III we look at the ways in which particular capitals have resisted the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and the way that this has shaped 
history. Chapters II and III provide a knowledge of the nature of 
capitalism, of what it consists in the Marxist view, both logically and 
historically. They are also concerned with the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall, which is the first major factor relevant to crisis. 
Having arrived at a conception of the system of capitalist production 
it is possible to set out the logical requisites of smooth, uninterrupted 
reproduction and growth. In Chapter IV, I present Marx's reproduction 
schema and then try to elaborate the inherent flaws in this schema 
(i.e., which in reality correspond to problems of reproduction) when it 
is applied to production on a capitalist basis, in a capitalist 
environment. The factors discovered here complement the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall as the causes of capitalist crises. 
In Chapter V, I begin to look in more detail at the structuration of 
real crises under capitalism. The first point of interest is the 
regularity of crises every 7-10 years. The periodicity of crises, or the 
industrial cycle, can also be explained on the basis provided in Chapter 
IV. Further points of interest are the frequency, amplitude and shape of 
industrial cycles, and trends in these over time. The explanation of such 
phenomena can only begin to take shape here. I begin to discuss how they 
are influenced by the credit system and the regulation of the nation-
state, and by the movements of finance capital. 
Finally, in Chapter VI, I summarize the argument of the thesis, and 
present some conclusions about the future of those societies in which the 
capitalist mode of production prevails, especially New Zealand. One major 
conclusion is that while the short term economic prospects are determined 
by purely economic factors, i.e., are predictable in economic terms, the 
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longer term holds no such certainty, and this is reflected in the 'short-
sightedness' of bougeois economic observers. In the long run, current 
economic trends cannot but provoke political turmoil in both the 
developing and underdeveloping countries, The political processes thus 
set in motion, will, in turn, determine economic prospects in the period 
beyond. It is my belief, therefore, that it is time to begin formulating 
political programmes which will temper the force of this eruption with 
far-sighted and progressive direction. The ultimate aim of this activity 
is to bring into being an economic order which avoids the rigours imposed 
by the capitalist system of production, and especially one aspect of this 
- crisis. 
Such a conclusion may seem untenable to many readers, who view the 
current social and economic order as natural and eternal. However, I hope 
this thesis will help provide a better understanding of the present 
crisis from which will follow an appreciation of the need for 
transformation. In this way, the present work takes as a guiding thread 
the following words of Ernest Mandel: 
The present crisis should make it easier to extract the working 
class from the grip of bo~eois ideology, for it is tearing 
off the veils that had ~ially concealed the real face of 
capitalism during the per1od of relative prosperity. The crisis 
thus favours a rise in proletarian class consciousness, which 
will stimulate an anti-capitalist struggle. But if the weapon 
of class consciousness is to be rigourously scientific, it mu~t 
entail neither lie nor legend nor myth but must be based on the 
real facts and their explanation. Such is our ambition. Such 
should be the ambition of all Marxists, for whom only the truth 
can be revolutionary. (The Second Slump p.8) 
Chapter II 
THE TENDENCY OF THE RATE OF PROFIT TO FALL 
Much of this chapter is concerned with the exposition of the ideas 
about the nature of capitalist production which Marx sets out in volume 
one of Capital. The idea of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
and the presentation of the law, reach their full development only in 
volume three of that book. These two parts of Marx's work, however, are 
entirely consistent as I hope my exposition will show. It is important to 
begin with capitalist production, for I wish to argue that starting from 
that basis we arrive at capitalist crisis, i.e., crisis can be explained 
by capitalist production itself. 
The immediate conclusion from an examination of capitalist production 
is the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Ultimately, 
other tendencies toward crisis will be derived from the same basis. The 
investigation must therefore proceed stepwise from Marx's basic premises. 
Hence, in this chapter I try to explicate the laws which Marx set out at 
the most abstract level. 
Disentangling the abstract laws, especially in Volume I, is not always 
a simple task, for the analysis is intertwined with the explanation, and 
this has the critique mixed into it. Since Marx does succeed in 
connecting up essence and appearance, abstract and concrete, all the 
internal relations revealed seem indispensable in coherently summing up 
the whole. It is otherwise with Volume II. Mandel gives the following 
quotes from Engels in his 'Introduction': 
'The second volume is purely scientific, only dealing with 
questions from one bour:eois to another' wrote Frederick Engels 
to the RusSian popul1s ~ Lavrov, on 5 February 1884. Seventeen 
months later, he told ~orge: 'The second volume will provoke 
great disappointment because it is purely scientific and does 
not contain much material for agitat1on.' Finally, ••• he wrote 
to Danielson: 'I had no doubt that the second volume would 
afford you the same pleasure as it has done to me. The 
developments it contains are indeed of such superior order that 
the vulgar reader will not take the time to fathom them and to 
follow them out. This is actually the case in Germanr where historical science, including political economy, has fa len so 
low that it can scarcely fall any lower •••. To them the second 
volume will always rema1n a sealed book.'(1) 
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What Engels refers to is that the actual written material that Marx 
left behind, and from which he compiled Volume II, contained only 
scientific inquiry culminating in the abstraction of laws, but lacked the 
corresponding explanation (or 'popularization' as Marx called it), which 
is left to the reader to provide, thereby rounding off the scientific 
work and thus 'fathoming' the abstract laws and 'following them out'. The 
procedure adopted here in relation to Volume I is quite the opposite. We 
have to disentangle the abstract laws of Capital from the explanatory 
material. 
2.1 SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION 
I begin with simple commodity production because in this chapter on 
profits we have to show how the pre-conditions for the historical 
emergence of profits developed, 
When I use the term 'simple commodity production' here I am referring 
to an abstraction which Marx used and not a neatly identifiable 
historical mode of production. Ronald Meek writes: "Neither in Marx's 
case nor in that of Smith was the postulated pre-capitalist society 
intended to be an accurate representation of historical reality in 
anything more than the broadest sense •••. It was not a ~as some 
critics maintain, but a mythodology."(2) 
Strictly speaking, Capital is not concerned with why capitalism 
developed, but only with the capitalist mode of production as such. Yet, 
to demonstrate the laws of development of capitalism adequately, Marx 
must discover how they have developed historically. The presentation of 
this discovery must take a short-hand form if it is not to be treated as 
a separate topic. Thus, 'simple commodity production' represents, in an 
abstract way, the historical womb from which capitalism was born and so 
embodies only what is logically necessary to demonstrate its historical 
development. That is, it contains only such conditions as would give rise 
to the possibility of capitalist production. 
Why does an adequate demonstration of the laws governing capitalist 
production and exchange depend on an account of their historical 
development? Marx begins Capital thus: "The wealth of those societies in 
which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as an 
immense accumulation of commodities, its unit being the single 
commodity,"(3) From this we can infer that capitalist production is 
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commodity production. Commodity production is production for exchange 
(rather than direct consumption), and thus capitalist production is, at 
least in part, production for exchange. However, it would be an 
unwarranted inference that commodity production is capitalist production. 
Hence, it is incumbent upon Marx to treat the more general case first, to 
set the broad parameters for the understanding of the particular. 
These "parameters" are of the utmost importance. To arrive at 
capitalism in its pure determination several conditions must be met, 
i.e., production and exchange in the capitalist mode must be ordered, and 
this order must have an historical as well as a logically imposed 
element. The logically derived conditions for capitalism are: 1) the dual 
nature of the commodity, 2) the labour theory of value, 3) the law of 
value, 4) the commodity theory of money, which, taken together allow, 5) 
price determination. There is also the implication, however, that in the 
historical development of commodity production these conditions, 1 
through 5, came successively into being in pre-capitalist times, although 
not mechanically one after another. Just as Marx abstracts "logically" 
from the imperfections in the operation and application of these 
conditions at any one time, he also abstracts "historically" from their 
overlapping and zigzagged development and its multifarious 
expressions.(4) 
If Marx had a particular question in mind when he wrote Part 1 of 
Volume I of Capital, it might have been: What conditions would have to 
develop before commodity production and exchange could be conducted on a 
rational (i.e., non-accidental) basis. It is in this light that the 
following must be understood, 
That everyday item, the commodity is, according to Marx, a very queer 
thing. It has a dual character. "Every useful thing, as iron, paper, 
&c., may be looked at from the two points of view of quality and 
quantity."(5) When we look at a commodity from the qualitative point of 
view, we distinguish different kinds of commodities. A commodity may be 
useful for this and that, but of no utility for the other. We may 
distinguish the different qualities which make an object a turner of 
soil, a flyer through the air, or a giver of shelter. In so doing we 
distinguish the utility of this object as opposed to that, its specific 
usefulness - its use-value. 
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From the quantitative point of view commodities also vary in value. 
The value which we must produce in exchange for an aeroplane is greater 
than that needed to acquire a house. Put another way, we must exchange 
several houses against one plane. This purely quantitative aspect of the 
commodity is its exchange-value. To be exchanged an article must be 
useful to someone other than its present owner. From the use-value of the 
commodity, however, we cannot derive the quantitative ratio in which A 
will be exchanged for B, as the use-value expresses only the substance 
and quality of commodities. In its independence from the use-value of a 
commodity, the exchange-value at first appears to have no determinant 
moment. Not only this, but it varies across space and time and thus 
seems, on the one hand, totally accidental, and on the other inherent to 
the individual, isolated commodity in respect of the lack of a common 
denominator of value for commodities in general. Now, if the exchange 
value of a commodity cannot be determined this is a mortal impediment to 
analyzing commodity production and exchange, for one pre-condition in the 
abstraction of laws, of course, is precisely that the object is governed 
in a law-like manner. 
If we were to found a society whose wealth consisted only of these 
isolated simple commodities, the barest rudiments of the commodity, we 
could only practise the rudest forms of exchange. We would have only 
accidental exchanges where we really had no grounds to predict whether an 
object will be realized as a commodity in exchange, or what substance or 
magnitude it will be exchanged for. It is otherwise under capitalism 
where almost all products are produced for exchange, all sellers receive 
money in exchange, and prices are set at the factory dispatch. Our 
isolated commodity lacks 1) a determinant relative value, 2) a mechanism 
for the social recognition of its relative value and calculation of 
equivalence, and, 3) a universal equivalent form of value, or money, for 
the transformation of values into prices. 
The first requirement then is for a determinant relative form of 
value. In the first chapter of Capital volume one Marx sets out the 
formal requirements of a theory of value: 
1. It must isolate a denominator common to all commodities such that, 
when we express a value relation 1 DC 8 = 200 State houses, the 
equation denotes that "there exists in equal quantities something 
common to both. The two things must therefore be equal to a third, 
which in itself is neither one nor the other. Each of them, so far 
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as it is exchange value, must therefore be reducible to this 
third."(6) 
2. This common denominator cannot be counted among the natural 
properties of the commodities for their physical dimensions, 
chemical composition, and so on, can contribute only to the use-
value of the thing. The exchange-value abstracts from the use-
value, it is only a quantity and not a quality of a commodity. 
According to Marx, the only property that satisfies the second 
requirement is the property of being products of human labour. Apart from 
the use-value of commodities this is their only common property. 
We must look a little more closely at the first requirement, for 
labour too has both a qualitative and quantitative aspect. From a 
qualitative point of view labour contributes directly to the use-value of 
the product. As the plough and the house are qualitatively different use-
values, so also are the 
blacksmithing and carpentry, 
two forms of labour which produced them, 
qualitatively different. This qualitative 
difference signals that the labour as a whole cannot play the role of 
common denominator. From the side of exchange-value, the use-value of a 
thing disappears from sight and along with it, evidently, so must its 
property of being the result of this or that type of productive activity. 
This second abstraction yields as common denominator one homogenous sort 
of labour, human labour in the abstract, labour exercised without regard 
to its particular mode. The exchange-value of a commodity therefore 
depends on the amount of abstract labour embodied in it. The quantity of 
labour in turn depends -on the time through which it was exercized. 
Hence, on this time depends the magnitude of value in exchange of the 
commodity. 
The historical stage of development of the commodity at which the 
labour theory of value was realized, would give rise to the possibility 
of barter. This barter has some non-arbitrary basis, since the relative 
value of commodities can be calculated in terms of embodied labour. 
However, when we broaden our view to branches of industry or the total 
social commodity stock, we meet a peculiarity. For each individual act of 
exchange the relative values of the commdities would have to be 
calculated, since commodities identical in every other respect may embody 
different quantities of labour. This would lead to absurd possibilities. 
Among others, abstracting from seasonal and regional differences, etc, 5 
lbs corn may for example be equal in value to 15 lbs corn. Secondly, we 
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see the correlate that the more idle and unskilled the labourer the 
greater value he creates because the more time he spends casually and 
ineptly forming the product, If human labour fulfils requirement "1" 
above then it seems that Marx's theory breaks down at the Macro-level, 
If, on the other hand Marx's theory is to work at the Macro-level, labour 
seems not to constitute a common denominator of exchange-value. 
In order to 'de-accidentalize' commodity exchange at the social level, 
Marx formulates the Law of Value as follows: ",,,that which determines 
the magnitude of the value of any article is the amount of labour 
socially necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary for its 
production,"(7) This follows from the view that the value of the 'total 
social commodity' must be calculated on the total social labour-power 
expended, This one mass of labour-power is composed of units each of 
which ",,,is the same as any other, so far as it has the character of the 
average labour-power of society, and takes effect as such; that is, so 
far as it requires for producing a commodity, no more time than is needed 
on an average, no more than is socially necessary,"(8) The conseqence is 
that the value of things, the ratio in which they are exchanged, depends 
on the different amounts of socially necessary labour-time required in 
their production. The socially necessary labour-time depends on the 
average productivity of labour in the society. Now it is clear that an 
unskilled workman is less productive than the average and thus must 
expend greater than the socially necessary labour-time in the production 
of commodities, and yet these will exchange only "at value", i.e., for 
commodities embodying the socially necessary labour-time. 
So far we really have only the possibility of barter. Production for 
exchange meets peculiarities in a barter system. First, the producer must 
produce exactly the product that the alienators of the commodities he 
wants wish to acquire. Across society this leads to compound logistical 
difficulties. Second, in many exchanges the equivalent form (or 
purchasing commodity) will be different and so the continual 
recalculation of exchange ratios would be required. Thus, it is difficult 
to see that commodity exchange and production would develop very far 
without money, 
The development of money is the development of a commodity which acts 
as a universal equivalent expressing the relative value of all other 
commodities. In Marx's time the primary money commodity was gold, 
although silver and other precious metals also served, as have other 
commodities e.g., livestock, in other times and places.(9) 
15 
In the equation: 1 plane = 200 state houses, the equivalent value 
appears on the right-hand side and expresses the relative value of the 
plane in houses; that is, its equivalent in houses. A universal 
equivalent form appears on the right-hand side of every possible value 
equation, such as: 
1 plane = 500 lbs gold 
1 house = 2.5 lbs gold 
1 plough = 0.5 lbs gold 
It is able to perform this function precisely because it too is a 
commodity and as such has a value determined by the labour-time socially 
necessary for its production. Now the value of a commodity expressed in 
money is its price, which meant the quantity of gold that embodied an 
equal amount of socially necessary labour. Thus, prices are determined, 
quite simply, by the law of value in the presence of a universal 
eqivalent form of value. On the basis sketched here simple commodity 
production, production for exchange, can be carried on. Moreover, with 
the single (although crucial) exception of a free labour army, the stage 
is set for the emergence of capitalism. 
Let us go back through "history", logically, as it were. To conduct 
commodity production and exchange on a non-arbitrary basis and in its 
fully formed mode we need price determination. Price determination 
requires a universal equivalent form of value which is determinant. 
calculations of equivalence require a relative form of value which is 
determinant. The relative value cannot be equivalent in price as this 
would result in a tautology (i.e., a price of $4 results from the price 
of the thing being $4). Value in both its relative and equivalent form is 
determined by the labour-time socially necessary for the production of a 
commodity. Hence, the measure of value is crystalized labour. Finally, to 
be recognized as a commodity an article must be exchanged and must 
therefore have, besides a determinant magnitude, a value in use to its 
acquirer, and no usefulness (except in exchange) to its alienator. Thus 
the development of commodity production presents itself as the 
progressive domination of exchange-value over use-value in the production 
of material society. 
Once the results of the analysis of simple commodity production are 
treated as givens, we have moved to a new level of analysis. So far we 
have given commodity production a rational basis. The final ripening of 
the price-form alleviates the previous accidental character of exchange 
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and rationalizes production in the sense that it need not now be 
arbitrary. Yet, there are flaws in this characterization of commodity 
production once we apply it to capitalist society. The very means by 
which we make it determinant, the dependence of exchange ratios on the 
relative socially necessary labour-time of commodities, seems to preclude 
the possibility of profits. If things exchange at value, then no one 
loses and no one gains any more than they had to begin with. If prices 
are determined by value, then over-pricing is on the whole precluded. The 
solution to the question of profits is Marx's single most celebrated 
achievement. 
2.2 CAPITALIST PRODUCTION, PRODUCTION OF SURPLUS-VALUE 
What distinguishes capitalism from commodity production as such, is 
accumulation. Capitalist production is production for exchange, but 
exchange in this s8n~P. under capitalism is primarily a means of realizing 
profits, which allow the expansion of capital. Yet profits do not arise 
in exchange, for if they did, the laws and relations we have found in 
simple commodity production would be invalid, and the basis on which 
commodity production stands would dissolve. Neither could generalized 
commodity production or its analysis proceed in that case. To discover 
how profits arise we look in this section at the circuit of capital as it 
occurs with reference to each individual capital, and especially at one 
phase of the cycle - production. 
The process of circulation is made up of buying and selling. Buying is 
the exchange of money for commodities (M-C, where M stands for money and 
C for commodities), selling is the exchange of commodities for money (C-
M). The simplest form of circulation is selling in order to buy, or C-M-
c. This circuit is characteristic of simple commodity production where 
the producer sells his goods in order to buy other use-values. The 
second possible circuit is M-C-M. This circuit starts and finishes with 
money, it is buying in order to sell. In the simple circuit, the object 
of exchange is clear: I exchange my commodities which are of no use to 
me, through the medium of money, for commodities which have use-value to 
me. I consume these commodities, and they fall out of circulation. In the 
second circuit, M-C-M, however, the result (money) is still value in 
circulation, and it is not a use-value to me. First, then, the second 
circuit which begins and ends with money (M-M) can have no other purpose 
than a change in quantity, for a change in quality is ruled out. Money is 
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money. I would hardly throw money into circulation if my object was to 
draw the same quantity of money out of circulation. Second, drawing an 
increment on my money, represented by M', appears as an end in itself, 
for in the process M-M' we never leave the sphere of circulation and so 
admit no interest but the incrementation of this money. Third, having 
admitted no interest apart from the incrementation of money, and being 
left in the sphere of circulation at the conclusion of the circuit, the 
newly expanded value can have no part in the curcuit M-C-M except to seek 
further incrementation. If it turns to consumption it falls out of the 
circuit and out of our consideration. 
The increment of M' over M, Marx calls surplus-value. The augmentation 
of the original value, or the addition of surplus-value, signifies that 
it has acted as capital. The expression M-C-M' is thus seen to be the 
general formula of capital. The conversion of money into capital is the 
process of expansion of value as a never-ending end-in-itself, Capital 
has no inherent limits. 
But how can the expansion of value occur in circulation? We have seen 
that circulation is composed of two antithetical modes of exchange, 
buying and selling, and that value is not created in exchange, for things 
exchange at value. Hence, the expansion of value, the formation of 
capital, must take place both within circulation, and at the same time 
outside that sphere! 
We know that the money which buys the commodity (M-C) is its value 
equivalent. We know also that the commodity which buys money (C-M) is its 
value equivalent. But in the formula M-C-M', the value of the second 
exchange is greater than the value of the first. We can infer that the 
change takes place in the commodity itself. However, the change cannot be 
the result of the mere circulation of the commodity for a commodity 
cannot have two values, which is only to repeat that surplus-value is not 
created in exchange. The change must therefore stem from the use-value of 
the commodity, or its consumption. This conclusion is only satisfactory 
if we can find a commodity whose consumption has the peculiar result of 
creating value. Such a commodity does exist according to Marx, and that 
is labour-power. "By labour-power or capacity to labour is to be 
understood the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities 
existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-
value of any description. "(10) 
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In the first place this creation of surplus-value depends on the 
availability of labour-power, a condition not posited in the dynamic of 
simple commodity production. Availability of the commodity labour-power 
has a two-fold meaning. First, the labourer must be free to sell his or 
her labour-power as a commodity. The capacity to labour must therefore be 
recognized as the private property of the labourer, which would 
necessitate its purchase for a given length of time. Second, the 
labouring class must have no commodities to sell other than its labour-
power, which ultimately means its members do not possess means of 
production. Those falling within these conditions form a free labour 
army. 
Clearly, the consumption of labour-power is not the whole solution for 
it takes us out of circulation completely. We must recognize that labour-
power cannot be consumed except in a labour process. When buying labour-
power the capitalist must also buy other commodities - buildings, tools, 
materials, etc.- for the labourer to work on, and to be transformed into 
the material depositories of the new value created. These commodities do 
not change in value, they merely pass on their value to the product, 
which will embody more labour and will be of greater value than the sum 
of the material elements of its production. At this stage we see that so 
long as labour-power is one of the commodities in the circuit M-C-M, then 
the possibility of the incrementation of value presents itself both 
inside and outside of circulation, at the same time. 
Hence, we must include this development in our formula for capital. 
First, production we now see falls within the sphere of circulation. From 
this we derive the following: 
M-C ••. P •.• C'-M', 
where P represents the production process, and C' represents the new 
commodities of greater value. Second, since the consumption of labour-
power must be included in such a process (i.e., a process which yields 
C') then labour-power must be a partial component of c. Hence: 
M-C(c+v) ••• P .•• C'-M', 
where c represents the constant part of capital, or material means of 
production, and v represents the variable part of capital, or the value 
of the commodity human labour-power. We look now to production as the 
theatre of value-expansion. 
Since our investigation started from the circuit of capital, we are 
dealing here with specifically capitalist production. The owner of money 
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buys means of production and labour-power. The seller of labour-power is 
set to work on the means of production to transform part of these, raw 
materials, into new commodities. In this process the value of the 
original commodities (raw materials) are preserved and passed on to the 
product. The value of the tools, machines, etc., and other conditions of 
production (e.g., buildings, fuel) which are consumed in wear and tear is 
also passed on. But the product now embodies more labour than the sum of 
its material constituents, and so when it is sold it will realize a 
greater value. But the new product by no means automatically contains 
surplus-value, for we have left out of consideration the value expended 
by the capitalist in the purchase of labour-power. If any amount of newly 
embodied labour makes C' greater than c (value of constant capital) it is 
not true that any amount of newly embodied labour is necessarily 
sufficient to make C' greater than C (c+v), or in other words sufficient 
for the establishment of the cycle M-M'. In order to yield surplus-value 
in the production process the exercise of labour-power must not only 
produce a use-value, but it must embody sufficient labour in the product 
to off-set the value of the capitalist's variable capital, plus an excess 
(which is surplus-value). Thus, the labour of the worker preserves the 
value of constant capital, creates a value equal to that of the variable 
capital which comes back to him in wages, and is the source of surplus-
value. Thus, while C = c+v, C' = c+v+s, where s represents surplus-value. 
Wages are not the value of labour. Value is crystalized labour. To ask 
after the value of labour is as fruitless as the search for the heaviness 
of weight (as John Eaton points out (11)). Wages (or more precisely 
variable capital) represent the value of labour-power. The confusion of 
these two values, one real one imaginary, is the major form of ideology 
in capitalist society. 
The aim of the capitalist is the expansion of his money; he is capital 
personified. To expand his money, or realise it as capital, more new 
labour must be embodied during the labour process than v, the value of 
labour-power. Therefore, the capitalist must set the labourer to work for 
a longer time than is necessary for the embodiment of labour equal to v. 
That is, the labourer must create more value in a day than that of one 
day's labour-power. 
The final question we have about labour-power is how its value is 
determined. At this high level of abstraction the answer is simple. The 
value of labour-power is determined in the same way as the value of any 
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other commodity, by the labour-time socially necessary for its 
production. This magnitude is dependent upon the value of the commodities 
necessary to reproduce the labourer and his, or her, dependents at a 
"normal" standard of living. Only in this way can labour-power be 
reconstituted at the end of the day, The value of the means of 
subsistence of the worker (food, clothing, entertainment, etc.) in turn 
are determined by the quantity of labour embodied in them. 
In the first place, then, if money is to act as capital, it must be 
thrown into circulation to purchase means of production and labour-power. 
Thus, money capital is converted into commodity capital. Secondly, 
commodity capital must be converted into a new product embodying surplus-
value, The realization of this value in sale yields a greater value than 
was first advanced, and when converted into money terms this is profit. 
The crucial moment in the circuit of capital is the production of 
surplus-value. The capitalist being capital personified subjectively 
lives out the objective circuit of capital, and, qua capitalist, sees no 
other motion in the world than M-M'. The worker personifies labour and as 
such enters the circuit only in the production phase. This fateful 
meeting of the capitalist and the worker, personifying the two great 
classes of capital and labour, is the crux of capitalism. At their 
intersection arises surplus-value which makes profit, and thus 
accumulation, possible and distinguishes capitalist production from other 
modes of production and from commodity production per se. 
2.3 THE RATE OF SURPLUS-VALUE AND THE RATE OF ACCUMULATION 
From the general formula of capital M-C-M', we see that in the renewed 
circuit the resultant money, M', can serve no other function than that 
originally advanced, 
Hence, M < M' < M" , 
The second curcuit thus becomes M'-C-M", and so on. 
Thus capital expands by its very nature. In this 
section we look at the determinants of the rate at which capital expands 
at the total social level. 
For the total social capital to be simply reproduced requires that a 
part of M' equivalent in value to c + v be laid out to replace the means 
of production and labour-power used up in the cycle of production, This 
would require that the whole of the surplus-value yielded (if any) be set 
to consumption, in the purchase of whatever goods were not consumed in 
the production process and the reproduction of labour-power. Capitalist 
reproduction, however, is reproduction on an extended scale and so some 
of the surplus-value must also be converted into capital. 
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Reproduction implies the extended repetition of the circuit of 
capital. As M' takes its place at the beginning of the new cycle, part of 
it continues its metamorphoses as capital, but part of it, i.e., the 
newly appropriated surplus-value, is converted into capital for the first 
time. Thus, the capitalist must not only refurbish his means of 
production and labour-power, but he must lay out funds in additional 
constant and variable capital. At the end of the first cycle, a greater 
value than that originally advanced was realized in its last act of 
exchange. But that sale was in reality partly the first act of the second 
cycle, the purchase of means of production, and partly the purchase of 
consumer goods by the working class, a prelude to the sale of labour-
power. The second cycle therefore begins on an expanded basis, and across 
society capital is reproduced. 
accumulation of capital. 
This process asserts itself as the 
The accumulation of capital is dependent on the production of surplus-
value. There is a distinction to be made between absolute and relative 
surplus-value. Absolute surplus-value depends upon the length of the 
working day. As the working day is lengthened or shortened, the surplus-
value produced grows or shrinks. The length of the working day has 
definite physiological limits, however, for workers need rest and 
nourishment. Moreover, it has moral or historically determined limits, as 
do the working week, the working year and the working life-time. Hence, 
if the capitalist-class wishes to increase the rate at which it 
accumulates capital, it cannot rely on absolute surplus-value beyond a 
certain point to achieve this. 
The idea of relative surplus-value presupposes that the working day is 
divided into necessary and surplus labour-time. Relative surplus-value 
depends on the ratio between that portion of the working period (say a 
day) which goes to the reconstitution of the variable part of capital 
(necessary labour-time), and that which produces surplus-value (surplus 
labour-time). Its expansion or contraction is not an absolute change in 
the amount of value produced, but the increase or diminution of surplus-
value relative to variable capital. Thus, any variation in relative 
surplus-value depends on the increase or the decrease of variable capital 
(necessary labour-time) as a proportion of the total value created. 
The rate at which capital can accumulate depends on the rate at which 
surplus-value is extracted. The rate of surplus-value is represented as 
s/v. Marx identifies three variables which affect this rate.(12) They 
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are 1) the length of the working day, 2) the intensity of labour, and, 3) 
the productivity of labour. The first two have definite physiological and 
moral/historical limits, aDd have, moreover, been more or less 
established through long struggles between the capitalist and working 
classes. This is not to say they are no longer relevant in times of 
crisis, but the third variable, the productivity of labour, has no such 
limits and is the normal means through which a change in the rate of 
surplus-value is effected. "In order to prolong the surplus-labour, the 
necessary labour is shortened by means whereby the equivalent for the 
wages is produced in less time. The production of absolute surplus-value 
turns exclusively upon the length of the working-day; the production of 
relative surplus-value, revolutionises out and out the technical 
processes of labour, and the composition of society. It therefore pre-
supposes a specific mode, the capitalist mode of production, a mode 
which, along with its methods, means and conditions arises and develops 
itself spontaneously on the foundation afforded by the formal subjection 
of labour to capital,"(13) 
An increase in the productivity of labour means that in a working day 
of given length, the same labour exercized with the same intensity, will 
produce more product. A two-fold increase in the productivity of labour 
would thus increase the worker's tally from 100 to 200 pieces per day. 
However, in accordance with the labour theory of value, the value of the 
two day's work would be equivalent since we assumed the labour-time to be 
constant. Thus, the same value is created, but distributed in one case 
over 100, and in the other over 200, articles. The value created per 
article is thus halved when the productivity of labour is increased two-
fold. 
In the case of a general rise in the level of productivity, the 
commodities which form the means of subsistence of the working class also 
diminish in value. Thus, if the normal standard of living before required 
the worker to consume means of subsistence of value 50, he now needs only 
45 or 40 to reproduce his labour-power. Hence, because the value of 
labour-power is determined by the labour (i.e., embodied in consumer 
goods) socially necessary for its reconstitution, the value of labour-
power has fallen. 
Still assuming a working day of constant length, and a constant 
intensity of labour, a reduction in the value of labour-power will mean a 
contraction in the necessary labour-time as against the surplus labour-
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time. Thus, the relative surplus-value increases, and along with it, the 
rate of surplus-value. Contingent upon the conversion of this surplus-
value into capital, the rate of accumulation can now also increase.(14) 
Finally, how is an increase in the productivity of labour achieved? 
The process itself is described in the last-given quotation - the 
revolutionization of the technical processes and labour. The advancement 
of technology is essentially a means to the greater economy, through 
efficiency, of labour. 
2.4 THE RATE OF PROFIT AND ITS EQUALIZATION 
The capitalist does not recognise the circuit we have described. He 
sees only the expansion of his money, or M-M'. By ignoring the details of 
the production process which is interposed between the advance of money 
and the return of an expanded value, the specific nature of capitalist 
production, the production of surplus-value, is at once concealed. The 
cost-price (k) of a commodity to the capitalist equals c+v, hence the 
final value of the commodity equals k+s. Ultimately, k reduces to the 
money advanced by the capitalist. The surplus-value embodied in the 
commodity is realized in its sale as the profit of the capitalist. Hence, 
the price of the commodity will be k+p, where p represents the profit. If 
the commodity sells at value then p=s.(15) Now in the equation M'=k+s, 
the surplus-value has no relation to the variable part of capital 
independent of the contribution of the latter to the cost-price. This 
leads to the appearance that it is the whole of the capital advanced 
which is uniformly expanded, and the precise mechanism of this expansion 
is shrouded in mystery. But wait! Since on the surface only the profit, 
or the surplus-value transformed into price terms, is visible (hence the 
formula M'=k+p), and this profit first appears in the sale of the 
commodity, the expansion of value must occur in that exchange. This of 
course contravenes the law of value, but it should be added here that it 
is a reasonable enough conclusion given appearances, and the interest of 
the capitalist in not breaking them down. 
In the previous section I pointed out that a rise in the productivity 
of labour resulted in an increase in the rate of surplus-value. We see 
now that these objective laws of motion of capitalist production differ 
from the subjective compulsion of the capitalist, for the internal 
relationship of sand v, which is the rate of surplus-value (s/v), is 
obscured from him. Surplus-value presents itself to him, or is measured 
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by him, in a different way altogether. It is retroduced from the rate of 
profit, which is the relationship of surplus-value to total capital 
advanced, or s/c+v. Since he cannot fathom the workings of the production 
process, he cannot isolate surplus-value at its birth-place. The first 
inklings of expanded value are seen in the rate of profit as this 
reflects the value newly created in production. It is these signals to 
which the capitalist responds consciously. 
In this section I discuss the determinants of rates of profit accruing 
to different individual capitals and branches of industry, how these 
profit rates activate the movement of capital between branches, and how 
these effects are transformed into causes in the further determination of 
the ever-fluctuating rate of profit. In all this I assume that the rate 
of surplus-value for each capital is the same. The rate of surplus-value 
is held constant because we are now dealing with the interaction between 
capitals and not with the relationship of capital and labour. The rate at 
which capital extracts surplus-value from the working class has already 
been discussed. We now look at the ways in which this surplus-value, once 
extracted, is distributed among the various capitals. 
To begin with let us look at the differences in productivity between 
capitals in one branch of industry, i.e., capitals producing one type of 
commodity, like cars or coal. The productivness of each labour-army will 
depend on the level of technology employed in each capital. The 
revolutionising of the technical processes of labour which accompanies 
the accumulation of capital, according to Marx(16), effects a change in 
the organic composition of capital. 
Marx defines the organic composition of capital thus: "I call the 
value composition of capital, insofar as it is determined by its 
technical composition and mirrors the changes of the latter, the organic 
composition of capital."(17) By capital Marx means the commodities bought 
by the owner of money to function as capital in the production process. 
They are means of production and labour-power. The composition of capital 
refers to the relative proportions of these two elements in the commodity 
capital. As we have seen labour-power is the variable component of 
capital. The extent of its employment depends on the quantity required to 
set the material means of production in motion. This is the technical 
composition of capital - so much labour-power is needed to work the means 
of production at a given stage of accumulation. The value composition of 
capital refers to the relative quantities of value invested in its 
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constant and variable components. All things remaining equal, the 
technical composition determines the value composition, and hence the 
latter will equal the organic composition. If the technical composition 
changes there may be a change in the value composition, for instance, if 
new automatic machinery replaces hand-operated plant. In this case the 
labour-power required will diminish and the variable portion of capital 
will fall as against the constant part, and thus the organic composition 
will rise. (18) 
The organic composition of capital is in this way directly related to 
the "technical processes of labour". With more advanced technology the 
same commodity product can be produced with relatively less labour. 
Hence, the technical composition of capital changes in favour of means of 
production, and, all things remaining equal, this will mean an increase 
in the constant as opposed to the variable portion of capital and 
therefore a rise in the organic composition. But, why should a rising 
organic composition of capital accompany accumulation? The answer to this 
is to be found in the competitive nature of capitalist production.(19) 
Competition is the stick that drives the technological revolutions of 
the capitalist mode of production, which raise the organic composition of 
capital. As labour productivity rises less labour-time is required for 
the production of the same commodity. Although the worker may work the 
same working day, etc., by using more advanced machines, processes and 
techniques, he produces more commodities. Since one day's labour is still 
embodied in the total day's production, each commodity must of necessity 
be the product of a smaller portion of that day's labour. Yet because the 
exchange-value of the single commodity is determined by the socially 
necessary labour-time, that is, the average normal amount of labour 
necessary for its production, the cost-price of the single commodity will 
decrease relative to its socially recognized value, Hence, vis-a-vis 
other capitals (especially the less efficient, producing commodities with 
more than the socially necessary labour-time), our capitalist will 
achieve a better rate of profit. 
The penalty for failing to keep abreast of competition and the rising 
organic composition of capital is cumulative. If a capital achieves a 
below average rate of profit it will not be able to reinvest at the 
average rate, and thus the organic composition of the branch of industry 
as a whole will increase at a faster rate than this particular capital's. 
Hence, its rate of profit will be relatively lower again in the next 
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year, and so on. Thus, the leading capitals grow at an ever-increasing 
rate while the below-average, or smaller, capitals are either driven out 
of this branch of industry (i.e., into branches with a lower organic 
composition of capital), or are annexed and thenceforth controlled by the 
larger, more powerful, capitals.(20) These processes tend to result in a 
uniform organic composition of capital within each branch of industry, 
corresponding to the level of development of productive forces available 
for the production of its particular commodity. 
When he comes to consider differences in productivity between branches 
of industry in Part II of Volume III of Capital, Marx indeed takes the 
position that the compositions of given branches will be roughly uniform, 
and that deviations from this situation are incidental to the analysis in 
general.(21) On the assumption that commodities exchange at value, 
capitals in different spheres with different compositions will have 
different rates of profit. Take two capitals with the same rate of 
surplus-value - 100%: 
A. 80c + 20v + 20s = 120 
B. 20c + 80v + 80s = 180 
The reader will recall that the rate of profit is the ratio of surplus-
value to total capital advanced, or s/c+v.(22) It follows that the rate 
of profit of Capital A is 20/80+20 = 20%. That of capital B is 80/20+80 = 
80%. The capital in the sphere of lower organic composition thus achieves 
a higher rate of profit in respect of the fact that its labour-army 
creates a greater magnitude of surplus-value for every 100 of capital 
invested. 
Having reached this conclusion, however, Marx remonstrates that "There 
is no doubt, on the other hand, that aside from unessential, incidental 
and mutually compensating distinctions, differences in the average rate 
of profit in the various branches of industry do not exist in reality, 
and could not exist without abolishing the entire system of capitalist 
production. It would seem, therefore, that here the theory of value is 
incompatible with the real phenomena of production, and that for this 
reason any attempt to understand these phenomena should be given up."(23) 
Here Marx finds the real world provides an anomaly to the consistent 
development of the labour theory of value. The remainder of the section 
deals with Marx's treatment of the anomaly of the equalization of the 
rate of profit. 
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Analytically, we require a consistently developed "proof" which 
accomodates both the law of value - which states that commodities 
exchange at a rate determined by the labour-time socially necessary for 
their production - and the fact that rates of profit tend to be even 
between spheres of production. Marx tackles the second requisite first. 
To explain the near equality of rates of profit · requires that we 
postulate a general rate of profit, such that, this general rate of 
profit falls to all branches of industry, and, assuming uniform 
compositions, to each capital within the branch, regardless of the 
differing compositions of the different branches. 
This is an obvious condition, but how are we to square it off with the 
law of value when different quantities of surplus-value are created on 
top of equal cost-prices. That is to say, when rates of profit in 
different sectors ought theoretically to differ! Marx's answer to this 
question is complex. First, he recognises that the produced surplus-value 
must be redistributed among the different sectors such that, the more 
efficient spheres of higher composition are precisely rewarded for their 
economy of labour with surplus-value produced in another sphere. Spheres 
of average composition realise their ~rod,1ced surplus-value. Thus, all in 
all, each capital realises the average rate of profit, and this is, then, 
the general rate of profit. 
To demonstrate, imagine two capitals in different branches of industry 
with the following compositions: 
A. 80c + 20v + 20s = 120 
B. 20c + 80v + 80s = 180 
The rate of surplus-value is 100% in both cases. The rate of profit of 
Capital A is 20/80+20 = 20%, That of capital B is 80/20+80 = 80%, The 
cost-price of the commodity product to both capitals is the same, but the 
value of the finished commodities is quite different due to the different 
organic compositions of the capitals. In reality we know that both will 
receive a near equal rate of profit. The only apparent way to explain 
that event without altering their cost-prices, is the transfer of 
produced surplus-value from B to A. To equalise the rates of profit 30s 
must be transferred. This transfer would yield the following: 
A. 80c + 20v + 50s = 150 
Rate of Profit = 50% 
B. 20c + 80v + 50s = 150 
Rate of Profit - 50% 
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We also find that the capital of average composition yields its own 
produced surplus-value, hence the average rate of profit is the general 
rate of profit: 
c. SOc + 50v +50s = 150 
Rate of Profit = 50% 
Now the redistribution of surplus-value in the way described is in 
fact incompatible with the law of value, as set out here in Section 
1.(24) It would thus seem a somewhat ad hoc development in the theory, 
because, quite simply, under the new hypothesis commodities would not 
exchange at value, That is, they would not exchange at cost-price plus 
surplus-value, they would exchange in whatever ratio necessary to satisfy 
the new hypothesis, i.e., at that price which would make the rates of 
profit equal. Marx develops this further -
Over the whole of society, a certain amount of capital is invested, 
and a certain amount of surplus-value is created. The part of the 
surplus-value which returns to each capital as profit takes no account of 
the compositions of individual capitals (i,e., of the amounts of surplus 
labour-time involved in their production!), but only of the total amount 
of capital each threw into circulation, Hence, the return to each capital 
is proportional to its mass, which means, conversely, that the return of 
profit to each unit of capital invested is equal. In other words, the 
rate of profit is equalized at the average, and it is this percentage on 
total capital advanced which each capital realizes as profit. 
And further -
From the point of view of the capitalist, the cost-price of the 
commodity(25) is equal to c+v. However, the 'cost' of the commodity from 
the point of view of social production is different. The transformation 
of its "value" into money terms, or price, must include not only the 
cost-price to the capitalist, but also the surplus-value which appears in 
the finished products. At the same time we must take account of the 
redistribution of this surplus-value in the way described above. Hence, 
the price of the commodity is c+v transformed into money terms, which is 
the cost-price, plus the profit of the capitalist. In all k+p, But since 
the share of the total surplus-value of a capital, or p, is equal to the 
average rate of profit on capital advanced, then p must be equal to k x 
p', where p' represents the average rate of profit. What Marx calls the 
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price of production of the commodity, can thus be calculated ask+ (k x 
p'). 
So, Marx's final word on the subject is that commodities do not 
exchange at value, but at prices of production. Is this ad hoccery? If we 
were to ask under what conditions one could legitimately change one's 
theory of the determination of exchange ratios, the only affirmative 
answer would surely be - if the determination of exchange ratios changed 
in reality. This is the claim which Marx makes. 
In Section 1 we saw that once we assumed a certain level of 
development of commodity production the labour theory of value was no 
longer sufficient in itself to determine exchange ratios. This is why 
Marx develops the law of value. In this section we have seen that the law 
of value, which remember was discovered under "simple commodity 
production", is no longer entirely sufficient to determine exchange 
ratios under capitalism. The new force (i.e., in history, and to be 
analysed) which requires auxilary hypotheses to the account of commodity 
production in general is capital itself, The differentia specifica of 
capitalism is accumulation and thus profit. It is the drive to accumulate 
that conditions the equalization of the rate of profit at the average, or 
general rate, and this in turn leads to the exchange of commodities at 
prices of production. Marx writes: 
"Under capitalist production it is not merely a matter of 
obtaining an equal mass of value in another form - be it that 
of money or some other commodity - for a mass of values thrown 
intp circulation in the form of a commodity, but it is rather a 
matter of realising as much surplus-value, or profit, on 
capital advanced for production, as any other ca~ital of the 
same magnitude, or ~.rata to 1ts magn1tude in wh1chever line 
it is applied. It is~erefore, a matter, at least as minimum, 
of sell1n9 the commodities at prices wh1ch yield the average 
profit, 1.e., at prices of production. In this form capital 
becomes consc1ous of itself as a social power in which eve~ 
capitalist part~cipates proportionally to hls share in the 
total soc1al cap1ta1 .•.• 
"Now if the commodities are sold at their values, then, as 
we ~ave' shown, very different rates of profit ar1se in the 
var1ous spheres of production, depending on the different 
organic compositions of the masses of capital invested in them. 
But capital withdraws from the sphere with a low rate of profit 
and invades others, which yield a higher ~rofit. Through this 
incessant outflow and influx, or, br1efly, through its 
distribution amo~ the various spheres, which depends on how 
the rate of profit falls here and rises there, it creates such 
a ratio of supply and demand that the average profit in the 
various spheres of production becomes the same, and values are1 therefore, converted into prices of production. Capita 
succeeds 1n this e~alization, to a greater or lesser degree, 
depending on the extent of capitalist development in the given 
nation."(26) 
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Moreover, notice that when the law of value was annexed to the labour 
theory of value, the latter was not made redundant, for we were still 
dealing with commodity production, where, at a certain level of 
development, the determination of value by labour expresses itself 
through the law of value. In the same way, the law of value does not 
cease to be applicable under capitalist commodity production; capital 
modifies its working precisely because it is profit-seeking. In the 
following table the deviation of prices around value is shown for 
different spheres of production with different compositions on the basis 
of the equalization of the rate of profit and formation of prices of 
production.(27) 
Capitals Surplus-Value Cost-Price Rate of Profit 
Value Price Deviation 
of Price 
c+v s c+v+s k pp p' from Value 
---------------------------------~--------------------------I 80c + 20v 20 90 70 92 22% +2 
II 70c + 30v 30 111 81 103 22% -8 III 60c + 40v 40 131 91 113 22% -18 IV 85c + 15v 15 70 55 77 22% +7 V 95c + 5v 5 20 15 37 22% +17 
Marx writes: "Taken together, the commodities are sold at 2 + 7 + 17 =26 
above, and 8 + 18 = 26 below their value, so that the deviations of price 
from value balance out one another through the uniform distribution of 
surplus-value, or through the addition of the average profit of 22 per 
100 units of advanced capital to the respective cost-prices of the 
commodities I to V."(28) In the first place then, the commodities 
exchange on average at value. The law of value has thus developed with 
the development of capitalist production, and not been abolished. 
Secondly, the law of value will still govern price movements- if the 
socially necessary labour-time for the production of a commodity 
decreases, so will its price fall; and if it increases, so will its price 
rise, only, not in the same proportion.(29) These changes will now be 
mediated through the equalization process. Thus, the law of value 
underlies the formation of prices of production. Marx comments on this 
development, and again points out that it arises from the movement of 
capital into the most profitable sphere, i.e., from what is peculiar to 
capitalism - the lust for profits: 
"The exchange of commodities at their values, or approximately 
at their values, thus requires a much lower stage than their 
exchange at their prices of production, which requires a 
definite level of capitalist development •.•• 
"Apart from the domination of prices and price movement by 
the law of value, it is quite appropriate to regard the values 
of commodities as not only theoretically but also historically 
prius to the prices of production,"(30) 
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Let us look now at how the formation of the general rate of profit, 
and prices of production would be calculated between two branches of 
industry of differing compositions and differing masses. Consider the 
coal-mining and automobile industries for which internal general rates of 
profit have been established, Let these be respectively 70% for coal-
mining, and 30% for automotive concerns. 
produce greater surplus-value to total 
represented as follows: 
Coal 60c + 140v + 140s =340 
Autos 70c + 30v + 30s =130 
In this case, coal-mining must 
capital, and this might be 
p' =70% p' =30% 
Between these very different branches of industry there is no formal 
difficulty in setting the average rate of profit by dividing the total 
capital involvement into the total surplus-value and expressing this as a 
percentage: 170/300 =56.66%, With our formula for prices of production, 
we calculate that the price of production for the coal-mining industry is 
200+200x56,66% =313.33, and that for the automobile industry 
100+100x56.66% =156.66. The results are 1) that the total prices of 
production = 470 = total embodied value, 2) that the coal-mining industry 
has realized less surplus-value (113.33) than it created (140), and, 3) 
that the automobile industry has realized a profit (including a surplus-
profit of 26,66) of 56.66 as against its produced surplus-value of 30. 
Thus, despite the fact that the coal-mining industry gains a much greater 
return than the automobile industry in view of its greater contribution 
to the total social capital, it has in fact released some of its surplus-
value into the automotive branch of industry. 
As for the relative prices of coal and cars, the following applies. 
Suppose that 1% of the advanced capital in coal-mining produces one 
hundred tons of coal. Suppose also that 1% of the capital of the 
automobile industry produces one car. Then the price of production of one 
hundred tons of coal will be 3.133, and this will be expressed in money 
which of course will depend on the relative value of our universal 
equivalent or gold, and the number of monetary units (e.g., dollars) 
which has contingently come to represent each ounce of the precious 
metal. The current value of money is not important, so let us assume at 
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random that in dollar terms the price of production of one hundred tons 
of coal = $31,333.3. The price of production of one car will be 1.566 = 
$15,666.6. The important thing is that even independent of the currency 
in which it is expressed a hundred tons of coal is equal in value to two 
cars. Now we could if we wished add to our value equations similar 
equations for all commodities in all branches of industry. In this case, 
the calculation of the average rate of profit would probably be 
different, but the result and its consequences would be formally 
identical. Finally, we could add the equation for gold production which 
(taking account of the quantity of paper money in circulation), would. 
show the definite money price assigned to a commodity of a given price of 
production, just as we have expressed the equivalent value of coal in 
cars. 
We might sum up in Marx's own words: 
The General rate of profit is, therefore, determined by two 
factors: 1) The organic composition of capitals in the different spheres of production, and thusl the different rates 
of profit in the different spheres. 2) Tne distribution of the 
total social capital in these different spheres, and thus( the 
relative magnitude of the capital invested in each ~rt1cular 
sphere at the particular rate of profit prevailing in it· i.e., 
the relative share of the total social capital absorbed by each 
individual sphere of production.(31) 
So far we have dealt with the formal calculation of the rate of profit 
and its equalization. But what are the real concrete processes which 
necessitate this procedure, i.e., bring about the equalization in 
reality? We have already seen that the root of the equalization of the 
rate of profit inheres in the expansive nature of capital. There are two 
sides to this. There is first the natural purpose of capital to 
accumulate at the highest pressure possible - this is the carrot which 
draws it on. And there is, secondly, the competition which arises with 
the accumulation of capital, which becomes the stick that drives it. 
Within a given sphere, a capital must consistently achieve an average 
rate of profit to remain viable in that sphere. If it does not, it will 
lose out in the battle of competition which is fought through the 
cheapening of commodities by means of raising the organic composition of 
capital. If a capital's reinvestment rate does not allow it to keep 
abreast of the level of development of productive forces in that sphere 
in general, it will be forced into another more backward branch of 
industry. The more advanced capitals, on the other hand, feel no 
inhibitions about not merely achieving an average rate of profit, but 
striving for the maximum possible profit. Because of this they may leap 
33 
ahead in the productivity of labour driving out all those capitals who do 
not soon follow them, and intensifying competition. 
Between branches of industry profit is also the motive, but here a new 
lever to the accumulation of one capital as opposed to others is 
introduced. That is, the mobility of capital between branches.(32) If we 
imagine for a starting point that different branches of industry have 
different organic compositions and therefore different rates of profit, 
the drive to accumulate and the competition it evokes will simultaneously 
attract and compel capital to move from spheres of lower profit to 
spheres of higher profit. In this way branches achieving above average 
rates of profit will attract investment of additional capital. This will 
increase production (supply) above effective demand, prices will fall 
under pressure of competition, and the rate of profit for the branch will 
decline. Branches of industry with below-average rates of profit will 
experience a net outflow of capital into more favourable spheres of 
investment. 
The approximation of the level of production to the level of demand in 
this way will always be over-compensatory since it is unregulated except 
by the lust of all capitals for profit. Thus, where rates of profit fall 
marginally below the average capital evacuates the branch of industry 
allowing it to rise again, and lowering the rate of profit of the 
favourable sphere which it now invades. This new situation will have the 
same effect, and condition the reverse movement. While the general rate 
of profit is never constant over all firms or spheres, the rate of profit 
tends to equalize in this way converting values into prices of 
production. 
The process of 'equalization' presupposes inequality. Looked at from 
the point of view of the system, equalization of the rate of profit would 
at first seem to embody only one motive force -that toward equality, 
which corresponds with the subjective profit motive. In the light of 
recurrent momentary unevenness, we must conclude that the impetus for 
equalization also reconstitutes the original inequality. This is indeed 
the case. In the unco-ordinated and competitive search for better 
profits, capital moves from one sphere to another in the correct 
proportions only by accident. It is far more likely that, in a given 
period, too little capital will be transferred, in which case the 
transfer will continue, or too much capital will be transferred, and then 
equalization must start anew in another direction. The process of 
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equalization of the rate of profit does not conclude with equilibrium, 
but carries on beyond this point to over-compensation. It must therefore 
be regarded as a tendency and never a permanent reality. 
2.5 THE LAW OF THE TENDENCY OF THE RATE OF PROFIT TO FALL 
In Part 3 of Volume III of Capital, Marx tackles another problem 
presented by the real course of capitalist development. The reader will 
recall from Section 3 of the present chapter that we concluded that an 
increase in the productivity of labour across society would result in an 
increase in the rate of surplus-value generally. That is, it would 
decrease the labour-time necessary for the worker to produce his material 
life, and so increase the surplus labour-time as a proportion of the 
working day. In Section 4 we looked at the situation between capitals, 
where the drive to accumulate, and the competition it evokes, tend to 
equalize the rate of profit in the redistribution of surplus-value, and 
this subsequently spurs competition on. The general upshot is that each 
capital strives to economize labour by increasing productivity. Thus, the 
general rate of surplus-value should increase. However, be this as it 
may, there is still under capitalism a tendency for the rate of profit to 
fall, and this was never so apparent as in the early competitive phase of 
the capitalist mode of production in which Marx lived. Marx was not the 
first person to attempt an analysis of the equalization of the rate of 
profit, or of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. "The economists 
perceived the phenomenon and cudgelled their brains in torturous attempts 
to interpret it."(33) Thus, Marx had the problem of explaining the 
empirical trend in a consistent way; his was not the claim that the real 
tendency followed from the presentation of the law. 
We represent the rate of profit thus: s/c+v. What conditions would be 
required for it to fall? Clearly, s must diminish relative to c+v. 
However, we have seen that the rapid development of productive forces 
under capitalism would tend to increase the rate of surplus-value and so 
the rate of profit would tend to rise. To explain the falling rate of 
profit, then, we must postulate an internally related pressure in the 
opposite direction. That is, not a counter-tendency which could reverse 
the trend of rising rates of profit, but an 'organically' related 
pressure, such that, in the very act of raising productivity the apparent 
"tendency of the rate of profit to rise" is pre-empted. This internal 
relation must also be consistent with the theory so far. Does such a 
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pressure exist? Marx's answer is yes. Simultaneously with the raising of 
labour productivity, and the pressure for the extension of surplus 
labour-time, the organic composition of capital rises. This increases the 
constant (c) as opposed to the variable capital (v). Thus, v shrinks, 
and certeris parabus, so does s. At the same time c is growing, Hence, to 
explain the falling rate of profit the increase in labour productivity 
must involve a greater increase in the organic composition of capital 
than the etiologically equivalent increase in the rate of surplus-value. 
Because both these pressures are entirely internal to capital, Marx 
generalizes this explanation into the law of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. "This does not mean to say that the rate of profit may 
not fall temporarily for other reasons. But proceeding from the nature of 
capitalist production, it is thereby proved a logical necessity that in 
its development the general average rate of surplus-value [i.e,, not 
extraordinary rates causing temporary falls in the rate of profit] 
must express itself in a falling general rate of profit,"(34) 
Now, the transition from the explanation of the trend of the falling 
rate of profit to the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall 
requires only this: that we assume, as is the case in any branch of 
science, that the long-run trend of the rate of profit to fall during 
Marx's life-time was not accidental, or due to extraneous causes, Even 
given this assumption, however, Marx did not have to analytically derive 
the particular law that he did, He might have found another explanation 
of the falling rate of profit. The important thing is that since he did 
arrive at this law, it was thenceforth incumbent upon all who followed 
him in this step to consistently explain anomalies to the law where they 
arose and thus "save" its validity. The question of how long the law of 
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall could be regarded as a real 
law of motion of the capitalist system turns exclusively on this 
endeavour, and I discuss this topic in the next chapter. 
There has, however, been debate on this topic in the history of 
marxism. The debate arises from the following conception of the problem:-
We represent the rate of profit thus: s/c+v. For the rate of profit to 
fall s must diminish relative to c+v. On the one hand, however, the rapid 
development of productive forces under capitalism would tend to increase 
the rate of surplus-value and thus, holding the organic composition of 
capital (c/v) constant, the rate of profit will rise. On the other hand, 
the means through which this increase in productivity is achieved is 
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accompanied by a rising organic composition of capital and thus, holding 
the rate of surplus-value (s/v) constant, the rate of profit will fall. 
Hence, the whole issue turns upon the relative movements of the organic 
composition of capital and the rate of surplus-value, insofar as these 
are internally related.(35) 
From this point of view P.M. Sweezy writes: "If both the organic 
composition of capital and the rate of surplus-value are assumed 
variable, as we think they should be, then the direction in which the 
rate of profit will change becomes indeterminate. All we can say is that 
the rate of profit will fall if the percentage increase in the rate of 
surplus-value is less than the percentage decrease in the proportion of 
variable to total capital,"(36) Sweezy is of course correct in what he 
says, but he wants the theory to do too much work and history to do none. 
The whole point is that the rate of profit was falling when Marx 
presented the law, and subsequent scholars who wish to be Marxists must 
account for the failures and distortions of the law to the point they 
feel it can be defended. If it can no longer be defended Marx was wrong, 
and we need another explanation of the falling rate of profit in the 
early competitive phase of capitalism, and another whole complex of 
theory to account for subsequent trends. 
Fine and Harris write: ",.,if c/v rises and s/v does not rise 
sufficiently, the rate of profit will fall. For Marx, however, it appears 
in places that there was no "if": the law of TRPF appears as an 
inevitable aspect of accumulation,"(37) Here again the problem seems to 
be conceived as one of logically prescribing history given the 
indeterminacy Sweezy pointed out, rather than as one of explaining a 
falling rate of profit on the basis of a rising rate of surplus-value. In 
the latter case Marx points out that there is only one important variable 
underdetermined - the organic composition of capital. The unsubstantiated 
assumption that Fine and Harris point to, i.e., the rate of surplus-value 
is held constant, is merely a means of simplifying and analysis given the 
fact that to explain the falling rate of profit on the basis of ~ rising 
rate of surplus-value within the Marxian system, requires precisely that 
the rise in the organic composition of capital outstrips the rise in the 
rate of surplus-value. The attribution of the falling rate of profit to a 




Gillman we have come full circle. He forgets that both 
trends in the rate of profit and the rate of surplus-value were 
historically determinate for Marx and formed the basis of the derivation 
of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. According to 
Gillman, we have yet to look at history for the first time: "Marx did not 
have the facts to test his law of the falling tendency of the rate of 
profit. They first had to emerge from generations of capitalist 
production. But now we have a considerable accumulation of such facts, 
and it seems high time that, with Francis Bacon, we counted the horse's 
teeth instead of continuing to speculate on the number."(38) Marx, in 
fact, counted the horses teeth and explained why it had that number. The 
only source of concern to J.M. Gillman could be if the number of teeth of 
the horse changes. That would require further explanation. But if we 
assume from the start that both the number of teeth the horse is said to 
have, and the explanation of why it should have that imaginary number, 
are purely speculative endeavours, then it is obvious that everything is 
indeterminate. However, Gillman's basis for inferring that the 
postulation of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall was speculative 
is that Marx could not collect data from the future, yet, one assumes 
this holds good for all of us. On the other hand, his argument that 
present day (1958) America is a better historical society for the 
interpretation of data is also suspect. Kuzo Uno has argued, on Marxist 
(rather than Baconian) grounds, that the formation of a consciousness 
which accurately reflected the essential nature of capitalist production 
was far more likely in places which developed through the stages of 
feudalism, primitive accumulation and then capitalism, and at the time 
when capitalism was here forced to "purify" itself of elements of these 
pre-capitalist modes of production,(39) 
The three views presented here address the problem that on an purely 
abstract basis there are no grounds to predict the relation of the rate 
of surplus-value and the organic composition of capital. Trends in the 
rate of profit are therefore indeterminate. They ignore the fact that 
Marx begins from the basis of capitalist production, where trends in the 
rate of profit, the rate of surplus-value and the organic composition of 
capital were all determined, and where from their inter-related movements 
the extent of their relative changes could be deduced. 
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through an accidental state of supply and demand." (Marx (1978) Capital. 
Vol.!. p,178.) Even if particular commodities do not sell at value the 
se+ler can still make a profit so long as they sell above their cost-prlce, 
16, See quotation in Note 14 above. ",,,the production of relative 
surPlus-value revolutionizes out and out the technical processes of 
labour, and the composition of society" - Marx. 
17. Marx, K (1978) Capital. Vol.I. Qg.cit, p.574. 
18. On the other hand, it is quite ~ossible in reality that the value 
com~osition of capital w1ll change wh1le the technical composition of 
cap1tal remains constant, for example, where the competit1on of the 
working class for jobs in an area or t1me of high unemployment enables 
the capitalist to buy labour-power below value. In this case, the same 
number of working hours is required to work on the same means of 
production, hence the change in tne value composition does not mirror a 
change in the technical composition and so the organic composition of 
capital remains unchanged. 
th 19 •. Capitalist cpmpetitioD ista naturaltaspectdof capitalism, where ere 1s on ~he one hand a drlve o accumula e an on tne other, unco-
ordinated production. The second condition aliows disarticulation of one 
productive unit from another, which diminishes the probability of 
production closely matching soc1al demand. The first conaition means 1) 
that capitals will expand as fast as possible once disarticulated and 
this naturally opposes them one to another with regard to available 
market demand, and 2) capitals will crowd into the sphere which is, in 
the first place, most profitable. In this sphere overproduction will 
likely result. Competition follows from these conditions given that a 
commodity can be sola at a price below its value, yet above its cost-
price, In this way individual capitals attempt to mitigate social 
overproduction partially, "The fundamental law of capitalist competition, 
which political economy had not hitherto grasped, the law which regulates 
the general rate of profit and the so-called prices of production 
determined by it, rests, as we shall later see, on this difference 
between the value and the cost-price of commodities~ and on the resulting 
possibility of selling a commodity at a profit unaer its value," (Marx (1977) Cap1tal. Vol,III p,37) 
20. "The battle of competition is fought by cheapening of commodities. 
The cheapness of commodities depends, ceteris paribus, on the 
productiveness of labour, and this aga1n on the scale of production. 
Therefore the larger capitals beat the smaller. It will further be 
remembered that, with the development of the capitalist mode of 
production, there is an increase in the minimum amount of individual 
capital necessary to carry on business under its normal conditions. The 
smaller capitals, therefore, crowd into spheres of production which 
Modern Industry has only sporadically or incompletely got hold of. Here 
competition rages in direct proportion to the number •••• It always ends in 
the ruin of many small capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into the 
hands of the conquerors, partly vanish,"(Marx (1978) capital. Vol.I. pp,586-7.) 
21. "The premise in this entire analysis is naturally that b
0
y 
speaking of the composition or turnover of a capital in a certa1n line f 
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production we always mean the average normal proportions of capital 
1nvested in this sphere, and generally the average 1n the total capital 
emP-loyed in that sp,here, and not the accidental differences of the 
inaiv1dual capitals.' (Marx (1977) Capital. Vol.III. p.144.) 
22. I assume here that the surplus-value extracted can be directly 
translated into profit, i.e. 1 that the mass of surplus-value = the mass of profit. It is not direct y relevant at this stage, as P.M Sweezy 
suggests, that we are abstracting from the division of the profit among 
cap1tals, e.g., from property rents 1 for we are currently aealing with the division of surplus-value to arr1ve at profits ~ se. Only after 
Part 3 of Volume III of Capital, does Marx deal With ~e division of 
profits. On the other hand1 1n 1dentifying c+v as total capital advanced, I am identifying this tota with the cap1tal actually used up, and this 
is indeed a s1mplifying assumption. For further discussion see P.M. 
Sweezy: The Theory Q[ Capitalist Development, Chapter IV, Section 6. 
23. Marx, K (1977) Capital. Vol.III Moscow,Progress. p.153. 
24. And as set out by Marx in Part 1 of Volume I of Capital. 
25. By 'commodity' here is meant the total commodity product of a 
production period in which all of c is used up. 
26. Marx (1977) QQ.cit pp.195-6. 
27. Ibid p.157 
28. Ibid p.157 
29. This is holding other determinants like supply and demand 
constant. See Marx on this- capital. Vol.III. p.177. 
30. Marx, K (1977) QQ.cit p.177. 
31. Ibid p.163. 
23. "The incessant equalization of constant divergences is 
accomplished so much the more guickly 1) the more mobile the capital, 
i.e., the more easily it can fie shifted from one sphere to another and 
from one place to another: 2) the more quickly labour-power can be 
transferred from one sphere to another and from one production locality 
to another. The first condition implies complete freedom of trade within 
a society and the removal of all monopolies with the exception of natural 
ones,.,[and]. ,the development of the credit system •••• The second 
cond1t1on impl1es the abol1tion of all laws preventing the labourers from 
transferring from one sphere of production to another: indifference of 
the labourer to the nature of his labour: the greatest possible reduction 
of labour in all spheres of production to simple labour: the elimination 
of all vocational prejudices among labours, and •.• a subjugation of the 
labourer to the capitalist mode of production."(Marx (1977) Capital. 
Vol.III. p.196.) 
33. Marx, K (1977) QQ.cit. p.213. 
34. ibid p.213.- square brackets added. 
35, The relative movements of the rate of surplus-value and the 
organlC composition of capital is only important here 1nsofar as ahey are 
internally related because the quest1on 1s not whether the ten ency-of 
the rate of prof1t to fall finds expression at any given time, i.e., 
whether the rate of profit actually does fall, but whether such a 
tendency exists. A nufuber of incidental semi-autonomous circumstances 
could stop the tendency of the rate of profit to fall being expressed in 
an empir1cal trend of falling profit rates. This has no bearing on 
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whether the tendency actually exists. Only an internally related cause 
coyld give us good reason to suspect that the tendency as such does not 
CX1St, 
36. Sweezy, P.M. (1970) The Theory of Capitalist Development NY, Modern Reader Paperbacks. p.102.- -
37. Fine, B & Harris, L (1979) Rereading Capital. 
Press. p.61. 
London,MacMillan 
38. Gillman J.M. (1958) The Falling Rate of Profit NY,Cameron 
Associates. p.31 
39. See K. Uno: Principles of Political Economt. A summary of this 
argument can be found 1n the 'translator's Introduc ion' to Same. 
Chapter III 
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND ITS CAUSES 
Marx called the tendency of the rate of profit to fall a law, because 
he believed it followed of necessity from the nature of capitalist 
production. However, in reality the dwarfing of labour by capital does 
not mechanically correspond to the drastic crash of the rate of profit. 
Here is another anomaly to the theory which must be explained, and 
thereby transformed into corroborating evidence. In Section 1 of this 
chapter I review some counteracting influences which, according to Marx, 
"cross and annul" the full force of the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall. 
In the following sections a further anomaly is discussed. Assuming 
that the tendency for the rate of profit to fall is ultimately the 
dominating tendency vis-a-vis the counter-acting influences, one would 
expect that given a broad enough time scale the rate of profit would in 
fact fall to a very low level eventually. Yet, this is not the case in 
reality. How is it then that the rate of profit may at times decline, but 
at other times display long-run increases, as in the boom after the 
Second World War? This historical equivocality seems to disconfirm a 
secular tendency for the rate of profit to fall. How are we to make this 
consistent with the theory so far? 
3.1 THE TENDENCY OF THE RATE OF PROFIT TO FALL AND ITS COUNTERACTING TNFLUENCES - - -- - - -- - -
If we consider the enormous development of the productive forces of social labour in the last 30 years alone as compared 
with all the preceding periods; if we consider~ in particular
1 the enormous mass of fixed capital, aside trom the actua 
machine~, which goes into social production as a whole, then 
the diff1culty which has hitherto troubled the economist, 
namely to explain the falling rate of profit
1 
9ives place to 
its opposite 1 namely to explain why this fa 1 1s not greater 
and more rap1d. There must be some counteracting influences at 
work~ which cross and annul the effect of the general law, and 
whicn give it merely the characteristic of a tendency for 
which reason we have referred to the fall of the genera1 rate 
of profit as a tendency to fall.(1) 
The tendency of the rate of profit to fall is totally internal to 
capital. It thus presents itself as a logical necessity. We saw that a 
rising rate of surplus-value which emanates naturally from the rising 
productivity of labour is insufficient to pre-empt this tendency. But the 
decline of the rate of profit is not as great as we would expect. So 
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there must be counter-acting influences which are, on the one hand, 
natural under capitalism, but on the other, not internal to capital. 
Marx identifies the following four counter-acting influences to the 
tendency: the increasing intensity of exploitation, the production of 
relative surplus population, the cheapening of elements of constant 
capital, and the extension of foreign trade. The first two depend on the 
progressive domination of capital over labour under capitalism; and the 
final two mechanisms depend on the opposition and domination of certain 
capitals over others. 
1. Increasing intensity of exploitation. The intensity of 
exploitation is increased primarily by those means we saw were now 
secondary in capitalist production - increasing intensity of 
labour which yields greater relative surplus-value, and 
lengthening of the working day, which yields more absolute 
surplus-value. The lengthening of the working day in advanced 
countries now commonly takes the form of over-time. The extension 
of the working period also includes Saturday work, which extends 
the working week. The introduction of 'second-earners' and 
children into the work force may also be subsumed here insofar as 
it extends the working hours of the household. In the case of 
over-time the capitalist is now compelled to pay extra for the 
extra surplus-value, and the intricate regulations governing this 
show its importance to him. In backward countries few such 
regulations exist, and here capital achieves higher absolute rates 
of surplus-value. The intensity of labour is increased with 
production line speed-ups, time in motion studies, and diminution 
of staffing levels relative to levels of production.(2) An 
increasing intensity of exploitation, Ceteris Paribus, increases 
the rate of surplus-value, and in this way it counters the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall. 
2. Relative surplus population. This stems directly from the rising 
organic composition of capital, where the increase in the variable 
capital in the process of expansion does not correspond to a 
sufficient increase in labourers employed to accommodate the total 
working population. This situation may have two related effects, 
both of which work through the mechanism of competition within the 
working class for jobs(3): a) the price of labour-power of the 
reserve-army of labour will fall, favouring the rate of surplus-
value in those capitals which (thenceforth) employ them; b) the 
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'over-supply' of labour will depress its market-price across the 
board, below its value. 
3. Cheapening of elements of constant capital. According to Marx, as 
the productivity of labour rises, the mass of the total product 
increases at a faster rate than the value of the improved means of 
production, Thus the value of the constant capital required for 
the production of a given commodity shrinks absolutely. This may 
raise the rate of profit while the rate of surplus-value is 
constant, but only so long as a capital stays ahead in the 
productivity of labour, and not if the increase in productivity is 
general. Otherwise, the market-value will be equalized with the 
individual value of commodities, 
4, Foreign trade. Marx writes: "Since foreign trade partly cheapens 
the elements of constant capital, and partly the necessaries of 
life for which the variable capital is exchanged, it tends to 
raise the rate of profit by increasing the rate of surplus-value 
and lowering the value of constant capital. It generally acts in 
this way by allowing an expansion of the scale of production."(4) 
The gist of this statement is not completely clear to the present 
writer because, on the one hand, it is difficult to conceive of 
the mere fact of exchange making goods cheaper, and on the other, 
if this works through the resulting expansion of production, 
itself consequent on either expanding imports or expanding 
markets, it is difficult to see how the effect could be general. 
The following interpretation is offered tentatively, The advantage 
of foreign trade must be distributed unevenly, and the most 
important units between which this distribution would seem to take 
place are capitals and countries. In other words, foreign trade 
has rewards for some capitals and countries at the expense of 
others. Firstly, it is clear that the expan~ion of trade into non-
capitalist regions extends the market and opportunities for the 
realization of profits. In addition this could cheapen raw 
materials and food bought in backward regions. Secondly, trade 
between advanced countries is bound to be an advantage if a local 
capital can buy cheaper imported capital goods, and its labour-
army can buy cheaper means of subsistence, And what applies in one 
direction also applies in the other. However, at the same time, 
capitals in both countries who produce a dearer good are bound to 
suffer. But when trade is expanding and the dearer goods of each 
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country are gradually being substituted for foreign imports the 
general rate of profit in both countries would tend to rise as 
uncompetitive local capitals were driven out. Thirdly, if a 
significant imbalance of trade arises, then there must come a 
point where the national capital of one country cannot be employed 
profitably in productive enterprise to a large extent. In this 
case changes in the general rate of profit would probably favour 
one country against the other. 
This is not an exhaustive list of the counter-acting influences to the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall. I do not think that Marx intended 
these to be taken literally as THE factors which reverse the trend of 
falling profit. There are many other factors which take effect at some 
times and not others, depending on specific conditions. It is appropriate 
I think to regard these as examples of some important factors only, But, 
even given the many counter-acting influences to the law, we would expect 
it to be expressed as a falling trend in the long-run. Instead we see 
both long-run trends of the falling rate of profit and long-run trends of 
its rise, Thus, on the one hand, capitalist development would appear to 
proceed independently of Marx's law, and on the other, it seems to be 
governed by accidental and indeterminate fortuities which the theory 
cannot account for. The restoration of the law to its former status 
requires that we explain, or make determinate, any apparent fortuities on 
a capitalist basis - that is, on the basis of Marx's theory of capital. 
In the following sections, then, I discuss the ways in which the total 
capital remains profitable at the expense of individual capitals, 
sectors, regions and countries. Where this type of advantage is involved, 
we term 'uneven development'. 
3.2 THE RISE OF MONOPOLY CAPITAL 
Despite its effects on the general rate of profit the primary means by 
which an individual capital may increase its rate of profit is to re-
invest an increasing proportion of its profit in constant capital. This 
follows from the view, developed in the previous chapter, that each 
capital competes, not immediately with its own workers for a share of the 
value produced, but with other capitals for a share of the surplus-value 
produced. 
The leading capitals stay ahead, or even leap ahead, in the 
introduction of labour-saving machinery, In a particular branch of 
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industry, this means that the cost-price of the single commodity falls 
further below its market-value, These capitals thus gain more leverage in 
the battle of competition. If the commodity sells at its social, or 
market-value, the capital has also realized an extra share of the 
surplus-value - which is consistent with the formation of prices of 
production. Insofar as the surplus-value is redistributed in this way, 
Marx says the capitals of higher composition receive a surplus-profit.(~) 
Within a branch of industry, surplus-profit comes to a capital to the 
extent that the individual value of its produced commodity is below the 
market-value of that type of commodity, The market-value of a commodity 
corresponds to the socially necessary labour-time for its production, and 
so it is the average of the individual values of all commodities of that 
type brought to market. A capital realizes a surplus-profit because it 
requires less labour-time than is socially necessary in the production of 
its unit-product, which, however, realizes the average or social value. 
This capital therefore produces at an above-average rate of profit. 
Since some capitals produce at an above-average rate of profit, others 
must produce at below average rates, Within a branch of industry, 
however, competition tends to equalize these rates of profit, first by 
motivating capitals to pull back the leaders by introducing better means 
of production, etc,, and secondly, by forcing uncompetitive capitals out 
of that line of production. In this way, big capitals get bigger, and 
small capitals are destroyed or wallow in backward spheres of production. 
Being in a sphere of generally lower composition would not be so bad 
if not for the second axis in the attainment of surplus-profits. On the 
face of it, a branch of production with a lower composition should have a 
greater return of surplus-value, But as we saw in the last chapter, this 
surplus-value is redistributed between spheres over time, in the 
equalization of the rate of profit. In this way, surplus-profits are 
achieved both by-capital, and by-sphere,(6) This second axis again 
contributes to the growth of leading capitals (i.e., those labour-
efficient capitals achieving an above-average rate of profit), and the 
underdevelopment of backward capitals - especially those in backward 
spheres, 
The early phase of the capitalist mode of production, often called the 
competitive phase of capitalism, was characterized by competition 
precisely because there were few effective restrictions on the movement 
of capital into this sphere, or that, so capitals crowded in here or 
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there, wherever the best rate of profit was most likely. It follows that 
the equalization of the rate of profit between spheres was very rapid, 
and thus the pressure to stay ahead in labour productivity was very 
great. Yet, also because of these conditions, the capitals which won out 
in the battle of competition grew at an ever-increasing rate. The control 
of the greater portion of capital became concentrated in a smaller and 
smaller number of large firms. Smaller capitals were driven into backward 
spheres where " ••. competition rages in direct proportion to the number, 
and in inverse proportion to the magnitudes, of the antagonistic 
capitals,"(7) 
The concentration of capital produced a change of quantity into 
quality. That is, share size in the first place allowed the transition of 
the leading capitals from freely competitive capitals into monopoly 
capitals. 'Monopoly' means effective restrictions on the entry of other 
capital into a particular branch of industry. This means, firstly, that 
the market-price of the commodity produced here is independent of the law 
of value, because the lack of competition removes the imperative of 
selling at the social value of the commodity, or at a competitive price. 
In formal terms, monopolies are in the privileged postion of being able 
to raise their organic compositions while other capitals in that sphere 
(effectively none) retain low compositions. Secondly, the monopoly 
capital does not enter into the equalization of the rate of profit, and 
hence the market-price is independent of the price of production which 
would otherwise exist for its commodity. Thus, a monopoly rate of profit 
exists along-side the general rate of profit. The monopoly may increase 
the productivity of its labour-army while its rate of profit need not 
decline with the general rate. Standing outside competition and the 
equalization of the general rate of profit, monopolies are not restricted 
in their level of profit or surplus-profit as other capitals are. 
The concentration of capital thus conditioned a break, not in the 
fundamental structure of capitalism - the relation of wage-labour and 
capital - but in its secondary structures, the relation of capitals and 
sectors to each other. According to Lenin, the full development of 
competitive capital in Europe was realized in the 1860s. After the crisis 
of 1873 there followed a period of depression in which the growth of 
monopolies was consciously encouraged by their benefactors. There was a 
short-lived boom in 1889, after which the rate of profit rose only slowly 
until 1900 because of the stagnation of world trade. This was a 
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continuous period of concentration of capital. From 1900-03 there was a 
slump, which eliminated many smaller capitals which had continued to 
compete with larger firms, and monopolies emerged dominant from this 
crisis.(8) The change in the structure of capital was both cause and 
effect of this crisis. On the one hand, the concentration of capital was 
a natural consequence of competitive capitalism, and signified a falling 
rate of profit. On the other hand, we have the beginnings of a new form 
of capital, monopoly capital, which escapes the falling rate of profit 
and thus remains viable at the expense of other capitals. 
3.3 THE TRANSITION TO IMPERIALISM, IMPERIALISM AND UNEQUAL EXCHANGE 
Half a century ago, when Marx was writing Capital, free 
competition appeared to the overwhelming major1ty of economists 
to be a "natural law". Official science tned, by a conspiracy 
of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a theoretical ana 
historical analysis of capitalism had proved that free 
competition gives rise to the concentration ot pror'luction, 
which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to 
monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact. Economists are 
writ1ng mountains of books in which they describe the diverse 
manifestations of monopoly~ and continue in chorus that 
"Marxism is refuted". But Iacts are stubborn things, as the 
English proverb says, and they have to be reckoned with, 
whether we like it or not. The facts show that differences 
between capitalist countries, e.g., in the matter of protection 
free trade, only give rise to 1nsignificant variations in the 
form of monopolies or in the moment of their appearance: and 
that the rise of monopolies1 as the result of the concentration of production~ is a genera and fundamental law of the present 
stage of the aevelopment of capitalism.(9) 
The battle of competition produces a monopoly when only one or a few 
capitals are left standing. The same force which drives other capital out 
of a branch of industry prevents new capital from entering it, that is, 
the scale and efficiency of production. Since capital cannot flow into 
this sphere, the rate of profit may remain high and is not subject to the 
downward pressure of competition. This is equivalent to saying that the 
rate of profit of the monopoly sector does not participate in the 
formation of the 'general' rate of profit. There is another side to this 
of course. That is that the monopoly also circumvents the outflow of 
capital from a given branch of industry. This is done by adjusting 
prices inversely with demand. Under these conditions the monopolist has 
developed some autonomy from the grasping profit system. He can regulate 
production, productive capacity and prices. To a certain extent, then, 
the monopolist can determine his own rate of profit. 
The extent to which a monopoly can continue to accumulate at a given 
rate, i.e., without a declining rate of profit leading to equalization of 
the monopoly and competitive rates of profit, is subject to definite 
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limitations. As we have seen, the total surplus-value produced and 
redistributed as profit cannot be greater than the total surplus-value 
produced. Hence, monopoly surplus-profits can only arise from two 
sources; 1) from the share of the surplus-value produced by the 
competitive sector, 2) from an increase in the social rate of surplus-
value. An increase in the social rate of surplus-value will hasten 
accumulation of capital, and this in itself will mean a rising organic 
composition of capital which should, in the long run, push down the rate 
of profit. However, perhaps this decline can be wholly absorbed by the 
competitive sector. Ernest Mandel makes an interesting demonstration in 
this connection. Where Mandel refers to production in 'Department I', he 
means that grouping of firms which produce means of production. 
'Department II' refers to the department of the economy producing 
consumer goods. (We will meet this distinction again in chapter 4.) A 
'cycle' refers to one circuit of capital from the advance of money, and 
its division into means of production and labour-power, to its return as 
expanded value and re-investment in commodity capital. The value 
compositions of the capital increase according to this re-investment. 
Mandel writes: "For the sake of simplicity we shall start from the 
hypothesis that Department I is entirely composed of monopolies, while 
free competition still predominates in the whole of Department II. Let us 
suppose, further, that production initially has the following value-
structure, with the rate of surplus-value constant at 100% and an 
increasing· organic composition of capital: 
I 4,000c + 1,500v + 1,500s = 7,000 I 
II : 2,000c + 1,200v + 1,200s = 4,400 II 
Under conditions of free competition, the equalization of the rate of 
profit between the two sectors would result in the following prices of 
production in successive cycles: 
First Cycle 
I:4,000c + 1,500v + 1,750 profit= 7,205 means of production 
II:2,000c + 1,200v + 995 profit = 4,195 means of consumption 
Second Cycle 
I:4,905c + 1,800v + 2,060 profit= 8,765 means of production 
II:2,300c + 1,400v + 1,140 profit = 4,840 means of consumption 
Third Cycle 
I:6,005c + 2,160v + 2,450profit = 10,615 means of production 
II:2,760c + 1,600v + 1,310profit = 5,670 means of consumption 
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Now if, instead of an equalization of the rate of profit to 31% in the 
first cycle, 30.7% in the second cycle, 30% in the third cycle, and so 
on, Department I sought to secure a steady monopoly rate of 40%, then the 
redistribution of values would be structured as follows: 
First Cycle 
I:4,000c + 1,500v + 1,500 profit = 7,700 means of production 
II:2,000c + 1,200v + 500 profit = 3,700 means of consumption 
Second Cycle 
I:5,350c + 1,850v + 2,880profit = 10,080 means of production 
II:2,350c + 1,250v + 220 profit = 3,820 means of consumption 
Third Cycle 
I:7,610c + 2,070v + 3370 profit = 13,050 means of production 
II:2,460c + 1,300v + 0 profit- 3,760 means of consumption 
Already in the third cycle it would become impossible to achieve the 
monopoly rate of 40%. Even if the non-monopolized sector made no profit 
at all -i.e., if production there carne to a halt- the monopolized 
sector's rate of profit would have dropped to 3,370/9,680, or to below 
35%. "(10) 
Mandel goes on to show that if we assume a more modest monopoly rate 
of profit of 35% this will become unattainable in the sixth cycle, even 
if the profit of the competitive sector falls to zero. He concludes that 
even with an increase in the rate of surplus-value, " •.• the impossibility 
of maintaining the monopoly rate of profit would be postponed until the 
seventh, eighth or ninth cycle depending on the rhythm of increase •••. 
The higher the monopoly profit over the average profit, the larger the 
monopolized sector, the faster must the monopoly profit drop to the level 
of the average social profit operative at the start, or decline together 
with it. The.increase in the rate of surplus-value can merely retard 
this law, not abolish it." (11) 
Although the individual monopoly is objectively more secure then the 
individual firm in the competitive sector it has still not freed itself 
completely from the law of value. It has no interest, on the one hand, in 
over-capitalising its sector, for this would be tantamount to the entry 
of capital in the branch of industry, and would mean that it had 
subjected itself to a falling rate of profit. On the other hand, it has 
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no interest in absorbing other, competitive sectors, which would be 
tantamount to the outflow of capital and would lead a tendency for the 
formation of a general rate of profit by eating away at the portion of 
the total social surplus-value available for redistribution produced by 
other, competitive capitals at lower profit rates. This is the objective 
basis of the extensive subcontracting system associated with the 
automobile and electronics industries, for instance, in Japan. 
Up to a certain point in the development of monopoly capitalism this 
was not always clear. Centralization of capital reached massive 
proportions in the early 1900s and characteristically took the form of 
combination. The centralization of capital refers to the annexing of 
already existing capitals rather than the expansion of an enterprise 
through accumulation and concentration. Combination refers to a 
particular type of centralization in which vertically or horizontally (in 
the same branch of industry) associated firms are integrated or merged. 
The centralization of capital appeared in the push to the emergence of 
monopoly capital, but centralization has not played the same historical 
role as concentration. Once established, monopoly capitalism began to 
assert its qualitative divergence from its forerunner, competitive 
capitalism, and centralization played a fundamental role in this. It 
produced branches of industry where almost the entire productive capital 
was drawn into the sphere of control, and put at the disposal, of a few 
central executive bodies. 
Profit returning to monopoly sectors could not be accumulated beyond a 
certain point, nor could it be excessively invested in other spheres 
without undermining the advantage of its own monopoly. It became clear 
that these returns had nowhere to go if not completely out of the 
realm in which the rate of profit equalized, and that meant out of the 
country. This is in fact what they did, beginning in the 1890s. The 
export of capital from the industrial centres sharply accelerated in the 
period between the turn of the century and the First World War, and it 
soon overtook the export of consumer goods. This not only signified the 
expansion of capitalism on a world scale, but also changes in the 
secondary structures of capital itself. Lenin provides the following data 
drawn from numerous sources(12): 
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Capital Invested Abroad (000,000,000 francs) 
Year Great Britain France Germany 
1862 3.6 
1872 . . . . 15.0 10(1869) 1882 . . . . . 22.0 15(1880) ? 
1893 • 42.0 20(1890) ~ 
1902 • . 62.0 27-37 12:5 
1914 • . . . . 75-100 60 44.0 
The export of capital to backward countries produced, and required, a 
highly developed and mobile finance capital. Credit systems had already 
developed within the most developed countries, culminating in banks and 
joint stock companies. Monopolies had no 'natural' interest in investing 
in these, since they (the monopolies) endeavoured to curtail the flow of 
funds in and out of their sector as far as was possible. At the same 
time, they might just as well have invested productively in a competitive 
sector rather than working through a bank and receiving a long-run rate 
of interest that is necessarily lower than the average rate of profit. A 
major mechanism for centralization was (and is) the takeover of the joint 
stock company. But this occurs predominantly within the parameters 
already mentioned - insofar as it does not involve the outflow of capital 
from a monopoly to a competitive sector. The finance capital which arose 
in association with the export of capital is quite distinct from the 
preceding forms of credit and finance. The money involved came precisely 
from the excess profits of monopoly sectors and was used for the 
development of industry in foreign, primarily backward, countries, 
especially those which had already been colonized. The interests of 
financial institutions which developed in this way were closely 
intertwined with monopolies, and, just as with productive monopolies, 
they did not contravene the imperatives of their own existence. In fact, 
by denying funds to selected firms they sought to strengthen their own 
position through the consolidation of the joint interests of their 
productive and financial 'branches'. 
Just as we found that the 'over-ripening' of competitive capitalism 
led to massive concentration and monopoly, we find that the distension of 
monopoly capital resulted in imperialism. This is a doubly 'ingenious' 
solution to the problems of monopoly (we shall see in the next section 
that it was by no means perfect); on the one hand, 
capital, and on the other, it finds a new source, 
it dissipates excess 
not only of profits, 
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but of surplus-profits. While monopoly capital per se draws its surplus-
profits at the expense of other sectors and capitals, under imperialism 
two further sources of surplus-profits are added to these - other 
countries and other regions. Thus, competitive capitalism leads to uneven 
development of firms(13), some grow large and some small, and this leads 
to monopoly. Monopoly furthers the uneven development of firms and, then, 
sectors and leads to imperialism. With imperialism we move to a world 
scale, with the addition to this list of uneven development of countries 
and regions of the globe. 
The conditions under which capital was exported represent the basic 
characteristics of imperialism. These conditions, and thus imperialism 
itself, were partially engineered by the monopolists, signifying 
simultaneously their continued autonomy from the underlying self-
destructive logic of capital, and their total domination by its self-
expansive tendencies. The first condition for the export of capital is 
some degree of political influence in the host country. Primarily, this 
is required to ensure that the local population, with its own class or 
stratification system can be fitted into, and kept within a capitalist 
structure. That is, for example, that the land market works according to 
the laws of supply and demand, that the unpropertied classes respect 
private property and are aware of their own need to work to gain it, that 
industrial interests are not spoiled by war or invasion, and so on. 
Insofar as the national governments of advanced countries played uncle to 
capital as~ whole, they rushed to secure territories for its expansion. 
Until about 1875 'colonization' signified no more than the term would 
suggest, and had no necessary connection with imperialism. However, 
around that time the colonial policies of major powers underwent a 
turnaround. In a fairly specific period the major powers attempted to 
consolidate their grasp of outlying areas as it became clear that this 
would assist national development as a whole. The Crimean War was 
fought before this period on behalf of competitive commercial capital 
(i.e., over entry to markets), and the First World War was fought over 
the redistribution of territories, not over the original division of the 
world. In the intervening period, large parts of the world were claimed 
by nation-states as the exclusive domains of investment of particular 
national monopoly capitals. It is interesting to note that the United 
States had gained independence well before this consolidation and was not 
subject to it, and that Britain, which was slow to erect trade barriers, 
began to decline as a world power.(14) 
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Secondly, where independent governments existed, inter-monopoly 
competition could persist in given branches of production, and this was 
disadvantageous as it could annul the barriers to further competition. 
Therefore, international cartels were often formed which divided the 
'free' world up amongst themselves into mutually agreed territories. 
Lenin cites the case of the agreement between the General Electric 
Company of the United States and General Electric (A.E.G.) of Germany. 
These two trusts were effectively the only two companies producing for 
their particular market, since no smaller company operated completely 
independently of them. In 1907 these companies divided up the world as 
follows: The American company got the U.S. and Canada, the German 
company got Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the Balkans,(15) Thenceforth, major competition ceased. 
Thirdly, there are the economic facts of the matter, and these are by 
far the most important, for without them the political and inter-
imperialist arrangements would have no reason for being. Capital migrated 
to backward countries with the richest potential for the production of 
raw materials. Land in these areas had to be cheap and of a suitable 
quality for growing cotton or containing deposits of copper, for 
instance, Land was generally cheap, but where it was not, the political 
arm of imperialism stepped in. An ample work-force was desirable, as this 
depressed low wages still further, below the value of labour-power. A 
lack of capital was also desirable, and this followed by definition in 
the first place, and from the efforts of colonial governments thereafter. 
At the same time as the production of raw materials was drawn into the 
capitalist sphere, the capital which utilized these raw materials in the 
advanced countries was also expanding, and the former was both cause and 
effect of this expansion. Raw materials were previously produced in 
backward countries, but not on this scale, and not according to 
capitalist principles. They had been produced in a pre-capitalist 
framework, which was accompanied by primitive accumulation. The 
importance of primitive accumulation in the emergence of an indigenous 
bourgeoisie and a level of development of the productive forces which 
facilitates accelerated accumulation cannot be over-emphasised. Primitive 
accumulation precedes, and forms the historical basis of, capitalist 
production, 
Imperialism systematically advantages the advanced and disadvantages 
the backward party, First, the capitalist as opposed to non-capitalist 
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production of raw materials uses labour more efficiently, and thus 
cheapens the price of raw materials in the industrial centres. This 
tends to retard the decline of the rate of profit 'at home'. Secondly, 
because of the formation of a general rate of profit in the particular 
branch of production, the more labour efficient production of the 
capitalistically produced good meant that the profit was greater than the 
produced surplus-value per unit-product. In other words, the surplus-
value realized in the redistribution of surplus-value according to prices 
of production favoured the capitalist sectors. This extra realized 
surplus-value is none other than the type of surplus-profit we have 
already described. Thirdly, this type of surplus-profit extraction is 
disastrous for the national production of the backward country. It did 
not mean that the country's capitalists received sluggish returns; it 
meant that the more vulnerable primitive accumulation which forms the 
historical boardwalk of capital was destroyed! Hence, indigenous capital 
hardly developed at all. Characteristically imperialist firms tried to 
drive their advantage home by monopolizing industry in the host country. 
In the light of national liberation struggles, imperialist states attempt 
to counter-balance this with loans, foreign aid and so on. However, such 
aid is not a solution but merely defers the problem. Ultimately, it is 
tranferred to the monopolies as surplus-profit. Thus, the 'developing' 
nation becomes totally dependent on the imperialist metropole, and its 
continued 'development' depends on its usefulness as a cog in the 
imperialist profit machine. 
This is the situation of foreign capital within the host country, but 
there is yet another way in which the advanced countries are advantaged 
by imperialism. There is still the differential between the labour-unit 
productivity in the backward country as a whole, including the foreign 
concerns, and the advanced country. This differential is the secret of 
the unequal exchange which occurs between less developed and more 
developed countries. Unequal exchange essentially refers to the fact that 
a product which took more man-hours to produce is exchangeable only in 
the same ratio as the same product of an industrial country which took 
less man-hours to produce. Put another way, if a backward country exports 
a commodity package which embodies one million man-hours of labour, it 
may receive in exchange for this commodities which took 300,000 hours of 
labour to produce. 
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Now this unequal exchange of labour-time was undoubtedly more 
pronounced under pre-capitalist production, but with this difference, 
that the whole of the population is employed productively. Under these 
conditions the backward country would be able to establish indigenous 
capital accumulation, or a combination of indigenous and foreign capital 
accumulation provided it could muster sufficient political and military 
potential to erect trade barriers to prevent the importation of capital. 
This is what occurred in the United States at the time of the Declaration 
of Independence, When imperialism sets in, trade barriers are also 
erected, but these are to protect foreign investment. Because capitalist 
production is nationally more efficient, it throws out all its 
competitors, but employs only a fraction of them as wage-labour, i.e., 
precisely because it economizes labour. The excess population must turn 
to only marginally productive activities. From this point on, the 
backward country cannot utilize its own natural resources because of lack 
of capital and may even be forced to sell them to foreign capital: it 
cannot achieve an average rate of profit on the small capital that does 
survive because this is invested in competitive, primarily service, 
sectors: and it cannot utilize its full work-force because of the 
deformed proportion of capital, technology and labour-power. This 
constant bane of underemployment has further costs to the state in that, 
at a certain stage of impoverishment, the exploitative nature of 
imperialism becomes very clear. There is a tendency toward 1) national 
liberation, and 2) worker movements. These cannot be bought off with all 
the modern concessions to the working class, because they are not 
employed, but marginal, and so must be repressed, as happened in the 
poorer, backward countries like those of South East Asia. Who pays for 
this is always a contentious point. The imperialist nation would prefer 
that a government be formed by a national bourgeoisie which, in line with 
the interests of capital generally, provides the conditions of 
reproduction itself. As far as is possible, the granting of independence 
to colonies proceeds to the extent that this condition is met. 
While the unequal exchange of labour-time became less marked under 
imperialism (i.e., the productivity of backward countries as a whole rose 
with the introduction of capitalist production), imperialism itself pre-
empts the possibility of this ever being totally abolished because it 
blocks the development of national capital. Moreover, the imperialist 
nation attempts to protect its foreign investments by disenabling the 
entry of capital foreign to it into 'its' backward country, Objectively, 
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this is an attempt to prevent the equalization of the rate of profit 
internationally. If any country could export its excess capital to the 
location with the highest rate of profit, that profit rate would soon be 
driven down by competition. This investment and competition would 
continue to raise the efficiency of production and lower the rate of 
profit until it was equally profitable to invest 'at home'. Under these 
conditions a developing country would in fact develop very rapidly to the 
average level. 
While the foreign capital trades more for less labour with the 
imperialist countries, it also trades less for more labour when it buys 
services or raw materials from local competitive capital, in accordance 
with productivity differentials. This situation is exacerbated, 
moreover, because infrastructural and para-military costs are met by 
taxes on those least able to pay. This follows primarily from the 
governmental imperative to retain capital investments in the country 
(where its own potential for the development of capital has been 
destroyed), which means offering a 'profitable milieu'. Under 
imperialism, then, foreign investment yields the highest long-run rate of 
profit of all invested capital, but this is a disadvantage to the 
recipient country. 
3.4 LATE CAPITALISM, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE STATE 
As soon as capitalists accomodate both the falling rate of profit and 
the law of value (i.e., maintain their rate of profit through withdrawal 
from the equalization of the rate of profit) with the formation of 
monopolies, capitalism can no longer be analysed using only the most 
general laws of capitalist accumulation. Monopolies further the 
accumulation of capital precisely by dodging the self-destructive logic 
inherent in the general formula of capital, under conditions of 
generalized commodity production. What can be said about monopoly is that 
it accommodates but does not invalidate the laws of capitalist 
accumulation. This is a structural proposition, which has no hard and 
fast conjunctural correspondant (i.e., empirical test at any given time). 
But, we have seen that monopoly was not the last word in the struggle 
of capital with its nihilistic tendencies. Out of it rose imperialism. In 
making a general description of imperialism, we could not go far, for 
structurally imperialist capital is ultimately identical to all other 
capital but conjuncturally it takes a different form and exhibits 
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manifold but superficial deviations from logically derived course of 
capitalism in general. We were interested primarily in its typical source 
of surplus-profits - unequal exchange. 
The competitive phase of capitalism lasted until about the last 
quarter of the nineteeth century. The stage of imperialism started at 
about the turn of the century when monopoly capital had emerged fully 
from the competitive phase. In this section I discuss the latest phase 
of capitalism, which can be dated from about the beginning of the Second 
World War. Ernest Mandel has dubbed this phase 'Late Capitalism', and 
this is how I shall refer to it. 
The major reason that exported capital was invested in the production 
of raw materials as opposed to other branches of production is that the 
price of raw materials had been rising both absolutely and as a 
proportion of the cost-price of commodities, prior to 1900. The absolute 
price rise was felt first. It resulted from an increased demand which 
followed the expansion of capitalist, raw material-consuming industries 
in developed countries as compared to the slower extension of pre-
capitalist-type, raw material-producing sectors in backward countries; 
and from the relative diminution in the value of gold with the 
exploitation of the Transvaal and the application of the cyanide process 
(1849, 1890). These trends evoked an extension and improvement of the 
means of communication and transport (especially steam ships and railways 
from 1848). However, the relative increase in the price of raw materials 
was probably more important. 
With the drive to accumulate, a bi-valent tendency arose in industrial 
nations. On the one hand, the organic composition of capital rose 
unevenly, and leading capitals tended to move further ahead, on the other 
hand, the competition which arose out of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to equalize, tended to equalize the organic composition of capital 
across sectors. Thus, while the level of development of productive forces 
remained uneven, the average organic composition of capital rose. This 
meant that the labour saved by new technology was greater than the extra 
cost of that technology (relative decrease in the value of means of 
production), and that the labour-power now required was cheaper 
(cheapening of means of subsistence). Now at the same time, the labour 
efficiency of backward, raw material producers was rising, if at all, 
only slowly (i.e., was decreasing relatively), and this meant that with 
the increase in the number of commodities produced per unit of capital 
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(means of production and labour-power), the value component of raw 
material in each commodity increased, Moreover, with the general 
diminution in the value of commodities in the industrial centres, a 
greater quantity of them had to be exchanged with backward regions at a 
given exchange rate. This meant that the price of raw material relative 
to the prices of other factors of production increased. 
The trend of rising raw-material prices, and the greater raw-material 
component in each commodity, turned back on the accumulation of capital 
and limited this. For every increase in the organic composition of 
capital, there was then an ever smaller increase in labour efficiency 
because of the rising composition of raw material to other circulating 
and fixed constant capital. 
In other words, while advances in the technological component of 
capital were exponentially cumulative, this was only arithmetically 
expressed in the increase of labour efficiency as a whole, because this 
included an independent variable which was relatively constant - the raw 
material value, or low level of productivity in a non-capitalist sphere. 
Thus, the rate of technological innovation in the industrial centres was 
decreasingly reflected in the rates of profit of leading capitals, and 
this can ultimately be traced to the slow advances in labour productivity 
in raw materials production, which fell outside the capitalist system. 
Accordingly, the solution which capital found was to draw the production 
of raw materials further and further into the capitalist sphere. 
Monopoly capital made full use of imperialist conditions, so was able 
to locate in backward countries. Not only did the price of raw materials 
to metropolitan capital decline under imperialism, but surplus-profits 
arose. However, from about the period of World War One, the price of raw 
materials began to rise again! At first sight, it may seem that, since 
the law of value is temporarily inoperative between countries - which is 
to indicate no more than the possibility of unequal exchange - unequal 
exchange may be advantageous to both countries. Since the capital in the 
backward country has a higher national rate of profit, based on a much 
higher labour component, could it not accumulate at a much quicker rate 
because of, not despite, unequal exchange? In other words, if a backward 
country has a rate of profit of 60% and an advanced country a rate of 
10%, the exchange of the products of their respective capitals- say, two 
types of constant capital - represents to one a 60% re-investment rate 
and to the other a 10% re-investment rate, since, looked at in terms of 
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their own national level of productivity, that is precisely what they 
would be, Hence, the foreign capital should accumulate at a faster rate 
and quickly over take its metropolitan partner. This, however, did not 
happen. 
Given the low cost of reproducing labour-power in the backward 
countries, it was in the first place more profitable to increase the 
extent and labour-intensity of production rather than capitalize it. This 
kept the productivity of labour low, and so the labour-unit productivity 
ratio varied with the increasing organic composition of capital in the 
metropoles. Hence, with rapid increases in the productivity of labour in 
the industrial centres, the relative price of raw materials began to rise 
as soon as the level of technology which accompanied the flow of capital 
into raw materials production began to stabilize, 
At this time in the history of capitalism the depression of the 1930s 
occurred. Beginning in the '30s and accelerating in the '40s a major 
overhaul in the plant of outlying raw-materials producers took place, as 
well as a restructuring of the organization of labour, and this was 
conditioned by the rising price of raw materials,(16) This had profound 
consequences, for the greater the investment necessary to extract raw 
materials from developing countries, the less attractive it became, 
because the incentive of low costs for the reproduction of labour-power 
diminished in the same proportion as the labour component of production 
diminished. As the prerequisite level of investment in fixed constant 
and variable capital in developing countries increased, it drew nearer to 
the hitherto 'uneconomic' costs of extracting raw materials closer to 
home and of investing in expensive machinery to produce synthetic raw 
materials in the metropoles. Much of the research for this latter 
enterprise was a spin-off of military applications in two World Wars and 
the Cold War. 
In the period of late capitalism, we have seen a continuous 
technological revolution (since about 1940), This is a product of two 
economic facts. With proportionally less investment in foreign countries, 
an important source of surplus-profit has dwindled, and with the 
reorientation of surplus-profit extraction around levels of technology 
'in one country', competition now reasserts itself. This competition has 
changed in form, and it is more apparent than ever before that it is, by 
nature, competition for surplus-value. There is no question now of 
competitive capital flowing en masse into monopoly sectors. Such an 
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undertaking is far too great. Rather, the monopoly and competitive 
sectors now compete stridently, as evidenced by the growing emphasis on 
marketing. Moreover, monopolies cannot now avoid competing with each 
other, as evidenced by the rapid and far-reaching advances in the levels 
of technology they employ to maintain above-average rates of profit. 
A major problem for monopolies now becomes over-production of their 
commodities and momentary over-capacity of fixed-constant capital. Late 
capitalism has at least one inherent counteracting influence here, and 
that is the increasing need for investment in unproductive spheres, 
especially science and technological research and development. The 
increasing cost of staying ahead in the development of labour-efficiency 
means, however, that the level of development of productive forces must 
race forward with leaps and bounds if it is to justify itself, and it is 
imperative for reproduction that it does. Another major counteracting 
influence to the distended growth of capital is in the search for new 
markets and market-shares. capital must find markets, and thus it 
simultaneously attempts to 1) open up new export markets in countries not 
drawn completely into the capitalist world economy, 2) compete for 
existing foreign markets with available or new products, 3) create new 
products and thus new demand, 4) expand its share of the domestic market 
with new or existing products. This activity has the concomitant, and 
again happily unproductive, requirement of expanded marketing divisions 
and marketing budgets. A third important counteracting influence, also 
perpetrated under competitive conditions, is the expansion of capital 
investment into (primarily service) sectors not traditionally 
capitalized, for example, ready-to-eat meals, food and drink dispensing 
machines, professional sport, entertainment (including video games, 
movies, hotels, television), security services, tourism, appliance 
repairs, retail 'chains', commercial art, education, science and medical 
health care. 
This competitive struggle tends to equalize these monopoly firms 
insofar as their ability to extract a certain return is concerned. And, 
of course, it evens out their potential at below their desired operating 
profit and level of 9rowth. This is the situation of the world economy at 
present. It is not the place here to speculate on the possibility of the 
emergence of yet another source of surplus-profits, but what can be said 
is that the engineering of continued reproduction, of profits in the last 
instance, has increasingly passed from the hands of the individual 
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capitalist firm with its plan to increase its organic composition, into 
the hands of the state. The state tends to act in the interests of the 
national capital as ~ whole and so in its economic programming tries to 
expand, not any single capital, but capitalism. Its economic programmes 
thus .over-ride the individual imperatives of competition. Most 
governments use Keynesian policies in these programmes. However, while 
these are of definite assistance in the short-term, they can never 
resolve the problems of late capitalism, but only defer them. The 
following are examples: 
1. The state can assist in the development of technology, but this 
must be restricted to types of technology which assist realization 
on export markets or make the 'nation' more competitive 
internationally. Innovations for the domestic market are left to 
the traditional inventor, as the recent television series 
'Production Line' showed. The New Zealand government operates such 
a scheme through the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (D.S.I.R.), and agricultural colleges. 
2. The export market may be encouraged with government assistance. 
For example, the Meat Marketing Board. 
3. The domestic market may be stimulated through the nationalization 
of industries and public works (these may be carried out by 
government departments, or better still, contracted out). The idea 
is to put more money in the consumer's pocket, but this must not 
be done at the expense of (in competition with) existing capital. 
Hence, in New Zealand where there is an absence of Department I 
industries (production of producer goods), heavy industrial 
projects are sought to stimulate demand where a government 
department or a foreign contractor is involved, and other schemes, 
e.g., construction, are sub-contracted to New Zealand firms. 
The expansion of capital into service sectors is not generally 
encouraged by governments because of its internally competitive nature. 
While not discouraging this practice, e.g., under the Commercial 
Practices Act, it is generally left up to economic factors. The New 
Zealand government in fact encourages the internal sectoral status quo. 
It provides, for example, direct subvention of the small New Zealand 
farmer's losses with Supplementary Minimum Prices (S.M.P's) for his main 
products. Moreover, we have recently seen moves (which may be interpreted 
as advantageous to the capitalist economy as a whole) to provide 
incentives to found new small businesses, or extend existing ones, which 
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involve, on the one hand, reducing the value of labour-power, and on the 
other, lowering interest rates. The strategy of lowering the value of 
labour-power must be seen in the context of 'Think Big'. If the 
government can lower the price of production of goods through wage cuts 
whilst simultaneously stimulating demand by employing workers in a non-
competitive sector, rates of profit may be maintained. In the most 
advanced countries, this is done with a 'permanent arms economy', among 
other things, which also has advantageous technological spin-offs. In New 
Zealand it is done with large-scale energy projects, which depend on an 
inordinate level of credit receipt, or 'overseas borrowing', in times of 
recession, 
A certain level of 'overseas borrowing' is sustainable by a government 
provided its excess money requirements are short-term. At this stage 
also, it is in the interests of foreign capital to support less developed 
countries, for this supports demand for their exports. At a certain 
stage, however, 'overseas borrowing' is transformed into 'debt 
servicing', or borrowing to repay previous loans. Now, debt 
servicing, apart from requiring some delicate negotiation, is, in itself, 
no real problem, The problem arises when there is no end to the round of 
borrowing and repaying. At that point the capitalist economy reveals 
itself as an aimless game of 'money-go-round', which is incompatible with 
the social nature of mankind - it leads to lower standards of living, 
unnecessary ailments, malnutrition and war, 
Is there an end to the current round of borrowing? The government's 
answer is that the 'Think Big' energy projects will attract investment 
which will lead a national up-turn. That argument, as far as it goes, 
seems quite plausible, The flaw is that investment in energy-intensive 
industries on a big scale will require the prior curtailment of the so-
called world-economic recession. When this will happen, and why, is by no 
means clear. In reality, the government is staving off a crisis in New 
Zealand society and at the same time (in the same act) preparing to make 
the most of the postulated new world economic boom. 
Finally, we must go back to the underdeveloped countries and see what 
has happened there in the period of late capitalism. When the proportion 
of capital invested in the production of raw materials in developing 
countries declined, their overall relative level of development declined 
even more rapidly. They were now thrown into a competitive situation with 
metropolitan capital in which they fell progressively behind because of 
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the advances in the level of technology in the metropoles, the 
proliferation of substitutable finished goods using other raw materials 
(plastics, vinyl, synthetic fabric) and the increased amount of 
exploration nearer to the metropoles (e.g., North Sea oil). The general 
lack of indigenous capital to float the economy is the final contributing 
factor which keeps these nations dependent on industrial countries. The 
situation of poverty and dependence leads to political unrest on the one 
hand, and a constant round of debt servicing on the other. Decades of the 
artificial maintenance of national exchange rates to contain social 
unrest and achieve party political goals, moreover, culminates, at a 
certain stage, in massive devaluations and galloping inflation. 
The tendency toward dependence is in fact a major counteracting 
influence to a spiralling downward trend in the economies of backward 
countries. Metropolitan countries send aid to defer this falling 
tendency of the national economy and, ultimately, of the nation as a 
whole. Such 'aid' is of course repayable (theoretically) and often has 
such conditions as reciprocal trade agreements, etc. It is therefore a 
politically and economically rational extension of capitalist logic. 
The second counteracting influence has its roots, not in the nature of 
the state under late capitalism, but in its other major feature -
technological innovation. The permanent technological revolution in late 
capitalism constantly increases the rapidity with which the level of 
development of productive forces rises. But it has another side: it 
increases the rapidity with which a given set of means of production are 
outdated. Thus, the moral/historical life-time of the means of production 
grows ever shorter. At a certain point in the development of this trend, 
depending on the branch of industry and the sector, the turnover time of 
fixed capital becomes so short that it is profitable to export outdated 
technology to underdeveloped regions and thus complete its valorization 
under conditions of (by now) super-low costs of the reproduction of 
labour-power. In the short-term this is a boost to underdeveloped 
national economies, and much encouraged by the state here. In fact, in 
certain sectors some countries court this type of foreign capital with 
many concessions including 'free trade zones', to achieve temporary 
relief such as 'export led growth'. 
Capital which has returned to underdeveloped regions in the last two 
decades or so is multinational capital. It gains its multinational 
character partly from the way in which it valorizes its out-dated fixed 
65 
constant capital. It we ask what sort of technology it exports and to 
where, we will find that this is also predictable. Generally, the capital 
must be invested in a line of production and a technology compatible with 
the advantages of labour-intensive processes such as manufacture, 
machinofacture, and assembly and packaging. Secondly, it must locate in a 
situation of coexistent poverty and stability. Under conditions of 
poverty, a dictatorial government and a large local para-military 
presence is often required to ensure political stability, Thirdly, it is 
more profitable to locate a capital concentration as close as possible to 
its potential market and to its raw material supply, 
This is the objective basis of the 'New International Division of 
Labour', which Frobel et al. had discerned by 1965.(17) As a counter-
tendency to spiralling collapse, it appears differentially. In some 
places it has clearly contributed to the continuing 'development of 
underdevelopment', such as in Latin America. In other places it seems to 
be working. In a string of East Asian countries - Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Phillipines, South Korea, Taiwan, and others - growth under the 
influence of foreign multinational capital has been very rapid, The 
advantages to these nations, independent of multinational capital, 
however, have been mainly infrastructural and military. Multinational 
capital is still mobile, and could conceivably find more profitable 
places to invest. Such a move would have profound ramifications. Tho 
military and infrastructural advantages are not a resuit of international 
investment but rather a ploy to attract more of it. They go hand in hand 
with low company taxes, which means that the costs of producing the 
magnet are taken up by foreign 'aid'. Foreign debt must be serviced, 
which means that disproportionately more investment must be attracted, 
which requires foreign 'aid', and so it goes. Far from the complete 
withdrawal of capital, a significant deceleration of investment would see 
these countries trying to pull themselves up by their own boot straps, 
Moreover, under conditions of underemployment and a necessarily low price 
of labour-power, more pressure has been put on the military as investment 
has slowed with the recessions of the 1970s. The very small ruling elite 
which such an economy can support comes under increasing pressure from an 
impoverished population if it cannot promise improvements. At that stage, 
the loyalty of the military is also in question, for their platform for 
repression is also medium-run economic and social improvement, and hence 
'outside' military support is often sought. 
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3.5 UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOURCES OF SUPPLUS-PROFIT 
The primary aim in the foregoing analysis is to expose the answers to 
the question contained in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter: 
why is it that under conditions of the rapid rise in the level of 
development of productive forces the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall did not cause a total collapse of the system long ago? We found that 
there were some counteracting influences to the tendency logically 
entailed in the system. In addition, we looked historically at the 
development of the capitalist mode of production and found three sources 
of surplus-profit which assist the advance of the leading edge of capital 
against the falling rate of profit in more or less discrete historical 
phases. The important aspect of these historical phases was not, however, 
their time and place, but their particular conjunctures of capitalist 
production and circulation turning upon, or developing dynamically from, 
the nature of capital itself. 
Under competitive capitalism the extraction of surplus-profits 
asserted itself as the conquest of certain capitals by others. But it was 
here difficult for any capital to retain a long-term advantage in any 
particular sphere as other capitals moved in quickly to equalize the rate 
of profit. However, those capitals that moved quickly enough were able to 
grow at a fast rate, and this produced the 'simple-monopoly' which is 
identical to the massive concentration of competitive capital. Monopoly 
capital could thenceforth extract surplus-profits by sector, which caused 
uneven development here. Classical imperialism compounded this with 
unequal exchange between countries and regions of the globe, and thus 
underdeveloped already backward countries. Under late capitalism the 
extraction of surplus-profits combines all these mechanisms. The leading 
capitals now dominate other capitals, sectors and countries by combining 
advanced technology, massive concentration, mobility and political 
influence. 
From this analysis, which does no more than follow the historical 
logic of capital, we can conclude that the uneven development of firms, 
sectors, 
system. 
countries and regions is an inherent law of the capitalist 
It is, in the first place, an expression of the attempts of each 
individual capital to maximize its profits, but it becomes a mechanism by 
which the leading capitals may draw the system on to new heights 
precisely because the bad effects of capitalism can be put on to the 
shoulders of less advanced regions, countries and sectors, and their 
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labour-armies. When we set out to analyze a country like New Zealand, it 
is important to remember the schema of uneven development. Not only can 
we periodize the history of New Zealand and understand it in terms of the 
dominant type of capital or capital relations existing in each period. 
When dealing with a specific period, we can also understand New Zealand's 
national-international articulations in terms of national, imperialist 
and multi-national capital, and its economic development in terms of 
sectors and more and less advanced firms. Moreover, in the late 
capitalist period we must understand the role of the state and its 
national-international articulations as a consequence of a certain level 
and quality of uneven development and a given nation's place in the 
schema thereof. 
Our survey of history has revealed successive periods of the 
capitalist mode of production. Our treatment of the late-capitalist 
period shows that in moving through history we are simultaneously moving 
away from the pure structural analysis of the laws of the mode of 
production as such, and toward a conjunctural analysis - or rather, the 
recognition of their unity as well as their contradistinction. This 
logical movement is not removed from but reflects the historical 
development of capitalism. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
1. Marx, K. (1977) Capital Vol.III. Moscow,Progress. p.232. 
2. "Everything that promotes the production of relative su~lus-value by mere improvement in methods, as in agriculture, without altering the 
magnitude of the invested capital, has the same effect."(Marx (1977) 
Capital. Vol.III. p.233.) 
3. "The competition thus created between the labourers allows the 
capitalist to beat down the price of labour, whilst the falling price of 
labour allows him, on the other hand1 to screw up still further the working-time."(Marx (1978) Capital. Vo .I. p.S13.) 
4. Marx (1977) Capital. Vol.III. Moscow,Progress. p.237. 
5. "If the ordinary demand is satisfied by the supply of commodities 
of average value hence of value midway between the two extremes, then the 
commodit1es whose individual value is below the market-value realize an 
extra surplus-value, or surplus-profit, while those, whose individual 
value exceeds the market-value, are unable to realize a portion of the 
surplus-value contained in them." (Marx (1977) Capital. Vol.III. p.178.) 
6. "The special productivity of labour in any ~icular sphere, or in 
any individual enterprise in this sphere, is of interest only to those 
capitalists who are directly engaged in it, since it enables that 
particular s~here, vis-a-vis the total cap1tal, or that individual 
capitalisth v1s-a-vis h1s sphere, to make an extra profit." (Marx (1977) 
Capital. vol.III. p.198.) 
7. Marx (1978) Capital. Vol.!. Moscow,Progress. p.S78. 
8. Lenin, V.I. 'Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism' In 
elected Works (1977) Moscow,Progress. pp.180-81. 
9. Ibid. p.180 
10. Mandel, E. (1980) Late Capitalism London,Verso. pp.531-3. 
11. Ibid. pp.S34-S. 
12. Lenin, V.I. QQ cit. p.213. 
13. I am neglecting here the disparities which arise naturally on a 
capitalist basis between regions within a count~, especial!¥ between 
town and country. The latter is a function of mass product1on which 
concentrated the capital and the workers at the one location, i.e., in 
cities. 
14. See Andrew Gamble's a~ument in his Britain in Decline. Chpt 2 -
" •• the ve~ success of British industrializat1on and the policy of free 
trade created the first great world capitalist boom during the 1850s and 
1860s. Aided by exports of capital and machine tools from Britain, 
several other states began to industrialize extremely rapidly •••. The 
industrialization of the world economy, and the resulting development of 
the accumulation of capital on a world scale, meant that the predominance 
of British naval and commercial power came under threat .•.• To protect 
themselves from British competition, every strong nation-state seeking to 
industrialize protected its industries w1th high tariffs, designed to 
shut out British goods, whilst denouncing free trade as a hypocritical 
policy designed to promote British industry at the expense of the rest of 
the World .••. The course of the hundred years decline was shaped by two 
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momentous choices, The first was the continued adherence to free trade 
and to the inst1tutions of the liberal world order long after the 
conditions which had originally recommended it had disappeared," (Gamble (1981) Britain in Decline. London,MacMillan. pp,52,53,58,) 
15. Lenin, V.I. QQ cit p.218. 
16. Mandel, E. QQ cit p.62. 
17. Frobel et al. 'The Tendency Toward the New International Division 
of Labour.' Revrew; Vol.I. No.1A SummerL 1977. -"Our main thesis is 
that roughly speaking in the 1~60's, ~he new set of conditions for 
capital expansion and accumulation became effectively operative, 
resulting f1rst of all in industrial relocation of manufacturing, in the 
beginning mainly in labour-intensive production processes (or in 
processes where labour-intensive techniques can effectively be 
substituted for more capital-intensive ones)," 
Chapter IV 
REPRODUCTION AND REVERSAL 
In the second chapter we saw how the individual capital is influenced 
by the working of the law of value on a social scale and how the 
individual movements of capital thus governed, when aggregated, produced 
at the social level the opposite of their desired effect, i.e., a 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall. We saw in the third chapter how 
the leading capitals counter this overall tendency and the effect this 
has had in the history of capitalism. In this chapter I wish to pursue 
the theme of the intertwining of the movements of individual capitals and 
the motion of capital (development of capitalism) on the total social 
level, as they present themselves to us - each, that is, as both cause 
and effect of the other. We turn here to the possibility of crisis. With 
a certain body of theory behind us, this possibility is tranformed from a 
formal into a real possibility to the extent that the preceding analysis 
reflects the true nature of capitalist society. The argument begins in 
the first section with the conditions under which the reproduction of 
capital might conceivably follow a smooth and uninterrupted path. In 
Section 2 I look at some real contingencies under capitalism which divert 
it from this path. In the final section I look at the situation of 
capital specifically in New Zealand, and the intervention of the state 
which its reproduction necessitates. New Zealand represents a special 
case. New Zealand's production is concentrated largely in the consumer 
goods sector, and therefore its surplus -value must be realized in the 
export trade, because the consumption of workers employed here 
corresponds mostly with the variable part of capital. This is mentioned 
here so that the reader may begin to appreciate the ways in which the 
reproduction schema presented in the first section, and the sources of 
disruption to it, would apply to this country. While the general schema 
of reproduction, and it flaws, throw light on the causes of capitalist 
crisis, the "specialness" of the New Zealand case explains the aspects of 
crisis peculiar to it, and the particular role of the state in New 
Zealand. However, these particulars are wholly subsumable under the 
general sources of crisis, which in turn define appropriate government 




THE POSSIBILITY OF REPRODUCTION OF THE TOTAL SOCIAL CAPITAL: A TWO DEPARTMENT MODEL- -- -- - -
We saw ealier the metamorphoses which capital must complete in order 
to remain as capital or expand its value, or reproduce. The metamorphoses 
were represented thus: 
M - C ••• P ••• C' - M' 
I used this formula as an abstract model for the turnover of capital in 
each individual firm and for capital in qenP.ral. It is clear that a 
person must first have money to turn himself into a capitalist. The money 
must be used to purchase means of production and labour-power. The latter 
must be set to work on the former in a labour-process for a sufficient 
period of time such that the commodity-product has a greater value than 
the original money advanced or the commodities it bought. Finally, the 
commodity-product must be sold on the market, and the surplus-value thus 
realized. In considering the actual history of the mode of production, we 
quickly left this level of abstraction behind us, but even in its 
abstract form the model entails all the possible causes of disruption to 
the extended reproduction of the firm. For instance, if a person is a 
worker or if his primitive accumulation is destroyed, he will never have 
the money to invest capitalistically in the first place. If there is a 
shortage of means of production- e.g., raw material or labour-power-
he may not conclude the circuit. Likewise if the production process is 
disrupted by class struggle, and also if he cannot sell his products, or 
if he can sell them only at a below-average rate of profit. For whatever 
concrete reasons these circumstances may come about, the result is the 
same. 
Now this formula at the same time explains everything and nothing. I 
have explained that the individual firm which is failing cannot, for 
instance, sell its commodities to realize a profit. However, in reality 
this is mere tautology - all capitalist crises involve the inability of 
firms to sell their goods, or to sell them at an adequate price. We must 
ask, what are the concrete reasons for the realization crisis, (e.g., 
lack of effective demand) and what are their causes? The question which 
is perhaps the most difficult is: why should there be any such problems 
at all? To answer these questions we must set out the requirements for 
the smooth reproduction of capital, and then look at the real historical 
conditions which it develops, and which must pre-empt uninterupted 
growth. 
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Marx's reproduction schema is set out in the twenty-first chapter of 
Capital, Volume two. In this abstract approximation to reality, Marx 
conceptualizes the capitalist mode of production in two departments. 
Department I represents the branches of production which produce means of 
production, and Department II, the branches which produce consumer goods. 
A two-department model is by no means a logical requisite. Marx might 
have had a department for, say, gold production, or for the production of 
means of production of means of production. In fact, there is a third 
department with which Marx sometimes worked, and that is the department 
which produces luxury goods. This department is of particular interest in 
respect of the increasing mass of capital involved in the production of 
'means of destruction', which paradoxically fall under the heading of 
luxury items.(1) For my purposes, however, the two-department model will 
be adequate to locate the basic combination of value and use-value 
structures of the total commodity package within which growth can occur. 
As an analytical tool, the two-department model corresponds to the 
structure of all societies (which is to say, essentially, modes of 
production) insofar as they require means of production and labour-power 
to reproduce themselves, and it corresponds to the specific structure of 
the capitalist mode of production insofar as these are commodified, and 
we treat them as such. Thus, the departmental value composition of 
society is represented in the following form: 
Ic + Iv + Is 
IIc + IIv + IIs 
For reproduction of the total social capital to occur, it is necessary 
that exchanges between the two departments balance each other in value 
terms. This implies that the specific use-values of the commodities 
produced in both departments correspond to their mutual needs. Hence, the 
following equation must be satisfied(2): 
Iv + Is/x (unproductively consumed by capitalists) 
+ Is/y (accumulated in the form of variable capital) 
= IIc + IIs/z (accumulated in the form of constant capital) 
(Where x,y and z are nominal divisors indicating no more than that the 
surplus-value is divided, or goes into different 'funds'.) The unstated 
value terms either partake only in simple reproduction (that is, merely 
reproduce themselves) or need not flow between departments. They are: 
1. Ic This merely replenishes itself through exchanges within the 
department. 
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2. Is/p This is accumulated as constant capital through exchanges 
within the department. 
3. IIv This is paid in wages to the workers of Department II and 
comes back to capital through the purchase of consumer goods to 
replenish the variable capital. 
4. IIs/q Accumulated as variable capital in Department II. 
5, IIs/r Unproductively consumed by Department II capitalists. 
(Again, p,q and r merely represent a further division of the surplus-
value,)(3) 
Workers and capitalists of Department I 
Department II to the total value of Iv + 
buy consumer goods from 
Is/x. With this money, 
capitalists of Department II buy means of production from Department I in 
order to reconstitute their own constant capital used up during the 
production process. Capitalists of Department I can now replenish their 
own means of production through the circulation of c within their own 
department, and hire additional workers, who will buy additional consumer 
goods (equivalent to Is/y) from Department II. The capitalists of 
Department II thereby acquire the purchasing power to buy from Department 
I additional means of production necessary for their own expanded 
reproduction (IIs/z =additional lie), while the sale of consumer goods 
to workers and capitalists within Department II on the one hand, 
immediately reconstitutes its variable capital fund (IIv), and on the 
other, realises a portion of the surplus-value (IIs/q) which forms 
additional IIv. Finally, with the further means obtained by the sale of 
additional IIc to Department II, the capitalists of Department I can 
complete their own expanded reproduction, mediating the sale of 
additional Ic (= Is/p) within their department (as well as the purchase 
of the equivalent of additional Iv from Deparment II, if this has not 
been covered in the first stage of circulation).(4) 
Now let us turn to one of Marx's own examples of balanced reproduction 
from the work cited earlier. Marx posits the following value composition 
for social production(S): 
I 4,000c + 1,000v + 1,000s = 6,000 } } Total = 9,000 
II 1,500c + 750v + 750s = 3,000 } 
Marx assumes that half of the surplus-value of Department I is to be 
accumulated, and thus, assuming the same technical composition of 
capital, 400 of the SOOis (1000/2), will go to additional constant and 
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100 to additional variable capital. Now that leaves SOOis plus 1000Iv to 
be exchanged for 1SOOIIc. This is a mere matter of simple reproduction in 
Department II. The 400Is to be capitalized circulates within Department 
I, yielding the following: 
I 4,400c + 1,000v(in money) + 100s(to be converted to 100v) 
Department II buys the 100Is as additional constant capital, and 
Department I adds this to its variable capital 'fund'. Department II now 
has 1,600c and so, assuming the same technical composition of capital, 
requires an extra SOv to restart the production process. This is taken 
from Department II's surplus-value, as were the purchasing commodities 
for the 100Is. Hence, of the 7SOIIs there remains 600, which forms a 
consumption fund for the capitalists of Department II. The value 
compostion of Department II now stands as follows: 
II 1,600c + 800v + 600 (consumption fund) = 3,000 
Department I now has this composition: 
I 4,400c + 1 100v (in money) 
+ SOO {consumption fund from reproduction of 1,S00IIc) 
= 6,000 
In the beginning the value composition of capital was: 
It is now: 
I 4,000c + 1,000v = S,OOO } } = 7,250 
II 1,500c + 7SOv = 2,250 } 
I 4,400c + 1,100v = S,500 } 
II 1,600c + 800v = 2,400 ~ = 7 ' 900 
If production now takes place, the value compostion of the total 
social capital at the end of the second year will be: 
I 4,400c + 1,100v + 1,100s = 6,600 } = 9,800 
II 1,600c + 800v + BOOs= 3,200 } 
Again, 1,100Iv + Is/2 (=S50) exchange for lie. But now 1,100Iv + 550Is is 
greater than 1,600IIc so the extra SOlie must come out of the surplus-
value of Department II, leaving 7SOIIs. This exchange reproduces 1,100Iv 
plus a consumption 'fund' of SSO in Department I. The other half of Is is 
capitalized in the ratio of 4c:1v. Hence, 4,400Ic is simply reproduced 
and, according to the internal circulation of Department I, an additional 
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440c is annexed to it, and 110Is remains (yet to be realized) to buy 
extra variable capital. Department I now has the following value 
composition: 
(4,400c + 440c) + (1,100v [in money] +110v [to be realized]) 
=> 4,840c + 1,210v = 6,050 
In Department II an extra 25v must be advanced in respect of the extra 
SOc it received from Department I, and this must come out of the 750s 
leaving 725s. Now, to realize the extra 110s which Department I needs to 
expand its variable capital, Department II must add this 110 to its 
constant capital, yielding 1760IIc. This 110 must come out of the 
remaining 725IIs, leaving 615IIs. But this new constant capital requires 
additional variable capital, to the tune of 55. This also must come out 
of the surplus-value of Department II, leaving 560s to be added to the 
capitalists' consumption fund here. There is a remaining surplus-value of 
550 to be added to the consumption fund of Department I capitalists. At 
the end of the second year we get the following composition of capital: 
I 4,840c + 1,210v = 6,050 } } = 8,690 (compare 7,900) 
II 1,760c + 880v = 2,640 } 
Now a third year of production: 
I 4,840c + 1,210v + 1,210s = 7,260} } =10,780 (compare 9,800) 
II 1,760c + 880v + 880s = 3,520} 
1,210Iv + Is/2 (=605) must be transformed into lie which means the latter 
must equal 1815. Again, the extra 55IIc comes out of the 880IIs, leaving 
825IIs. If Department I expands with a ratio of 4c:1v then Department II 
must also capitalize the equivalent of (the future) 121Iv --> 121IIc. 
This comes out of lis leaving 704Ils. The other (existing) 484Is 
circulates within Department I. Department II must complement its 
additional constant capital with (27.5 + 60.5 = 88)v, and this must come 
from lis, leaving 616IIs. The annual declaration is: 
I (4,840 + 484 = 5,324)c + (1,210 + 121 = 1331)v = 6,655 
II (1,760 +55+ 121 = 1936)c + (880 + 88 = 968)v = 2,904 
The total social value at the end of the third year is 9559; at the 
end of the fourth year 11,858; at the end of the fifth year 13,043, and 
so on (fractions rounded off). After five years the total social capital 
would have expanded from 7,250 to 11,566, or 60%. The question now is 
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what clues can this schema of reproduction give us as to why growth 
cannot, in reality, be smoothly maintained? 
4.2 INTRANSIGENT FLAWS IN THE SCHEMA 
Crises in the capitalist system are transient and therefore so are 
their causes. But the causes of specific crises reveal themselves as such 
only after the fact, as it were. At other times the tendencies which lead 
momentarily to crisis are still at work within the system, and thus 
crises are no less inevitable for their transient nature, The tendencies 
which ultimately become causes of crisis resolve themselves into the 
basic laws of capitalist production: the law of value, the equilization 
of the rate of profit, the rising organic composition of capital and the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall.- The schema of reproduction which 
Marx presents highlights certain mechanisms which mediate their 
transformation into capitalist crises. In this section I deal with these. 
They are: disproportionality, overaccumulation and underconsumption. 
4.2.1 Disproportionality: The Interdepartment Value and Use-Value Structure 
Marx's reproduction schema demonstrates that capitalist reproduction 
is possible within limits, given a certain value and use-value structure 
between the two departments. We have seen a particular example of 
proportionality. 
before is met: 
Proportionality means that the imperative I mentioned 
Iv + Is/x + Is/y = IIc + IIs/z 
These are the only value categories we are interested in for the moment. 
The use-value structure of social production must also be 
proportionate. That is, the commodities produced in each department over 
and above the needs of simple reproduction must be needed in the other. 
Exchange between the two departments is conceptualized as the dual flow 
of value in one direction and money in the other (it is not barter). Marx 
does not abstract from time, and thus exchange between the two 
departments is a dynamic interchange of money and commodity values. 
Should one purchase fail to take place, or one sale be incomplete, the 
flow of money and commodities is interrupted and the reproductive dynamic 
breaks down. However, if the right use-values are produced in the right 
quantities there is no reason why this should happen. 
laws governing what is produced and in what quantity? 
So what are the 
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The proportions which apply between the departments are governed by 
the law of value. As already demonstrated the operation of the law of 
value tends to equalize the selling price of particular commodities, or 
make them sell on average at value. The resulting competition between 
firms tends to lower the rate of profit in that branch of industry unless 
one of several conditions apply. One example is the extension of the need 
for a certain commodity or an increase in social demand. However, this 
condition in itself merely implies that this branch of industry will 
become relatively more profitable, hence capital will flow into it re-
establishing the general rate of profit across branches. Otherwise, 
capital will flow out of this branch as production overtakes social 
demand, competition for surplus-value intensifies, the organic 
composition of capital rises and the rate of profit falls. Neither can 
monopolies escape this law, although they can be subject to it at the 
expense of other individual capitals. Eventually, they too must allow 
capital out of the sector as supply overtakes demand. The law of value 
thus distributes capital in a department in response to the final 
requirements of the other department. However, this is an imperfect 
response. 
Capital flows into the most profitable branches of production, and 
this is both cause and effect of the tendency of the rate of profit to 
equalize. That capital is in perpetual motion testifies to the fact that 
the equalization process is never complete but always partial and self-
negating. The emergence of monopolies exaggerates this situation as they 
absolutely lower the rate of profit in spheres where capital is fluid, 
and so relatively large movements of capital can be set off by the 
smallest hint of more profit. Monopolies themselves are freed from the 
rat-race of profit-scavenging between spheres of production, but their 
problem becomes one of judging the reinvestment rate in accordance with 
next year's social demand. They are more fortunate in this as, 
controlling the whole line of production,.they may produce to order. But 
this too has limits, as the firms to whom they sell in the other 
department are, like those of their own department, unsure of the demand 
structure which will prevail in the coming year. Moreover, like any other 
firm, a monopoly may be undersupplied in means of production unless it 
pre-orders its productive commodities which, ~ priori (before the working 
of the law of value), is equally difficult to judge. The law of value 
asserts itself only post festum.(~) 
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Hence, proportionality, like general equilibrium, is only a tendency 
and never a permanent reality. Moreover, precisely because the tendency 
operates in the context of the law of value, equalization of the rate of 
profit and competition, it too is a self-negating or perpetual trend. The 
capitalist mode of production is in an almost constant state of 
disproportionality, The correct proportions between the departments are 
achieved only accidentally, If this disproportionality becomes too 
pronounced, then there will be a breakdown in money and commodity flows 
and a general cessation or limitation of the scale of reproduction rather 
than the normal situation of localized, intermittent contractions (and 
expansions) in given sectors and firms, and general continuance of 
expanded reproduction. 
4.2.2 Relative Over-Production and Inter-Industry Value and Use-Value Structures - -
Just as the proportions between departments must be maintained, the 
flow of value within each department must be roughly maintained, and this 
depends ultimately on the quality or type of commodity in which each 
portion of the social value is contained. Absolute over-production can 
occur only in the context of simple reproduction. Where expanded 
reproduction has grown up, too much is never enough provided the overall 
or selected sectoral expansion can absorb it. Thus, the expansion of one 
industry is over-extended only if the expansion of other sectors 
(effectively producing purchasing commodities) falls behind. This is 
relative over-production. 
Relative over-production is a characteristic feature of the capitalist 
economy, whereas in pre-capitalist and post-capitalist modes of 
production it is seldom a problem, dogged as they are by crises of under-
production. Capitalism is marked by over-production because of the 
consistent logical tendency toward maximum accumulation and thus economic 
prosperity at the level of the individual firm. Growth requires 
expansion; expansion can be achieved only through the realisation of 
increasing masses of surplus-value; progressive realization requires 
rising effective demand in the purchasing sectors of that specific 
commodity. The conditions of expansion are exactly the same in the 
purchasing sector. Thus, unchecked growth, if it is to occur, must equate 
with balanced growth. Four circumstances modify this course of 
development. 
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1. Uneven development. We have already seen that uneven development 
is an inherent law of capitalism. Capital (which is to say, the 
leading capitals) thrives on the underdevelopment of other firms, 
sectors, regions and countries. It is the very same trend toward 
maximum accumulation which moves capital to appropriate the 
surplus-value produced in other spheres. Each capital 'knows' that 
if it does not maximise its profits the result will be, not 
general balanced growth, but its own underdevelopment. Hence, the 
very same tendency which moves it to accumulate precludes the 
possibility of balanced development and signals the inevitability 
of over-production. 
2. Competition. Competition excites capital into a frenzy of 
accumulation, with the bad effects mentioned in 1. It also forces 
capital into the most profitable sectors, and just as this is an 
imperfect distributor of capital between departments, so it is 
within one department. In effect, competition is a response to 
changing value and use-value structures, themselves modified by 
the movements of capital, and a result of their modification, 
i.e., through the competitive search for more profitable spheres 
of investment. 
3. Money hoarding. Money is not hoarded accidentally. One instance in 
which money is hoarded is in reserve for the purchase of new fixed 
capital which may be required only after some years. This signals 
a permanent, relative over-production in Department I broken only 
by frenzied retooling, which generally occurs simultaneously in 
competitive sectors every seven to ten years(7), at which time 
there is conversely undersupply. A second case of money hoarding 
is where capitalists store value in currency or precious objects 
when productive investment is uncertain. The third case is a 
special case: where workers save for an expensive commodity, or 
when they imagine they are saving to start in business themselves, 
their money is temporarily turned away from consumption. Their 
savings generally remain in circulation through the mediation of 
banks and finance institutions. This money, however, has made its 
way back to capital without the mediation of the sale of a 
commodity, and thus the new cycle of production begins on a false 
(i.e., not in accordance with the g~neral formula of capital) 
basis which cannot be maintained without the eventual sale of the 
commodity. These circumstances usually occur only periodically, 
and not generally. 
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4. The ultimate poverty of the working class. This subject is treated 
in the next sub-section. 
Over-production is closely articulated with disproportionality. Over-
production between departments- that is, say, the production of too many 
means of production or enough of one sort and too many of another - is 
disproportionality. Under these conditions there will be an oversupply, 
unrealized product and hence a break down in the money flow at the next 
stage of the dynamic. But, characteristically, a crisis will break out in 
one department, causing disproportionality and disruption in the 
expansion of the other department. I will briefly elaborate on this:-
Department 1: If Department I produces too many or the wrong sort of 
means of production of means of production, some will remain unsold. The 
sub-department that produces these will contract, lowering the sub-
departmental wage and forcing capital into other sectors. Increased 
competition will stimulate demand for new means of production and means 
of producing these. The inability of the contracted department to supply 
these will mean a disproportion of undersupply of Department I products. 
If accompanied by an anticipatory expansion of the wage-good sector, this 
will mean that total wages will be well below total prices of production, 
and Department II will contract. Meanwhile, Department I will have 
prepared for a production drive which is no longer viable, so it will 
suffer over-capacity and idle means of production. The sub-department 
supplying them will have a fall-off in orders and contract again. 
Department 11: If Department II accumulates rapidly, its consumer 
goods will overshoot total available buying power, especially if its 
expansion only 'fore-shadowed' an expansion in Department I, for the 
total wages in Department I will expand more slowly than the aggregate 
wage-income; which will therefore be expanding more slowly than the total 
value of consumer goods. Department II will thus contract as the 
expansion of Department I gets under way, and the latter will be hit with 
defaulted debts, or an undersupply of money from Department II. Existing 
consumer goods will partially devalorize, and the workers will buy cheap 
means of subsistence, allowing the possibility of diversification in 
Department II. Orders placed with Department I will be for new sorts of 
means of production, and so those sub-departments producing these will 
expand. This expansion will be small because the orders will be from, and 
to, only a small percentage of firms in each department. With Department 
I expanding and Department II contracting, the contraction of aggregate 
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income will continue and diversification will maintain growth only in a 
small percentage of selected firms. 
Thus, 
sectors, 
over-production in one department - or in one of its key 
then spreading throughout the department - will cause 
contraction and then effective over-production in the other department. 
Contractions in growth will cause contractions in money-flows at the same 
time as contraction in the volume of commodity movements, spreading 
contraction throughout the economy. This will mean diminution of the 
aggregate wage, causing general relative emiseration of the working class 
and absolute impoverishment of selected groups. Leading capitals will 
dis-invest in flagging sectors. 
However, relative over-production at a certain (low) level does have 
good effects for the capitalist economy. Because of the post festum 
nature of the law of value, the value and use-value structure of social 
want is only tendentially met by the value and use-value structure of 
social production. This implies there is always either a short-fall or 
over-production. Successive short-falls would in fact be tantamount to 
contracted reproduction, whereas capitalist reproduction must on average 
be expanded reproduction. The objective mechanism by which contracted 
reproduction is avoided, and the ground prepared for expanded 
reproduction, is average, net, relative over-production in all 
departments. From the point of view of social labour, this is a very 
wasteful mechanism, but from the point of view of capitalist reproduction 
on a social scale it is the best (least wasteful) mechanism for achieving 
capitalist expansion in a capitalist environment. From the point of view 
of monopolies, it puts the burden on other sectors. Individual 
competitive firms which cannot easily regulate production or preservation 
of commodity stocks (technically, physically or in the face of continuing 
competition), see it as an inexplicable evil to be pondered whilst 
awaiting an upturn. 
4.2.3 The Two Sides of Over-Production 
4.2.3.1 Underconsumption: Problems of Realization of Surplus-Value in 
Department II 
In Section 2.1 we were interested in the value components Iv, Is/x, 
Is/y and IIs/z. In Section 2.2 we looked at their articulation with the 
movements of Ic, Is/p, IIv, IIs/q and IIs/r. The first set of values 
circulate between departments, the second do not. In this section we are 
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interested in one value component from each set. They are IIs/z 
(accumulated in the form of constant capital) and IIs/q (accumulated in 
the form of variable capital). Together these make up the surplus-value 
of Department II which is to be realized in other than Department II 
capitalist consumption. (Department II capitalist consumption, remember, 
was represented as IIs/r,) 
Disproportionality in general can arise because of the 'anarchy of 
production' - that is, the unco-ordinated investment and disinvestment of 
capital for whatever reasons - and the resulting unbalanced value 
structure between departments. Overproduction is quite distinct as it has 
another necessary premise: the drive to accumulate. Underconsumption is a 
special case of overproduction which results, where commodities must be 
sold at value, in the inability of Department II to fully realize its 
surplus-value. Like relative overproduction generally, this follows, not 
from the anarchy of production, but from the contradiction between social 
production and private accumulation. 
In volume three of Capital Marx writes: "The ultimate reason for all 
real crises remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses 
as opposed to the drive of capitalist production to develop the 
productive forces as though only the absolute consuming power of society 
constituted their limit,"(8) The validity of this proposition is not 
immediately clear from the schema of reproduction Marx himself presents. 
The example we looked at had the following value composition in the 
second year: 
I 4,400c + 1,100v + 1,100s = 6,600 
II 1,600c + 800v + BOOs = 3,200 
From the point of view of Department II, realization had the following 
six steps: 
1. 800IIv replenishes itself 
2. By selling commodities to the workers and capitalists of 
Department I (1,100Iv + 1,100s/2 [= 550]) Department II obtains 
enough money to replace its 1 , 600 means of pr·oduction and must buy 
an extra 50 means of production to maintain proportionality. This 
50 is the first of the surplus-value to be realized, 
3. 25 variable capital must be added to this - which requires a 
potential sale of commodities 25IIs to future workers of 
Department I I . 
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4. Department II buys an additional 110 means of production. This 110 
goes in money to Department I, which pays it to additional workers 
- hence we require a potential sale to the additional workers of 
Department I of 110IIs. 
5. 55 variable capital must be added to this - which requires a 
potential sale of commodities 55IIs to future workers of 
Department II. 
6. This leaves 560IIs unrealized, and this must be consumed by the 
capitalists of Department II. 
Provided these proportions are roughly maintained, or deviations from 
them cancel each other, Department II will in fact be able to realize its 
surplus-value. Now the surplus-value of Department II goes toward 
additional constant and variable capital, and capitalists' consumption. 
We disregard the last named portion - capitalists' consumption - because 
it affects exchange neither between classes nor between departments. The 
variable capital will replenish itself with the interim aid of a 
capitalist reserve fund, merchant's account or bank credit, as per 3. and 
5. above. Therefore, the demand generated in Department I must grow at 
the same rate as the rate of capitalization in Department II. This is the 
case in the schema: both grow at a rate of 10%. However, if we introduce 
a rising organic composition of capital (",,,drive of capitalist 
production to develop the productive forces ••. ") the demand for wage-
goods generated in Department I will grow more slowly than its constant 
capital. Hence, to avoid underconsumption the constant capital of 
Department II must grow more slowly than that of Department I. There is, 
of course, no ultimate reason why this should be the case. In fact, we 
have seen a tendency toward disproportionality, which must also be a 
tendency toward (periodic) underconsumption. 
The important part of Marx's proposition above is the "opposition" he 
postulates between the expansion of productive forces and the consuming 
power of the workers. It is only under conditions of the unlimited drive 
to accumulate (which is an established requisite in the face of 
competition and the falling rate of profit) that the purchasing power of 
the working-class becomes inadequate to realize the surplus-value of 
Department II. Notice that monopolies which by definition escape both 
competition and the falling rate of profit to a greater or lesser extent, 
are able to cheat underconsumption by regulating production. 
Now we must ask after the role of underconsumption in crises. 
84 
One of 
the most famous works on the topic is Rosa Luxumburg's book, The 
Accumulation of Capital.(~) Luxemburg asks how capital can expand and 
find new customers when the whole of the purchasing power of the working 
class (v) must necessarily be less than the value of the total commodity 
package (v + s), and when the capitalist class cannot enrich itself one 
iota by its internal exchanges. Luxemburg's answer is that non-capitalist 
social classes (peasants, non-capitalist landowners, etc.) must be drawn 
into the capitalist market, and thus transfer value into the capitalist 
system, to its ruling class: 
The surplus value must therefore shed its form as surplus 
product before it can reassume it for the purposes of 
accumulation; by some means or other it must first ~ss through 
the money stage, So the surplus product of departments I and II 
must be bought - by whom? On the above showing, there will have 
to be an effective demand outside I and II, mere to realize the 
surplus value of the two departments, just so the surplus value 
can be turned into cash.(10) 
Her ultimate conclusion must be that as soon as all areas of the world 





drawn into capitalist relations of 
cease to expand and thus necessarily 
The point to notice about Luxemburg's argument is that it abstracts 
from competition by treating the capitalist class as homogeneous. 
Luxemburg does not conceive of the total capital as many capitals 
competing, but as 'one capital'. For some purposes it is useful to make 
analyses at this level, but for analyzing underconsumption it is not, 
for, if capital were in fact 'one capital' rather than many in 
competition, underconsumption would not be conceivable as a necessary 
aspect of capitalism as the drive to accumulate could be effectively 
regulated, as a monopoly does in a limited way. Hence, it is true, 
capital might cease to expand and thus 'collapse' ~definition, but this 
would tell us little about the real course of events. Bukharin was 
correct to say that "Rosa Luxemburg's basic mistake is that 
total capitalist as the individual capitalist .... Indeed, 
she takes the 
if the total 
capitalist is equated with the typical individual, the first of course 
cannot be his own consumer ... "(11) Hence the need for a "third party" 
consumer demand. 
Luxemburg seems to base her argument on the following model of 
reproduction: 
M- C(labour-power +means of prod') ... P ... C' - M' 
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It is clear on the basis of this model that the value of labour-power, 
which forms only a part of C, can never equal C' or the expanded value of 
the product. However, where competition prevails, each capital 'hopes' 
that the equivalent of its own workers plus someone else's workers will 
feed their wages back into the purchase of its commodities. This capital 
will realize its surplus-value while others complete this process only 
partially. Thus, development is uneven, as has already been explained, 
and only the leading capitals expand 'normally', while some go out of 
business altogether. This situation is typical of the capitalist mode of 
production even abstracting from the exploitation of non-capitalist 
sectors and social classes. 
Rather than Luxemburg's theory of total collapse, underconsumption may 
contribute as a 'trigger' to intermittent capitalist crises. Since there 
is a constant tendency toward overproduction and disproportionality, the 
effects of underconsumption will hit all firms in Department II evenly 
only by accident. It is far more likely that selected sectors and firms 
will be hit, which, in the last analysis, is part of what competition 
means. These conjunctural fluctuations in consumption, departmental 
proportionality and levels of production are a normal, characteristic 
feature of capitalist development. In this sense, capitalism is always on 
the verge of crisis, or in a constant state of incipient crisis. The real 
crisis arises when disproportionality oversteps the allowable limits, due 
to massive overproduction. Such a crisis may be triggered by 
underconsumption concentrated in a particular key sector of Department 
II, as it was in the u.s. automobile industry at the onset of the 1974-75 
recession.(12) Unsold finished goods retard the purchase of ancillary 
finished goods from other parts of the department, causing relative 
overproduction there. Then raw materials orders contract, and the 
production of means of production becomes uncertain. The slump in u.s. 
automobile sales in 1974 was accompanied by underconsumption in the 
construction industry.(13) Together the contraction of these two sectors 
affected other sectors in Department II to effect a disproportion of 
sufficient magnitude to be recognised as a real crisis. 
The articulation of underconsumption with the partially autonomous 
phenomena of overproduction per se and disproportionality is important in 
determining the depth of the crisis. If, for example, the level of 
production is increasing at a disproportionate rate, capitalists in 
Department II may be persuaded to capitalise some of the surplus-value 
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which, for the balanced growth of the system, they ought to be consuming. 
If underconsumption is felt at this conjuncture it would be disastrous, 
since not only would the working class be underconsuming in particular 
sectors, but the rate at which goods were being produced would be 
increasing, If the sectors of underconsumption and excess production 
overlapped this would militate against a quick recovery and long-term 
disproportions (underdevelopment of certain sectors) would result. 
4.2.3.2 Over-Accumulation: Problems of Valorization of Capital in Both 
Departments 
We saw in the last sub-section that problems of the realization of the 
surplus-value of Department II result from the "restricted consumption of 
the masses as opposed to the drive of capitalist production to develop 
the productive forces as though only the absolute consuming power of 
society constituted their limit,"(14) As might be expected, it is this 
drive to accumulate which results in over-accumulation, but like over-
production per se, over-accumulation is always relative. Specifically, 
over-accumulation is relative to the profitable level of physical output. 
If this does not expand in the same ratio as capital, over-accumulation 
may result. Therefore, over-accumulation is not premised solely on the 
drive to accumulate, for this posits no necessary relative reduction in 
the profitable level of output,. but can result from the drive to 
accumulate only when its effects are mediated by problems of realization, 
The more proximate cause of over-accumulation, then, is underconsumption. 
Underconsumption, however, 
surplus-value of Department II. 
only affects the realization of the 
It is clear, on the other hand, that 
over-accumulation can just as much effect Department I to the extent that 
the profitable level of physical output of producer goods declines 
relative to the rate of accumulation of capital, Now, strictly speaking, 
a lack of demand for producer goods is not underconsumption, for, unlike 
consumer goods, means of production are not consumed in the market (i.e,, 
do not fall out of circulation through sale); they are rather consumed in 
the production process. Thus, the correct concept for describing a 
decline in demand for producer goods, which constitutes the immediate 
cause of over-accumulation of means of production in Department I (i.e., 
means of production of means of production) is the contraction of 
capital, 
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Finally, here, the reader will recall (Chpt 2, Section 2) that, for 
Marx, the production process falls both inside and outside of the 
circulation of capital. It presents this dual character because of the 
twofold nature of the commodity. On the side of its use-value commodity 
capital is consumed in production and thus falls out of circulation, and 
on the side of exchange-value commodity capital is conserved and expanded 
(C- C'), and the capitalist attempts to realize this expanded value in a 
further act of exchange - sale. It thus remains in circulation. From the 
point of view of capital, consumption of commodity capital in the 
production process is not directly relevant to the realization of 
exchange-value, and has no necessary effect on the latter. It is rather a 
part of the process of the valorisation of capital through the 
transformation of the original commodity capital advanced (means of 
production and labour-power) into a new use-value with an expanded 
exchange-value. The 'underconsumption' of commodity capital is therefore 
relevant only to the process of devalorisation of capital, and not to the 
problems in realization, which are, for Department II underconsumption 
(properly so-called), and for Department I the contraction of capital. 
The concept which connects the 'underconsumption' of use-values in 
production with their devalorisation is under-utilization. 
From the foregoing it is clear that over-accumulation in Department II 
may follow as a direct result of underconsumption. This over-accumulation 
may lead to the contraction of capital in Department II, which will mean 
a lack of demand for means of production, and thus over-accumulation will 
sooner or later be felt in Department I. However, just as it is 
tautological to say that underconsumption follows from a lack of 
effective monetary demand for consumer goods, so it is with the 
contraction of capital and the demand for producer goods. Beyond this we 
must recognise that development in both departments is uneven, that the 
specific capitals in which the lack of demand is felt will be those with 
below-average organic compositions of capital, and that the specific 
branches of industry in which it is felt will depend on the use-value 
structure of demand. Therefore, it is quite possible that over-
accumulation will occur in certain sectors of Department I or the 
department as a whole without first becoming a reality within Department 
II. The relative contraction of capital in Department II (i.e,, over-
expansion of Department I) may precede a permutation of three 
consequences: 1) less surplus-value available for distribution in 
Department I, which will squeeze less efficient firms, 2) overproduction 
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of selected goods which will hit corresponding branches of industry, and 
3) general overproduction, which will force the contraction of the 
department as a whole. Where Department I expands at a disproportionate 
rate, contraction may follow, causing unemployment and underconsumption 
of consumer goods. Thus, there is no necessity for real over-accumulation 
to spread from Department II to Department I; it may also originate in 
Department I and spread in the opposite direction. 
Over-accumulation is fully realized where an increased mass of capital 
produces no more or even less profit than before its expansion. If this 
is cumulative over several cycles, an absolute contraction of capital may 
follow with a corresponding contraction in physical output. Such a 
contraction in production has a twofold significance, It means under-
utilization of means of production and a corresponding reduction in the 
rate of worker-employment. 
From the point of view of the individual firm, contraction means 
under-utilization of means of production. Capital accumulated up to the 
point of recession cannot now produce salable goods. In fact, for some 
time before a recession is felt, the means of production employed are 
producing unsalable goods, which, unrecognised and unchecked, 
contributes its part to bringing on the crisis. As the means of 
production now lie idle, or produce only intermittently, they are 
devalorising. That is, they may be physically depreciating through 
irregular use, age and other unproductive wear and tear; and they are 
morally depreciating insofar as they cannot now be valorised, i.e., 
transformed into new commodities with greater value. Different types of 
commodity capital will devalorise at different rates and for different 
time periods. Raw materials such as untreated timber when stored outdoors 
will devalorise permanently. Other more durable raw materials like stone, 
gravel, galvinised iron and wood indoors, etc., will revalue and be 
useful when production picks up, The general trend with machines is that, 
once production picks up, more efficient means of production are 
installed, and thus the old means of production suffer permanent moral 
depreciation and will never transmit the whole of their original value 
(price of production) to new commodities 
It is well known, that at the same time as capital cannot be utilized, 
great hardships are imposed upon certain strata of the working class. The 
relative surplus working population which follows on the rising organic 
composition of capital and uneven development of regions and countries is 
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added to by the 'oversupply' of labour relative to the profitable level 
of utilization of productive capacity. Now, it is one thing to make a 
machine redundant, but quite another to make a person redundant. Not only 
is the worker made redundant as the worker of an individual firm, but he 
is made redundant in terms of social production, the essense of society, 
and thereby forfeits the fundamental element of social being. Therefore, 
the unemployed worker is, quite apart from being inherently unemployable, 
lowered by his forced redundancy to a level of existence in complete 
contradiction with the potential level of civilization that could in fact 
develop upon the current material base of society. To the degree he 
perceives this potential, he becomes politicized. And to the degree he 
finds no substitute for being an essential member of society, he becomes 
anti-social. In this way the crisis of social production is re-reflected 
in itself, and finds personal, political, moral, legal and spiritual 
expression, and no longer presents itself merely as a hitch in the 
realization of profits. 
Moreover, social production has been developed into a great pyramid of 
material life on a planet that could not support a tenth of the number of 
people in its natural state. When this production is disrupted, more 
people will be forced below the subsistence standard of living, over and 
above, that is, the normal uneven development of the system. Over-
accumulation is, therefore, never absolute over-capacity of the social 
means of producing, but entirely internal to the capitalist system, with 
its disproportions and relative overproduction, i.e., over-capacity of 
capital. 
The logic of capital admits no standard such as human need. In 1972-74 
there was a severe famine in the Sahel region of Africa, Bangladesh and 
parts of India and Pakistan. From 1963-78 world grain production rose 
2.9% per year, while world population increased 1,9% per year.(15) 
Immediately prior to 1972, the u.s. government was propping up grain 
prices with artificial reductions in grain production. This conjuncture 
of course had effects which were at least unnecessarily severe, perhaps 
totally unnecessary, in the absolute sense. Not only social being, but 
material being is threatened by over-accumulation and its logical 
corrolary, unemployment. 
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4.3 TURNOVER OF CAPITAL, THE REALIZATION OF SURPLUS-VALUE AND THE STATE 
Once a crisis is felt in Department II as reproduction 'with an 
undertone of stagnation'(16), this situation requires an active effort by 
each individual capital to mitigate it. Thus, competition intensifies. At 
this time the slow-down in the turnover of capital means, on the one 
hand, unsold stocks of finished commodities, and on the other, the growth 
of investment in stocks and bonds. Unsold commodity stocks halt the 
turnover of capital by firms and thus the normally expanded reproduction 
of the system. At the same time, money advanced for stocks and bonds 
stays in that form, since it has been taken out of direct circulation in 
anticipation of the reserve funds needed in the normal process of the 
turnover of capital (savings for expensive fixed-constant capital, bulk 
raw material and interim accounts including the wages of additional 
workers) which has now slowed right down. Thus, unsold commodity stocks 
mean the expansion of stock capital, including that held by financial 
institutions. 
This stock capital earns interest, probably at a higher rate than the 
average rate of profit. This is because it is moved into industries where 
the rate of profit is still high, and these are consequently likely to be 
large industries which extract surplus-profits from their unevenly 
developed range of penetration (sectors, regions and countries). Leaving 
pure speculation out of consideration, capital is also moved to the 
public, primarily in the form of mortages and hire-purchase. Thus, the 
leading capitals can make efforts to maintain growth through new ventures 
and new technology. The fluid finance capital asserts its advantage by 
following profits into whichever sector is producing them, and demand is 
generated artificially by credit. 
The state is also the recipient of stock capital (internal and 
external borrowing), and it uses this in attempts to reduce both excess 
commodity stocks and credit, thus restoring the semblance of normality to 
the turnover of capital. This section is concerned with the mechanisms by 
which this is done. 
4.3.1 The Domestic Market and the Realization of Surplus-Value 
In New Zealand the overwhelming proportion of private productive 
investment falls within Department II. This means that disproportionality 
has little effect internally, while at the same time the economy is 
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particularly susceptible to international overproduction of key finished 
goods and underconsumption of New Zealand-made goods domestically. 
The problem 'at home' is to stimulate a certain quantity of demand for 
a certain quality of goods, i.e., New Zealand-made goods. This problem 
has been with successive governments, and so we have a complex set of 
trade barriers against the importation of finished goods, including 
import licencing and selective tariffs. Tariffs have always been 
preferred to sales tax, as the presence of foreign commodities on the New 
Zealand market might distribute underconsumption to the advantage of 
foreign exporters or give them parity both in substitutable goods and in 
areas where demand is elastic. The other side of this medal is that New 
Zealand capital as a whole cannot realize the surplus-value contained in 
its finished goods because of the lack of demand generated in a small 
Department I, and so it must export. In time of crisis, this puts the 
government in the contradictory position of arguing for free trade whilst 
necessarily maintaining tariff barriers. The state provides export 
incentives for innovative entrepreneurs, and subsidises established 
export industries. As the world crisis progresses, the suplementary 
minimum prices (S.M.P.s) offered by the government on agricultural 
overproduction have become more and more important. Effectively, the 
government has guaranteed the realization of surplus-value to parts of 
the farming sector with the (borrowed) stock capital which should be 
employing its potential final consumers, i.e., in the 'international 
Department I' which has contracted. The government thus depends on 
selling in countries outside the sphere of capitalist contraction- e.g., 
the oil-producing nations, Japan and Russia - or waiting for fluctuations 
in the market to reduce its losses. In the latter case the government 
loses out by buying dear from the farmer and selling cheap to the 
customer, yet it is still the same money which pays the farmer, but now 
in a borrowed rather than a privately earned form. This also puts 
considerable pressure on the state to develop marketing strategies, and 
this too has happened, especially in the agricultural and horticultural 
sectors and the manufacturing sectors which export their derivatives, 
e.g., carpets and wine.(17) 
The government has now taken further steps to avoid underconsumption 
on the domestic market. Like most New Zealand governments, it has 
allocated public works selectively by area - to be carried out by 
selected firms. This is to generate demand from the workers of Department 
92 
I. Recently, however, there have been moves to generate a Department I 
under the rubric of 'Think Big'. This strategy actually predates the 
'Think Big' energy projects with the erection of hydro-electric power 
stations and the southern aluminium smelter. The recent 'Think Big' 
projects are joint ventures between New Zealand and overseas capital. 
There are two reasons for this. First, not having a Department I, New 
Zealand capital is ill-equipped technologically and in terms of market 
access rights to produce the end commodity at a realistic price, which is 
to say, realize the surplus-value of its new Department I. Second, since 
the raison d'etre of these ventures is to stimulate internal demand, it 
is of primary importance that wages are spent in New Zealand to return 
profit to existing industries. (Whether new profits are retained is only 
of secondary importance. Since there is no existing Department I, 
overseas and government capital in the new plants cannot be in 
competition with local capital.) 
The recent agreement concluded with the Australian government, known 
as Closer Economic Relations (C.E.R.), also fits the pattern of expanding 
effective demand for New Zealand finished goods. C.E.R. will 
progressively 'free up' trade between Australia and New Zealand. This 
will result in the free movement of goods and capital between the two 
countries. In the long run it is hoped that the Australian market will 
absorb a greater quantity of New Zealand finished goods than vice versa. 
Thus, underconsumption will be allayed. This strategy, however, is much 
less sound than 'Think Big' from the New Zealand point of view. The flaws 
in the reasoning occur at three levels. Most generally, Australia's trade 
with the rest of the world is considerably more free than New Zealand's. 
This is possible because, with a bigger Department I and a level of 
technology in Department II closer to that of its trading partners, 
Australia is less susceptible to underconsumption. This means that 
cheaper Australian and other overseas goods will compete favourably with 
New Zealand goods on the combined market, setting up a productivity 
gradient and a drain of labour from New Zealand. Second, on the combined 
market there will probably be an equalization of the distribution of 
underconsumption, but this will be an equalization in value terms. So 
long as New Zealand produces a smaller number of commodities per unit 
value, Australian and other overseas commodities will always be 
preferred. Thus, underconsumption in value terms may be replaced by 
overproduction within the prevailing use-value structure. Thirdly, 
Australia's higher technological base will mean that its currency will 
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continue to dominate that of New Zealand. As Australian currency grows 
relatively stronger, the first points mentioned will be exacerbated 
because of the relatively unrestricted transfer of value and commodities 
between the countries. The link to Australia would thus also put New 
Zealand in a w~rse postion in 
from which it purchases means 
overvalue its dollar further 
its trading relations with other countries 
of production. New Zealand may then have to 
(especially in the face of trade deficits) 
to maintain and upgrade its quantity of means of production. This would 
require borrowing but would not be inflationary. If the balance of 
payments deficit grew too large, however, massive devaluations may be 
required, and these would be hyper-inflationary. At the same point the 
pressure to overvalue currency occurs, Australian capital exporters, 
foreign capital invested in 'Think Big' and potential overseas investors, 
would be exerting pressure for devaluation to bring investment costs in 
line with labour-productivity relative to other countries or areas of the 
world. This dual pressure would become irreconcilable if the crisis 
deepened sufficiently. 
As the crisis progresses, finance capital, landowning capital, and 
their articulation, become a less and less tolerated drain on the 
capitalist productive system, and are not left unregulated. Between 1974 
and 1981, it was more profitable to invest in mortgage finance than to 
invest productively.(18) Within that period the government transformed 
the State Advances Commission into the semi-autonomous Housing 
Corporation in an attempt to restrict mortgage advances through 
competition. However, the Housing Corporation has never drawn funds from 
private individuals. As recently as November, 1983, the minister of 
housing, T. Friedlander, annouced that the housing corporation would not 
start borrowing from the public as it was not the role of government to 
compete with the private sector.(19) One can only conclude that such 
competition is permitted only where it does not restrict consumer demand. 
Also in November 1983, interest rates on mortgage finance came under 
direct regulation by the government. Such a move cuts the profits to the 
lender and redistributes them to the house-buyer. More buyers will thus 
be found, which will support the housing industry and maintain consumer 
demand further through it workers. Lower repayment rates will have 
favourable effects on interim consumer demand. On the other hand, lenders 
will be more inclined to invest productively; thus, the ratio of profit 
taken to value created will shrink, meaning better results for productive 
investment. 
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Land-owning capital has also come under regulation, in the first place 
through the 1982-83 waqe/pri8e regulations, which will be extended in a 
modified 
landlord, 
form. Property rents are consumed neither by tenant nor 
nor are they invested productively, They go to local bodies, 
finance institutions, and, more often than not, they are accumulated 
within the landowning class in further existing propeties. By regulating 
rents, the government releases consumer power that would otherwise have 
been tied up in money hoards for the purchase of additional existing 
propeties, but it decreases the investment potential of rental 
properties, thus discouraging capital from entering and being trapped in 
this sector anew. 
By lowering interest rates generally, the government hopes to draw 
money out of hoarding and 'closed' sectors into consumption. This will, 
it is hoped, increase profit rates, restoring business confidence and 
leading to 'real' productive investment, as opposed to 'credit-supported' 
investment, which will reproduce consumer demand and thus lead an upturn. 
However, when we look at New Zealand's articulation with the world 
capitalist economy, and its structure, this scenario loses plausibility. 
4.3.2 The Structure of the capitalist World Market 
The fact that New Zealand capital is applied overwhelmingly in 
Department II means that underconsumption is an ever-present threat, We 
have seen some of the internal measures the state has taken to maintain 
consumption, but in the last analysis that consumption corresponds mostly 
to the variable capital component of the product value. The realization 
of the surplus-value of Department II (i.e., of New Zealand) depends on 
the demand generated in Department I, and that means the consumption of 
our finished-good exports in other countries. It follows that while 
disproportionality is of negligible importance internally, the New 
Zealand economy is dominanted by it internationally. Expansion or 
contraction in New Zealand is determined by specific conjuntures of 
expansion and contraction in the economies of its more industrialized 
trading partners. 
As I mentioned, the 1974-75 recession was triggered by 
underconsumption in the u.s. automobile and construction industries. The 
slump in these sectors merely revealed what had been happening under the 
surface of the capitalist economy - overproduction and general decline in 
the rate of profit - from the 1967-70 period. As Department II 
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contracted, Department I quickly felt the effects of its own relative 
overproduction. 
"It [the recession] then spread to textiles, electrical 
appliance~. and building mater1als (glass1 c~mentL bricks), ~nd flnall¥ hlt petro-chem1cals. The stee 1ndus~ry was st1ll 
suffer1ng shortages throughout the [Northern] summer of 1974; 
then this branch was hit by the full force of the recession. 
The same is true of the wood and furniture industry. 
"On the other hand, in the sectors of machine-tools, coal, 
oil, and cereals, supply continued to lag behind demand througn 
the first phase of the recession. Sugar, howeverL suffered a 
spectacular downturn (a 30% fall in price in ~he space of 
several weeks). Oil sales diminished 1n volume. oraers in 
telecommunications, which had been thought to be undergoing 
indefinite and constant expansion, were on the decline both in 
Europe and Japan,"(20) 
In New Zealand the decline in real profitability (adjusted to C.P.I,), 
which began at least as early as the beginning of 1973, was, for the 
first time recognised by the business world as a decline in book earning 
rates in 1974.(21) Overproduction and disproportionality in other 
capitalist national economies forced contraction there, and this left 
little consumer demand for New Zealand products. This was felt as 
underconsumption in the New Zealand economy and caused contraction here. 
The contraction of the New Zealand economy, and those of other similar 
countries, fed back into the world capitalist economy, causing truly 
international disproportions (contraction of orders for means of 
production). This made the recession a generalized (world) capitalist 
recession. 
Thus, from the period of the 1974-75 recession two related government 
strategies became especially important. The first was to stimulate 
domestic demand by the means discussed in the last sub-section, and this 
has developed even into the transfer of the profits of strictly non-
capitalist social classes (landowners) into the working class. The second 
emphasis was on the marketing of New Zealand products especially in 
countries which, while not traditional trading partners, were relatively 
untouched by the recession (e.g., Russia), or at least realizing a good 
proportion of their own surplus-value (e.g., the O.P.E.C. countries) or 
part of someone else's (e.g., Japan). In all these places New Zealand was 
in competition with imperialist and other neo-colonial countries. The 
intensity of this competition is expressed, for example, in the fact that 
the government recently stopped foreign fishing in New Zealand's coastal 
waters and is prepared to back this restriction with force in order that 
countries like Japan, Russia and South Korea might have a short-fall in 
food supply and buy New Zealand agricultural products or even fish. The 
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other half of the marketing strategy is to produce for demand, which 
requires international market research. This needs government funding and 
thus closer co-operation between the government and export manufacturers. 
It has two parts. First, labour-productivity is encouraged to cheapen New 
Zealand goods and get as big a share of new market-niches as possible. 
This applies mainly to new lines of production but also plays a part in 
the rehabilitation of established branches of production, especially 
agriculture. More importantly, however, is the "restructuring" of 
industry (adaptation of the use-value structure of production) in 
response to market information. 
Conversely, the country's commitment to agricultural production is 
expressed as a maintenance of the scale of production (although there 
have been unregulated moves to replace pasture with forestry in some 
places, e.g., Northland, Wairarapa), and an increased emphasis on cost-
cutting in this sphere. This increase in the organic composition of 
farming capital does not mean less purchasing power in the framework of 
family production, and may, indeed, even increase the productive activity 
in ancillary Department I and service sectors. Lower national prices of 
production in the family-farming sector are a positive advantage to the 
government. The government gaurantees the surplus-value of farmers; it 
thus buys dear and sells cheap in times of international overproduction. 
The difference is a cost which, by definition, is not passed on to the 
final consumer. Hence, the lower the price of production, the smaller the 
government's loss. Furthermore, if the government were to set a level of 
'sustainable loss', the lower the national price of production the 
further the government can trade at below the value of the product and 
thus more capital completes the circuit, trade relations become more 
secure and the storage problem at home is eased. 
Since New Zealand must import means of production, it was 
traditionally accepted that the dollar should be over-valued to allow 
imports, and the 'bill' was picked up by borrowing.(22) However, between 
1973-74 and 1974-75, international underconsumption coupled with 
unresponsive importation patterns raised New Zealand's balance-of-trade 
deficit (visible excess of imports) from $274 million to $1,180 million. 
The following contraction of industry coupled with the search for new 
markets steadily lowered this figure until, in 1978-79, there was a 
visible excess of imports of $145 million. In line with what I have said, 
trade with Britain was (still) shrinking in 1974, and this was followed 
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by a reduction in trade with Australia in 1975. Countries other than New 
Zealand's main trading partners (U.S., U.K., Japan and Australia) 
accounted for an increasing proportion of trade, especially exports,(23) 
The contraction of industry and the consequent problem of over-
accumulation then evoked the government marketing strategies, 
A trade surplus should allow New Zealand firms to update their 
technology and thus at least to present the appearance of a new round of 
accumulation. However, business confidence has stayed realistically low 
in the 1980s, and employers see two related disincentives to investment. 
First, according to the New Zealand Employers Federation(24), wages are 
too high, and secondly, inflation and interest rates are too high:-
In 1973-74, the operating profits percentage return on total 
assets exceeded mortgage interest rates by 20% and more. Since 
then, return on assets (at book value) has sunk to less than 
80% of new mortgage rates - and if assets were stated in the 
debased currency value of 1981 it would be even less.(25) 
The government is also now coming under pressure from New Zealand's 
trading partners either to open up the New Zealand market(26) or to buy a 
greater volume of imports. The latter action is to be preferred in the 
form of purchase of means of production. 
However, before this will happen, lower wages and lower inflation and 
interest rates are necessary to trigger expansion and to boost 
confidence, i.e, stimulate investment. Several government moves may be 
seen in this light. First, the wage/price regulation attempts to reverse 
the debasement of profits through inflation, and transform inflationary 
tendencies into debasement of wages. That is, by holding wages constant 
and at the same time allowing prices to rise marginally (i.e., to an 
extent which allows the maintenance of rates of profit, all things 
remaining equal), the real wage of the worker falls. This is no solution 
in itself, but if it is coupled with the expansion of credit and the 
advent of 'Think Big', then the absolute level of employment may increase 
marginally producing simultaneously with the reduction in wages an 
expansion of consumer-demand. To continue the trend of debasement of 
wages, regulations have been implimented to significantly weaken unions 
by making them voluntary, and changes in the state pay-fixing procedure 
began in November of 1983, so that private-sector wages may either follow 
public-sector wages down, or at least not be supported by the latter. 
Second, the average expected or existing profit must climb above the rate 
of interest. The government announced in November 1983 that interest 
rates would come under direct regulation and thus remain "low", The level 
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at which they were set will engender partial disinvestment by lenders, 
and further moves can be expected on this front. 
The 'trigger' to national recovery is, by definition, unpredictable. A 
major oil-find in coastal waters may well set off a new round of 
investment; an upturn in key sectors and countries of the world economy 
might serve, as might massive government borrowing, as in Brazil and 
Chile in the 1970s. However, unless the trigger to recovery is in fact 
the real recovery of the world capitalist economy, no upturn can be other 
than short term, as the second, third and fourth rounds of accumulation 
cannot occur without massive government support. If such a bubble should 
burst, as happened in Argentina in 1982-83, massive devaluations would 
follow with galloping inflation. Overseas borrowing sources would dry 
up, capital would go out of the country or into safe depositories (e.g., 
precious objects). The emphasis would thus return to trade policy, as 
the same old problems reasserted themselves. The biggest threat to New 
Zealand capitalism under these conditions would be the organization of 
the new industrial proletariat currently being prepared in the 
government's conscious development of a Department I, in the form of big-
scale projects. 
Thus, economic recovery in New Zealand cannot be achieved 
independently of the generation of consumer-demand in Department I 
internationally. This is not to suggest that within the limits of the 
recession there cannot be better and worse policies. On the contrary, the 
better policy for 'the nation' will be the one that acknowledges the 
limits which the recession in the world capitalist economy places on 
economic behavior and material life, and prepares, not for miracles in 
the downturn, but either to make the most of the upturn when it comes or 
to withdraw from the capitalist system. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
1. This is nothing, of course, compared with the paradox that nuclear 
weapons are socially useful because they realize their ~rice of 
proauction on the market. I believe this indicates a contrad1ction in 
capitalism rather than in the labour theory of value. 
2. This equation is also presented by Ernest Mandel, See his 
'Introduction' In Marx, K (1978) Capital Vol.II. Hammondsworth,Penguin. p.27. -
3. The fractionation of surplus-value in these terms indicates that it 
goes into different 'funds' - one for variable capital, one for constant 
capital and one for capitalists' consumption. This is the case with the 
surplus-value of both aepartments. Hence:-
Is/x + Is/y/ + Is/z = Is 
IIs/p + IIs/q + IIs/r = lis 
4. For a similar description see Mandel's 'Introduction' In Marx, K (1978) QQ,cit, The pu~ose of this description, like the equation c1ted 
in 2. aoove 1s not to demonstrate anything new or original. However, in 
the exposition of Marx's reproduction schema£ which is well known to most 
Marxists, it is useful to draw on Mandel as ne is a writer with whom I am 
familiar. 
5. Marx, K (1978) QQ.cit. p,586. 
6, Post Festum: literally 'after the feast'. An expression sometimes 
used by"""""Harx. '!'he post festum assertion of the law of value is an idea 
which expresses the 1rrat1onal1ty of capitalist production; that is, of 
the short-term o~y of accumulat1on which is indulged with total abandon, 
and which only later reveals bad effects given the goal of long-term 
expans1on. 
7. We will see the reasons for this in Chapter VII. 
8. Marx, K (1977) Capital Vol.III. Moscow, Progress. p,484, 
9, One of the biggest controversies surroundin9 Luxemburg's work is 
the question of whetner or not she is in fact an underconsum~tionist'. 
That isL whether, for her, underconsumption is the sole and f1nal cause 
of capi~alist cr1ses. Ernest Mandel, who writes on Luxemburg under the 
heading of underconsumption theories Marxist Economic Theore· Vol.I. 
pp,361-63) defines underconsumptionism thus: "In order o explain 
periodical crises£ the supporters of underconsumption theories start from 
the condiction Detween the tendency to unlimited development of 
production and the tendency to limitation in consumption by the broad 
masses, a contradiction wh1ch is indeed characteristic of the capitalist 
mode of production," Mandel's definition of underconsumption is 
essentially the same as mine:- problems of the realization of the 
surplus-value of Department 11. 
ButL M. Bleaney (Underconsumption Theories. p.144) points out that to 
avert ~he crises with wh1ch Luxemburg 1s concerned ",,,buyers of means of 
production will do just as well as .Eluyers of consumption goods •.. " from 
which he deduces ... the non-underconsumotionist character of Rosa 
Luxemburg's ideas," Where does this leave us? 
The theory of underconsumptionism here alluded to is clearly not 
Luxembu~'s whole theory. Without going further into the question we can 
at best JUSt1fy, what may be, a straw woman on analytic grounds- it will 
help us answer the question of the role of underconsumption in crisis. 
Whether the non-underconsumptionist portions of Luxemburg's theorY 
mitigate the undoubted underconsumptionist parts, rendering the whole 
non-underconsumptionist in some sense is another question. 
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10. The Accumulation of Capital p.137. 
11. Tarbuck, K (ed.) - R. Luxemburg and N. Bukharin: Imperialism and 
the Accumulation Q( Capital p.201 
12. Mandel, E (1980) The Second Slump London, Verso. p.51. 
13. Ibid. p.51. 
14. Marx, K (1977) Capital Vol.III. Moscow, Progress. p,484. 
15. Mandel, E (1980) QQ.cit. p,143, 
16 This is one of Mandel's expressions For references to 
'Tonalities' see, for example Late Capitalism pp,1~0-32, 168, 180, 190, 442, 446, 459. --
17. Tourism will also help satisfy the need for this demand the only 
difference beingL that insteaa Of the product going OUt to the DUyer, the 
buyer comes to ~he product. However, in the tourist line marketing is 
also necessary, ana the government has provided this, with a notable 
increase in Japanese tourists to New Zealand in recent years. 
18. P.A. Management Consultants Ltd: N.Z. ComYTnb Profitability 
1972/73-1981 Auckland. p,21. (More recent figures unava1 ale) 
19. T.V. 1 News November 2, 1983. 
20. Mandel, E (1980) The Second Slump. gg.cit. p,30, 
21. P.A. Management Consultants Ltd. QQ.cit. pp.?? 
22. Excepting the fact that New Zealand must follow Australia in 
devaluation to retain its capital investment. 
23. New Zealand Yearbook 1980 p.564, 
25. P.A. Management Consultants Ltd. QQ.cit. p.20. 
26. The government will open up the market for Australia - see The 
Press, Christchurch, November 10, 1983, import licencing to be phased out 
1n favour of tariffs. This is to allow imports of Australian goods, but 
not other overseas goods coming through Australia. 
Chapter V 
THE PERIODICITY OF CRISES UNDER CAPITALISM 
We now have the means of explaining capitalist crises as such. In the 
previous chapter we elaborated the crucial ideas of disproportionality, 
underconsumption and over-accumulation; and discussed their reciprocity 
with trends in the rate of profit. This explanation of the capitalist 
economy is based on the analysis of capital itself, and its basic unit -
the commodity. Therefore, we came to the conclusion that capitalism is 
constantly in a state of incipient crisis. The trauma of the capitalist 
system of production is self-induced and inalienable. 
This leads us to the next question. If crises are inevitable can we 
predict when they will occur? The answer to this question hardly requires 
an elaborate body of theory, for the regular periodicity of crises has 
been well documented for over 150 years. The regular cycles of relative 
prosperity and crisis are known as industrial cycles and are historically 
specific to the capitalist mode of production. 
In this chapter I attempt to show that the explanation of crisis at 
which we have arrived is simultaneously an explanation of the industrial 
cycle. That is to say, since the explanation is based on the analysis of 
capital, the way that crises occur in the capitalist system in reality is 
the way we would expect them to occur. Besides this, two sources of 
variation in the frequency and amplitude of industrial cycles are 
discussed. These are the economic planning of big capital (Section 2), 
and the conscious policy of the state (Section 3), which are of 
particular importance under late capitalism. 
5.1 MARXIST THEORIES OF CYCLICAL CRISIS 
To begin with we will look at three variants of the 'Marxist theory of 
cyclical crises'. The three variants are drawn from an essay by Thomas E. 
Weisskopf, and it is basically his account of them that is presented 
here.(1) To understand the theories we must understand the key role which 
Marxists generally attribute to the rate of profit in crises. 
Capital is value in search of accretion. It follows that capital must 
be profitable. If money, productive commodities and labour-power cease to 
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yield a profit, they cease to act as capital. If the capitalist cannot 
realize a profit, he cannot expand production because he does not have 
the material means to do so; if he cannot realize a normal profit he will 
not expand production because, 
profitable investment. Thus, 
as capital personified, he seeks only 
a falling rate of profit provides both the 
objective and subjective conditions for a contraction of production and 
crisis under capitalism. On this understanding the following theories 
attempt to account for the genesis of periodic declines in the rate of 
profit which signal the onset of crisis. The three variants are: the 
theory of the rising organic composition of capital, underconsumption 
theory and the theory of the exhaustion of the reserve army of labour. 
1. The rising organic composition of capital. This theory is 
predicated on changes in the conditions of production. It rests on two 
hypotheses: 1) the ratio of constant to variable capital will tend to 
rise, and 2) the rate of surplus-value will not change much. Given that 
s/v is constant, the ratio of profit to total company income remains 
constant within a firm. Roug conversion to price terms will look like 
this(2): 
Mass of Profit s 
-------------------------- = Company Output (or Income) s+v 
Now, taken together, the first and second hypotheses imply that the ratio 
of output (or income) to capital stock will tend to fall:-
Output (or Income) s+v s/v + 1 
------------------ = = ---------Capital Stock c c/v 
Clearly, if s/v remains constant and c/v, the organic composition of 
capital, rises, the fraction will decline, indicating that output does 
not rise in the same proportion to capital stock. Since the mass of 
profit and company output are proportional, a diminution of output 
against total capital denotes a declining rate of profit. But what is the 
cause of this falling ratio? Since this theory abstracts from demand 
structures and deals only with production, the only reason for a decline 
in the ratio of output to total capital is that as total capital 
increases the potential net output decreases relative to it.(3) In other 
words, the additional capital will be less productive than the original 
capital, value for value. 
Now, productive capacity is a function of the total real capital stock 
and the available labour-hours, and so the fall in the rate of profit 
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ultimately requires a diminution in available labour-hours as against 
total capital. In concrete terms this can only occur in two ways. First, 
if the accumulation of capital outstrips the increase in the working 
population; second, if the new capital is technologically devolving 
(labour-wasting), During an expansion, two things can occur: either 
capital is accumulated to the point where there are not enough workers to 
ensure that productive capacity rises at the same rate as capital, or 
the capital accumulated is of a quality precluding the corresponding 
expansion of the labour army, or both. In each case, rates of return 
decline, causing contraction. Contraction alleviates the problem of 
labour shortage and/or the problem of over-accumulation per se, 
stimulating a new round of investment and so on. 
Both of these senarios abstract from the real situation under 
capitalism insofar as technological innovation is concerned, The second 
(devolving technology) can be rejected out of hand as ahistorical, 
counter to the laws of capitalism and accidental and atypical where it 
does occur. The first possibility seems tenable until we remember that 
the 'labour-hours available' 
and therefore the level 
are relative to the productivity of labour 
of technological development. If the 
accumulation of capital is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the 
productivity of labour, then balanced growth (labour-hours/capital) may 
continue while the working population employed neither grows nor shrinks. 
Certainly, increases in the productivity of labour today outstrip the 
value-accumulation of capital, causing a relative surplus working 
population on a world scale,(4) This theory, then, cannot stand alone as 
an explanation for periodic crises. 
2. Underconsumption. This theory rests on three hypotheses: 1) 
capitalist development tends to distribute income in favour of profits 
and against wages, 2) the propensity to consume out of wage income is 
significantly greater than that to consume out of profits, and 3) the 
investment demand derived from profit is not sufficient to support sales, 
since investment capital derived from consumer-spending, Let us assume as 
a starting point close to full utilization of productive capacity. Given 
that the realization of profits ultimately depends on wage goods 
(combination of 2) and 3)), the ratio of demand to output will decline, 
as wages cannot possibly be equivalent to costs (including wages) plus 
profit. As actual output adjusts to lower demand, a gap will grow between 
potential net output (productive capacity) and effective monetary demand. 
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This leads to a decline in the ratio of actual output and productive 
capacity which can be termed under-utilization of productive capacity. Up 
to a certain stage in the cycle, of course, actual output may continue to 
grow, albeit - like demand - at a slower rate than productive capacity. 
This would still denote an increase in under-utilization. Assuming a 
constant rate of surplus-value (or at least one that is not increasing at 
the same rate as actual output is declining), the decline in the actual 
output (or income) signals a decline in the mass of profit. If this is 
coupled with a simultaneous (relative) increase in productive capacity 
(capital stock with or without additional workers), then the rate of 
profit will fall. The contraction which follows must serve the objective 
function of destroying unutilizable capital (in value terms), lowering 
the wage component of capital to make production profitable, facilitating 
orders from Department II to Department I, generating consumer demand 
among the workers in D and making it more profitable again to invest. 
While the 'organic composition of capital' tbeory locates the ultimate 
cause of crises in the decline of productive capacity as against capital 
stock (that is, purely in the sphere of production), the 
'underconsumption' theory finds it in a decline in actual output 
conditioned by consumer demand as against full productive capacity. We 
have already seen the general form of the critique of underconsumption 
theory (Chapter IV, Section 2.3.1). Generally, underconsumptionism 
abstracts from the inherently uneven development of the capitalist system 
and sees only a uniform capital on one side and a uniform working-class 
(quantitative) demand structure on the other.. The primary forms of uneven 
development left out of consideration by underconsumption theories are by 
firm and sector on the one hand and by department on the other. In the 
first case underconsumptionism abstracts from the victors and casualties 
of the competitive struggle. Only if the demand for commodities is 
distributed evenly over firms and sectors, and if there is therefore no 
surplus-profit, will underconsumption hit the economy as a whole, 
necessitating a downward turn in the industrial cycle. Moreover, upon 
recovery, capital, rates of profit and demand would have to rise like 
water to their old level. The real situation is one of competitive 
struggle for the distribution of the surplus-value which is realized. 
Underconsumption is spread more or less unevenly over the weaker sectors. 
The abstraction from competition, in fact, posits the desired solution 
in the premises to the argument, and the same is true at the departmental 
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level. In order to show that the commodities of Department II cannot be 
sold, it is necessary to assume that Department I grows more slowly or at 
the same rate as Department II (i.e., that sufficient demand is not 
generated in Department I). In fact, it will have to grow at exactly the 
same rate, as it is inconceivable that Department II should accumulate 
capital not produced in Department I. Now, we know that over the whole 
system, wages and capitalist consumption is less than the total product 
in value terms. Therefore, if an increase in the production of means of 
production and an expansion of the aggregate demand generated in 
Department I is necessarily followed by a proportionate increase in the 
scale of production of Department II, then unrealized surplus-value will 
continue to accumulate in Department II of necessity, and Department I 
cannot suffer overproduction by definition. In reality, such a situation 
could arise only accidentally and could not be sustained (in which 
respect underconsumption theorists are quite correct). Under all other 
conditions, underconsumption can not be entertained as the sole and 
ultimate cause of crises. 
3. The 'exhaution of the reserve army' theory, This theory rests on 
four hypotheses: 1) capitalist development tends to deplete the reserve 
army of labour as economic growth exceeds growth in the working 
population, 2) the scarcity of labour increases the political-economic 
power of workers vis-a-vis capitalists, allowing strong worker 
organizations, 3) the increase in workers' power precedes an increase in 
average unit labour costs, and 4) capitalists will not pass on the whole 
of this cost increase to the consumer in higher prices (presumably 
because of competition), and so the share of income to wages increases 
relative to the share to profits. The decrease in the ratio of profits to 
total income is the original source of the decline in the rate of profit 
in this theory, and so the cause of crises is clearly seen as existing in 
the sphere of distribution. An increase in the factor share of wages will 
lower the rate of surplus-value, and thence the rate of profit, ceteris 
paribus, causing a contraction of investment, and in physical production 
and money flows. The contraction restores the reserve army of labour, 
weakens workers' organizations and allows a swing in factor shares of 
income to profit. This will condition a recovery. 
In considering this theory of cyclical crises, it is useful first of 
all to distinguish between the industrial cycle and the less frequent 
'long-term cycle' which have come to be associated with N.D. 
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Kondratief,(5) The longer cycles of contraction and expansion as an 
empirical phenomenon run their ascendant course in about 25 years, and 
have a downward swing lasting 25 years also. Since the beginning of the 
Second World War, we have seen an ascendant long-term cycle, lasting 
until the mid-nineteen-sixties, and most of the following downward swing 
to the present. Now, the point to note is that the industrial cycle 
continues to oscillate within the long-term cycle, describing periods of 
contraction despite the continuing presence of a reserve army of labour 
in the downward portion of the long-term cycle, and periods of expansion 
despite full employment and high wages in its ascendant portion. The 
second of these trends laid the basis for the entry of women into the 
workforce in the Post-War era, and in combination with uneven development 
prepares the emergence of migrant labouring populations. Since empirical 
reality seems to fly in the face of the 'exhaustion of the reserve army 
of labour' theory, can we pinpoint the theoretical flaw? I think we can. 
In sections 1 and 3 of Chapter 25 of Capital, Volume I, Marx examines 
the relationships of the industrial reserve army of labour, the 
industrial cycle and the level of wages. From a perusal of this material, 
the following remarks on the hypotheses put forward in the 'exhaustion of 
the reserve army' theory are suggested: 
Hypothesis 1 states that "capitalist development tends to deplete the 
reserve of labour." Marx is in basic agreement with this, but he goes 
further in including the counter-tendency of the rising organic 
composition of capital in his calculation of the expansion and 
contraction of the reserve army, and he does not assume that full 
employment necessarily replaces unemployment, i.e., 
historical question. 
for him it is an 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 concern the concrete mechanisms through which a 
depletion of the reserve army leads to wage rises, Marx is clear on this 
point. "Taking them as a whole, the general movements of wages are 
exclusively regulated by the expansion and contraction of the reserve 
army ..•• "(6) Again, agreement. 
Hypothesis 4 puts forward the idea that wage rises are the prime cause 
of a decline in the rate of profit. Here is where Marx differs. The 
movements of capital, its expansion and contraction, cannot be due to 
semi-extraneous causes. Capital, itself, is the subject of Marx's book 
because it is the central determinant in the capitalist mode of 
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production. Let us finish that quote:- "Taking them as a whole, the 
general movements of wages are exclusively regulated by the expansion and 
contraction of the reserve army, and these again correspond to the 
periodic changes of the industrial cycle."(l) Thus, where the 'exhaustion 
of the reserve army' theory would proffer the following order of 
determination of events: industrial reserve army --> rate of wages --> 
rate of accumulation, Marx himself would wish to turn this full circle 
and say: rate of accumulation --> industrial reserve army --> rate of 
wages. An investigation following these reformulated lines would be 
informative about wage rates, but would merely beg the question of the 
industrial cycle, since the rate of accumulation (our object of study) is 
independent. 
In similar fashion, Marx polemicizes against the vulgar economists 
(e.g., Malthus) who attribute the industrial cycle to the expansion and 
contraction of physical population: " ... that would indeed be a beautiful 
law, which pretends to make the action of capital dependent on the 
absolute variation of the population, instead of regulating the demand 
and supply of labour by alternate expansion and contraction of capital 
[i.e., the industial cycle]." Malthus and Co. thus had yet another order 
of determination: available labour-power --> rate of accumulation --> 
rate of wages. This too is incorrect.(8) 
The criticism of the 'exhaustion of the reserve army of labour' theory 
must now gain some subtlety, for there is a grain of truth in it. Once 
the rate of accumulation produces a certain reserve army and this acts 
upon wage rates, Marx says that wages, if rising, may in fact tend to 
stifle accumulation. Thus, on the one hand, he emphasizes more than 
once: " ..• the decennial cycle and periodic phases, which moreover as 
accumulation advances, are complicated ~ irregular oscillations 
following each other more and more guickly ..•. "(i) These oscillations in 
fact are due to the operation of laws something like those posited in the 
'exhaustion of the reserve army' theory, but not in the economy as a 
whole- only in the supply and demand for labour between branches.(10) On 
the other hand, wage rises do contribute, at certain parts of the cycle, 
to the real strangulation of accumulation, as in the very low part of the 
cycle where wages must fall to revive the rate of profit. However, even 
here capital is still determinant since, with contraction of capital and 
the reconstitution of the reserve army, wages do in fact fall. Marx does 
not elaborate the actual causes of the industrial cycle, and as is well 
known, nowhere did he leave a systematic analysis of crisis.(11) 
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Therefore, the third theory of cyclical crisis covered has no 
particular interest for us here. The first two theories of crisis on the 
other hand are, in one respect, almost totally correct, but suffer a 
common damning flaw. While they are correct in isolating a true effect 
of capitalist development, which turns into a cause of capitalist crisis, 
they proceed to abstract from every other real contributing element of 
crisis. On the contrary, we have seen that these theories cannot 
singlehandedly explain crisis. 
Our analysis suggests that the over-accumulation of capital (Theory 
1), and the inadequate consumer power of the working class (Theory 2) 
both play a role in crisis. They interact mutually, and with departmental 
disproportionality and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (i.e., 
in a semi-autonomous way) to motivate a dynamic first of over-production 
and inadequate realization of surplus-value, then of spreading then 
general contraction. Just as the regularity of the industrial cycle tends 
to disconfirm the idea that crises are accidental in capitalism, it also 
tends to indicate a regular interplay of the factors mentioned above. 
Hence, we must attempt to set out a multi-factoral dynamic model of the 
industrial cycle. Much of what follows is already contained at different 
places in the preceding analysis. 
In a passing comment on the industrial cycle, Marx writes: "The course 
characteristic of modern industry, viz., a decennial cycle (interrupted 
by smaller oscillations) [consists] of periods of average activity, 
production at high pressure, crisis and stagnation •••. "(12) Here Marx 
identifies four phases in the industrial cycle. The cycle must turn into 
an upswing, this rise must accellerate, it must turn down and it must 
decline. We can now distinguish four phases of the industrial cycle: 
stagnation, recovery, boom and crisis.(13) 
Stagnation. At the beginning of the low part of the cycle there·are 
both too many commodities and too much capital accumulated in Department 
II. Orders to Department I have contracted. But Department II goes on 
selling its commodities and the process of clearing excess stocks begins, 
albeit at a slow rate. Department II also goes on producing with the 
fixed capital it has accumulated and so need not place orders with 
Department I. For these reasons the level of production in Department I 
falls below that of Department II in the depression, preparing what we 
might call the 'original disproportion'. Wages fall under pressure of a 
still growing reserve army of labour. At first production carries on with 
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the aid of credit, which is inflationary,(14) With stagnation, however, 
many firms have already been ruined, and the demand for money drops off. 
Only at the bottom of the cycle does the rate of contraction of capital 
overtake the rate at which the rate of profit is declining. 
Recovery, During the slump the rate of profit has been very low, such 
that no reduction in interest rates could revive investment. But as stock 
piles of consumer goods dwindle with lower prices and less productive 
activity, the price of goods stops falling and slight reinvestment is 
stimulated in Department II. At this time capitals in Department II start 
to think about retooling, since the prices of raw materials and means of 
production are at their lowest, and wages remain low because of the 
swelled reserve army of labour. Prices have stabilized, and reinvestment 
will be profitable. The funds for the new, devalued, fixed capital have 
been hoarded during the period of stagnation by only a fraction of all 
capitals, whose advantage is thus also reproduced on an expanded scale in 
the next cycle. The new fixed capital involves new technological advances 
developed at the height of the boom, which have lain idle and 
depreciating for the whole of the recession. This situation of a few 
leading capitals retooling with cheap means of production when the market 
is clearing encourages investment by raising profit expectations. The 
rate of interest has fallen with the low demand for money, hence, once 
the leading capitals have proved profitability, credit is readily 
available at affordable rates. Thus, profitable investment in Department 
II recommences. 
Orders begin to flow from Department II to Department I, reviving 
selected sectors. This increases employment and consumer power for the 
realization of the surplus-value of Department II without increasing wage 
rates in either department. This stimulates further investment in the 
production of consumer goods. Department I cannot immediately cope with 
the orders; hence, prices rise and so do profits. Department II increases 
its labour army and sets it to work on old means of production. Hence, 
the organic compostion of capital tends to fall, not rise, This keeps the 
general rate of profit rising, as do low wages and faster turnover times. 
A rising rate of profit and a steady rate of interest, up to a certain 
point, further ensure rising investment rates and retooling. 
Boom. The original disproportion in growth in favour of Department II 
is transformed into its opposite as orders for fixed capital flood in. 
Department I undergoes a boom of activity as it strives to meet the very 
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profitable demand, and capital flows into this department. This 
disproportion is exacerbated by the durable nature of fixed capital 
(seven, ten or fifteen years' 'worth' must be purchased in one set of 
plant), and, the expansion of the capital of Department II also requires 
seven to ten years' worth of additional means of production. The 
expansion of the capital goods sector is the main reason for the 
depletion of the reserve army, which increases consumer power and 
temporarily removes all limits from the expansion of Department II except 
the rate at which it can install new capital. The smaller the reserve 
army becomes, the higher wages can go, Hoarded money is now dissipated 
and so interest rates rise. On a rising productive base all forms of 
speculation and lending become profitable. 
Crisis. The demand created by even full employment is not unlimited. 
At a certain stage in the cycle, the supply of consumer goods exceeds 
social demand because of the rapid increase in absolute output and the 
productivity of labour. However, at the height of the boom new 
replacement and additional capital goods have already been ordered and 
continue to be ordered for several reasons. 1) Consumer goods continue to 
be sold to merchants and shop-keepers who do not wish to reduce their 
turnover and are not yet clear whether or not the market is in decline, 
or what their share of a possible decline would be. 2) High wages mean 
that a decline in realization may turn into a decline in the rate of 
surplus-value and then a decline in the rate of profit. The tendency, 
therefore, is to increase capitalization to ensure a normal market share. 
3) Each individual capitalist knows that if he adjusts his output to 
demand(15), other capitals will not follow suit but will increase their 
organic compositions of capital to raise their individual rate of profit 
above the average, The now high rate of interest reduces net profit to 
borrowers and evokes further investment to maintain the mass of profit. 
Thus, it is impossible both to judge the point where supply exceeds 
demand and to achieve a uniform adjustment of production to that point. 
With overproduction in Department II, underconsumption is soon felt, 
first by retailers who have overstocked. As their rates of profit begin 
to fall, they cut their losses by cheapening commodities. Orders to 
producers decline at the same time as production capacity and output 
reach their heights. The capitalist is unsure of the signals he receives 
from the market and so increases productivity as far as possible above 
average, 
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The increase in tho organic composition of capital is, by itself, 
sufficient to induce a decline in the general rate of profit all things 
remaining equal, at this stage. This declining rate of profit heralds 
simultaneous over-accumulation (over-capacity of means of production) and 
overproduction. On the doorstep of the real crisis, the reinvestment 
funds of the various capitalists are tied up in commodity stocks. 
Considerable tension thus arises in the money market, where interest 
rates undergo another, smaller peak as capitalists seek working capital 
to pay wages, buy raw materials and take receipt of new fixed capital 
without lowering commodity prices to move stock. The constant capital 
they have accumulated is not valorized at the normal rate as effective 
(realized) turnover slows right down. Since they cannot get back the 
money invested in constant capital at the normally expanded rate, 
capitalists now hold on to it for longer, especially as the money market 
tightens up. This capital lies idle and so does not employ workers, which 
sqeezes consumer-power and tends to reduce sales still further. The 
increase in the ratio of constant capital to realized surplus-value 
indicates a further decline in the rate of profit. Eventually, 
commodities are devalorized and sold to pay bank loans. 
As it becomes clear that it is now a case of sharing losses and not 
profits, each capital in Department II wants a smaller and not a larger 
share. For this reason, and because greater quantities of the 
reinvestment fund are needed for working capital, the expansion of 
production in Department II slows down and in some sectors begins to 
contract. This means that orders to Department I decrease. Department I 
has itself been subject to capital accumulation during the 'over-heating' 
period and the first phase of the 'real' crisis. Overproduction of 
consumer goods thus turns into overproduction of capital goods. This 
disproportion now subjects Department I to the same rigours which 
Department II has undergone. Only here, the idle capacity is on average 
much greater in value terms. This, now unused, fixed capital was bought 
with credit money to a larger extent (capital flowed in at the beginning 
of the boom attracted by the higher rate of profit), and a rising rate of 
interest now militates against Department I being propped up with credit 
to the extent of Department II. Moreover, it has now become a case of 
banks trying to avoid losses too. At the beginning of the crisis they 
were inclined to lend in order to protect existing investment loans. By 
the time Department I needs credit support, however, the banks are less 
likely to give it, so the sector most in need of support is hardest hit. 
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Department I is now forced to limit its expansion and production, workers 
are laid off and so a vital source of consumer demand dwindles producing 
a new level of underconsumption and corresponding reductions in the rate 
of profit, which again finds its way into the ledgers of Department I. 
As credit becomes the only antidote to the worse effects of the crisis 
- ruin - a disproportion develops between productive sectors and lending 
sectors. Interest rates climb relatively, above the rate of profit which 
makes banks very selective in their lending policies. Companies now cut 
prices to realize working capital and sell off assets. Bankruptcies begin 
to proliferate, there are defaults on orders, and accounts are unpaid. 
Prices continue to fall, profit rates and production drop to their lowest 
level. 
5.2 OVER-ACCUMULATION AND FINANCE CAPITAL 
In this section I look at crisis and recovery again with special 
reference to the role of over-accumulation in these phases of the 
industrial cycle. Then the response of finance capital to the crisis is 
discussed and I attempt to draw some conclusions about the influence of 
this response back on the industrial cycle. 
5.2.1 Over-Accumulation and Crisis 
From the contrasting nature of the two antithetical phases of the 
industrial cycle - crisis and recovery - we can derive the objective 
function of crises in the capitalist economy. The conditions which 
correspond to crisis are too much real (commodities) and potential (idle 
means of production) productive capacity in society as compared with the 
effective capacity of the working class to consume. The conditions for 
recovery, therefore, are the dissipation of these values, or the 
devalorization of the excess capital. This is necessarily attended by 
minimal growth (if any), and low rates of profit. It is also accompanied 
by the reconstitution of the original disproportion. Once this condition 
applies, production may fall marginally below demand, profits increase, 
and investment again becomes viable. 
The ground for a recession is prepared by a falling rate of profit. 
Increasingly, Keynesian inflationary anti-cyclical policies are unable to 
avert recessions by keeping the real rate of profit out of company 
ledgers until the upswing in the industrial cycle.(16) Such was the case 
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in 1974, and the recession was very hard-hitting, At the point of 
downturn government subvention and stimulation of the economy (in a word, 
injection of money from outside the regular sphere of circulation) begins 
to have bad inflationary effects. As book earning rates fall, costs go up 
and demand tapers off. Comparisons with inflation adjusted-investments 
(even savings stock which returns no real profit) are unfavourable, and 
interest rates climb above rates of profit. At this time the stock of 
commodities grows simultaneously with capital invested in stocks (i.e., 
unproductively invested), In short, capital does not reinvest at the 
normally expanded rate because, in the first place, it cannot realize 
enough of its surplus-value to do this, and, secondly, the disposable 
income that is on hand is either used as working capital or turned into 
stocks and shares, since it is not expected to return an adequate profit 
in the future, Objectively, all fail to complete their circuit and cease 
to act as capital in their sphere of origin.(17) 
According to the laws of uneven development, however, the point of 
contraction is different for different firms and sectors. Fluid finance 
capital ideally attempts to avoid the pressure to contract by being 
mobile between sectors. It successively invades profitable spheres and 
evacuates less profitable ones, Here it demonstrates its superiority 
even over monopoly capital, for while the latter is able to withdraw only 
temporarily from the equilization of profit rates the former is 
permanently involved, but being superbly mobile it can continually invest 
where profits are above-average, and withdraw before equalization is 
realized and turns to over-compensation, This is why investment in 
stocks and bonds, mediated through finance institutions, is for a time so 
much more profitable than the average capital, or the single capital on 
average. Firms that at first avoid contraction cannot do so 
indefinitely in a 'climate of stagnation'. They maintain normal expansion 
only because they have won out in the competitive struggle which has been 
intensified by the falling rate of profit, underconsumption and prior 
contractions. But, to say that they are more competitive is to say that 
they have a higher organic composition of capital and thus, partially at 
least, the burden of general overproduction is moved onto other firms. 
They utilize all their capital at the extra cost of over-capacity to 
others through the more efficient use of labour. This, in itself, merely 
signifies continuing downward pressure on the rate of profit, more 
extensive contraction, and a new round of competition at the next level 
of labour productivity. At each level the less productive firms drop 
away. 
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The same developments or conditions which produce a rising organic 
composition of capital, a great mass of commodities, accelerated 
accumulation and a declining rate of profit simultaneously produce a 
relative surplus working population. At the point where it is apparent 
that too much capital has been working overtime, it is clear that 
relative to the rate at which capital can expand too many workers have 
been employed to set it in motion. As the law of value impresses on the 
capitalist class its excess of capital, it also reveals that there is too 
large a working population relative to the profitable level of 
utilization of capital. The new employment of workers ceases, and some 
additional workers are 'set free'. Insofar as the working population is 
mobile, it moves into more profitable spheres along with capital, but, 
generally, unemployment increases. This is not helped by the fact that 
the most profitable branches of industry depend for their above-average 
share of surplus-value on greater labour productivity and constant 
technological revolution, which makes the expansion of their labour 
armies less than proportionate with their expansion overall. In other 
sectors, as I mentioned in the previous section, as soon as it becomes 
clear that it is now a case of sharing losses and not profit, each 
capital wants a smaller, not a larger, share. Therefore, contraction of 
production and labour armies follows over-accumulation. 
5.2.2 Over-Accumulation and Recovery 
The excess capacity of constant capital, working through the period 
when the excess is as yet unrecognized, produces general overproduction 
in Department II, spreading to the whole economy as the imbalance of 
growth swings in its favour. When the crisis hits, this overcapacity and 
overproduction is redressed by the withdrawal and destruction of capital 
(this latter need not involve the physical destruction of means of 
production, but only of their capacity to act as capital, which means the 
destruction of their value, or devalorization). Ideally, capital to the 
value of excess capital will be devalorized. This is the objective 
function of crisis in capitalist production. There are various means by 
which this devalorization might take effect:-
1. Commodity stocks have to be sold below their price of production 
to be sold at all. Failing this, they may be more or less 
permanently withdrawn from circulation by physical and moral 
depreciation. 
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2. Various forms of credit and account are defaulted on, hence they 
are withdrawn by deferred payment and destroyed by writing off, 
bankrupcies, etc. 
3, Fixed capital lies idle and is subject to permanent withdrawal or 
physical and moral depreciation. Raw materials depreciate. 
4. Variable capital is depreciated by the depression of wages below 
their hitherto more or less regular value by the presence of a 
growing reserve army of labour. 
The devalorization is distributed unevenly in the competitive 
struggle. Some capitals are destroyed, others come to a standstill and 
some suffer mere under-utilization. The 'withdrawal' of capital, we have 
seen, is sometimes equivalent to its tranfer into sectors of continuing 
profitability, such as monopoly and imperialist sectors. If the leading 
capitals reach the limit of the transfer of the burden of the crisis on 
to other sectors, then these investments too may devalorize with a crash 
in the stock market and a bank panic. At that stage we have depression, 
and new sources of surplus-profit must be found.(18) The withdrawal of 
capital is often more overtly speculative, with quick transfers of 
stocks, land or gold. However, in the course of the crisis these 
commodities themselves steadily devalue, and it is unlikely that the 
money-owners selling out of land or gold at the end of the recession 
(i.e,, to cash in on rising industrial profits) will recover their 
original investment even though land and/or gold may have been the best 
investment open to them. Gold and land then revalue in the course of the 
boom - absorbing value which will be re-emitted during the next 
recession. 
In the case of commodity stocks we must distinguish between the 
departments. The surplus of durable goods in Department II may be slowly 
cleared, or part of the surplus may never sell and depreciate on the 
shelf because of the limited introduction of a better or cheaper product 
during the crisis, bankrupcy and wastage, physical depreciation or a 
changing use-value structure of demand. Perishable consumer goods will, 
all things remaining equal, suffer an initial loss and then sell at 
reduced rates with steadily falling prices. The commodities of Department 
I are not consumer goods, but so long as the consumer market is glutted 
they will depreciate, for there sale depends on a rising rate of profit 
in Department II, and that cannot occur before supply falls below social 
demand. Hence, unlike consumer goods which are sold as they depreciate, 
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capital goods depreciate but are not sold until the consumer market .is 
finally cleared. In the process of being sold they revalue because of the 
disproportion between the two departments. They are generally durable and 
so do not physically depreciate before use, and because they embody 
never-before introduced technology, there is no reason why moral 
depreciation should not be mitigated by increasing demand. 
With the lion's share of capital tied up in commodity stocks and means 
of production, ready money becomes the increasing focus of business 
dealings in the crisis. Each firm needs 1) bank credit to provide a wage 
fund as an increasing proportion of wages is set down to come out of next 
months returns, to pay for auxiliary services, and to pay off one account 
whilst running up another, 2) credit or account, for delivery of raw 
materials, premises, transport and mechanical repairs, etc. At the same 
time, each firm is forced to extend credit to its buyers to ensure sales. 
When a large percentage of available money credit and credit of account 
is working, the money market becomes tight for creditors are 
simultaneously debtors vis-a-vis other sources of credit. Where the 
credit does not 'stretch', bankruptcies follow, with deleterious effects 
on creditors who are obliged to write off the account at least partially. 
Installed fixed capital depreciates through use as normal, although 
more slowly. The effects of shutdowns and idleness depreciate capital 
physically. The major point of moral depreciation of fixed capital is in 
recovery, when there is a rush to install new machinery and old capital 
becomes relatively less productive and thus less profitable. Where a firm 
suffers bankruptcy, or comes to a standstill, its assets are often 
stripped from the plant and sold off at depreciated rates to cut losses. 
Raw materials, 
fixed capital, 
good might. In 
which should experience a slightly more steady demand than 
nevertheless depreciate in the same ways as a consumer 
a depression raw materials production slows right down, 
and prices fall. 
In the presence of a swelled reserve army of labour, wages also fall, 
and this is another factor which sets the scene for a reconstitution of 
normal capitalist production. A decrease in the average wage increases 
the rate of surplus-value, which provides a tendency (not expressed in 
crisis) for the rate of profit to rise. This is reinforced in Department 
II by the cheapening of raw materials and curtailment of all but 
essential maintenance and servicing of fixed capital. A higher rate of 
surplus-value on a smaller labour army and a smaller yearly capital 
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investment, although objectively favourable conditions, still need the 
final sign - the clearing of the consumer good market, relative increase 
of demand and stabilization of prices. Investment now begins to look more 
profitable in Department II and means of production are at their 
cheapest. Firms look to retool. Prices in Department I stabilize, then 
rise rapidly, and the recovery is achieved. 
5.2.3 Finance capital 
To mitigate a crisis, a certain proportion must be struck between 
withdrawal of capital and its destruction. The distinction here depends 
on whether or not the capital revalues and is useful again after the 
recession. When means of production lie idle, they have been withdrawn 
from circulation, but they are not necessarily destroyed as capital. If 
they depreciate and cannot be either sold at value or set to work 
profitably then capital has been destroyed. If they weather the 
recession, and emerge with their full value to operate just as before, 
then capital was withdrawn but not destroyed. Now, it is highly unlikely 
that a machine, for example, would endure a crisis in this way, for the 
function of crises under capitalism is to destroy capital. On the other 
hand, it is likely that a certain quantity of money capital constantly 
being turned to the most profitable investment would endure. Thus, 
finance capital is able, effectively, to withdraw from circulation in 
sectors experiencing overproduction, and, rather than depreciating, 
invest in the most profitable or least unprofitable sectors. The 
withdrawal of capital in this way 'cheats' the industrial cycle, for the 
capital is not destroyed but maintains or expands its value and after the 
crisis is fresh and useful for making bigger profits. 
As more and more capital becomes concentrated as fluid finance 
capital, in fewer, more capable hands, the ability of the key (big) 
individual executive boards to reduce the effects of crisis to their 
capital at first increases. This has a dual effect. On the one hand, it 
means a multiplication of the destruction of numerous smaller firms in 
order to achieve a sufficiently high proportion of destruction to 
withdrawal of capital overall. This pushes up the profit of finance 
capital even further above average. On the other hand, with the growing 
concentration and centralization of capital in banks and finance 
institutions, withdrawal without destruction reaches its limits. That is, 
insufficient capital is destroyed to allow an up-turn. Since 1974 it 
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seems that the correct proportion has been impossible to achieve. 
Revaluation and reinvestment after 1974 was too great, and another slump 
followed in 1978. Thus, in the medium run a complete recovery is not 
prepared by sufficient devalorization of capital. 
This situation produces a change in the way the industrial cycle 
presents itself. Since there is not sufficient devalorization there is 
not a genuine boom. When profit rates begin to rise, capital floods back 
into many sectors to quickly. The now rapid rate of technological 
advancement ensures that there are more developed means of production 
ready, Investment by productive firms is no longer the result of hoarded 
money and genuine accumulation. Rather, to maintain a competitive edge, 
reinvestment is financed partly with new stock issues but mostly with 
overdraught credit. The influx of capital is too great; rates of profit 
flatten out, then fall. Prices stabilize but do not rise much, if at 
all. High levels of technology in Department I cheapen capital goods but 
do not generate a large consumer demand. Recovery turns to crisis before 
it gets properly under way, and finance capital again withdraws. Thus, 
the fluctuations within the industrial cycle challenge the severity of 
the cycle per se. The expansive phases of the cycle are more often 
curtailed, and only one in several cycles results in a genuine revival, 
and then only significantly for the leading capitals. Necessarily, 
however, the tendency to ruin grows for those firms, sectors, areas and 
countries whose capital circulates outside the financial sphere. These 
capitals themselves then undergo large-scale concentration. Sectors 
consolidate, and at the national level industry is assisted by the 
state.(19) When Department II profits begin to improve, there is a 
massive inflow of capital in the form of bank overdraught and stock 
issue. This is so rapid and so big that overproduction quickly follows 
the mitigation of underconsumption. Just at that point Department I, 
whose regular profit peak is higher than that of Department II, has 
received orders and is expanding. Capital rushes here in the same form, 
but soon the boom collapses, The shortfall in realized profits to loans 
is taken up by the state, to whom international finance capital is 
normally only too willing to lend, 
The situation in which finance capital is put requires further anti-
devalorization measures, including the movement of capital into different 
currencies, different banks, different precious objects (metals, gems, 
art objects, priceless objects), and so on. It also involves double-
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dealing, exacting political concessions, promulgating wars and investment 
in sectors with gauranteed markets - primarily, high technology 
armaments, nuclear weapons and space exploration. In the last analysis, 
finance capital also suffers excess accumulation, which by its very 
nature cannot be completely or adequately mitigated by the regular 
industrial cycle. In late capitalism, it tries to expand its markets by 
moving into service sectors. and finds a new source of surplus-value in 
constant technological revolution. 
5.3 INFLATION AND THE STATE 
If we look only at the market and its laws of supply and demand and 
leave the production of value and its imperatives out of consideration, 
then inflation appears as a rise in commodity prices and can have only 
two causes. One is increasing costs, the so-called "cost-push" theory, 
and the other is excess demand, the so-called "wage-pull" theory.(20) 
Some economists, the neo-Keynesians, for example, are prone to tho market 
view where inflation means a rise in the consumer price index and little 
more.(21) In his serious attempt to analyze inflation in New Zealand 
W. Rosenberg writes: "Because of the fear of a repetition of the 
cumulative effects of the 'excess supply' situation, which occurred 
during the great depression of the thirties, 1945 to 1970 economic 
policies concentrated on the creation of excess demand. It can be seen 
that this solution leads to inflation once resource expansion becomes 
restricted by high levels of employment .•. " 
"We have seen" he continues "that the Keynesian remedies no longer 
work. On the other hand, Keynes' analysis of the reasons for expansion 
and contraction is still basically correct and very useful. Thus 
inflation, shortages and foreign exchange crises are the result of an 
excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply, expressed in sectoral 
terms ... "(22) 
The problem for the cost-push theory is that inflation on one market, 
the consumer-goods market, is explained by inflation on another, the 
producer-goods market. What causes that inflation? Clearly inflation on 
another, or the same (!) market. Thus, inflation explains inflation, 
which merely begs the question. The problem for the wage-pull theory is 
that it also depends on prior inflation - in the price of the commodity 
labour-power. But excess demand for labour-power is surely a result of 
excess demand for finished goods, so what is so bad about inflation? It 
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must surely be accompanied by a rise in the rate of profit. If wage 
rises, in turn, cause price rises, and these are roughly proportionate, 
then where is the rub? Surely no one wins and no one looses except the 
appropriator of surplus-value, who retains his 'naturally' advantageous 
position. The problem for W, Rosenberg's theory is, again, specifying 
just why the business community is so conscious of the rate of inflation. 
One can understand that Keynesian policies are concerned with creating 
demand, but would not their failure mean insufficient demand had been 
created, and anyway, are they not themselves inflationary in nature? One 
can also understand that shortages and rising commodity prices are not 
favourable to each individual consumer, but to each individual capitalist 
would they not be an undreamt of haven of profit? Why then is inflation 
an aspect of capitalist crisis? To explain this we must take into account 
not only markets, but production; not only prices, but value; not only 
commodities, but money. 
We must first hark back to Marx's theory of money, The reader will 
remember from Chapter II, Section 1, that for Marx money was the 
universal equivalent form of value. The labour-time socially necessary 
for the production of a certain quantity of gold was equal to the labour-
time necessary for the production of a quantity of commodities, of all 
types, which would be exchanged for that gold. Thus, the law of value 
determines average prices, and prices are the most developed form of the 
determination of the exchange ratios of commodities. It is immediately 
obvious that prices may change for two reasons: a change in the value of 
gold, or a change in the value of other commodities. But there can be 
nothing to alarm us in these types of price changes, for they actually 
express a change in the social value of the thing, which adjustment is a 
precondition for capitalist commodity production and exchange. 
'Inflation', in fact, makes no sense in terms of gold-money. 
'Inflation' cannot be conceived merely as rising prices, for prices 
can rise perfectly 'sanely' for other reasons, i.e., according to the 
laws of production and the market, the sine qua non of capitalism. 
Inflation is rather the devaluation of the unit of currency, It can 
therefore be experienced only by a means of circulation which has no 
value itself, and that means paper money, If we increase the quantity 
of gold in circulation we increase the amount of value in circulation, 
but this will not be inflationary in the long run, for each ounce of gold 
has a certain value. Much of it may have to be hoarded because it cannot 
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be spent, or because it devalues temporarily with over-supply, but it 
will revalue under normal conditions. When paper money came into 
widespread circulation, it represented a certain quantity of gold. So 
long as the quantity of paper money in circulation did not grow 
excessively, and always stood for a quantity of gold in the possession of 
the issuing bank, there were no real problems with this. Paper money was 
a convenient, economical means of circulation, which moreover allowed the 
extension of credit against the return of real riches in the industrial 
nations who were expanding their trade, However, it is clear that if the 
quantity of money tokens which represent a quantity of gold increased, 
then each unit of currency will devalue, producing inflation. The 
questions to be considered are, 1) why should the quantity of paper money 
in circulation increase, and 2) why is this bad? 
Before the collapse of the gold standard(23), each unit of paper money 
represented a quantity of gold, and so when it was put into circulation 
it represented more an increase in value in circulation than a 
devaluation of paper money. Credit did exist, but it was normally granted 
out of bank reserves, i.e., also representing a quantity of gold, and had 
no significant effect on the industrial cycle. However, at about the time 
of the great depression, Keynes discovered that an inflationary increase 
in the money supply could be used to even out successive industrial 
cycles. From that point government policies began to change. The gold 
standard collapsed under pressure of governments wishing to utilize the 
Keynesian strategy, and banks were then allowed to grant great quantities 
of credit. This credit money was used by productive capitals to mitigate 
short or medium-run declines in the rate of profit. A regular "credit 
cycle" thus arose in articulation with the industrial cycle. 
In the downward swing of the industrial cycle, stockpiles of unsold 
commodities accumulate. This decreases the trading profit of companies 
and squeezes available working capital, which is used for the payment of 
wages, repairs, property rents, transport, office equipment, and so on. 
Production contracts. At that point the credit cycle begins its upturn, 
for the value trapped in unsalable commodities cannot be drawn on to 
maintain the business until the market is cleared. The purchase of 
services and labour-power must carry on, albeit on a smaller scale, if 
the produced value is ever to be realized. This requires credit. The 
first cause of inflation, then, is bank overdraft credit which put more 
money into circulation in the low part of the industrial cycle. This has 
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the effect of keeping more firms viable through the recession, until, 
upon recovery, the credit money they have obtained would fall 'naturally' 
out of circulation as profits and bank balances revive, accounts are paid 
and interest rates peak (making marginal capitals invest in finance 
institutions rather than borrow to invest productively at below the rate 
of interest). Thus, the average amount of money in circulation over the 
whole cycle should equal the value actually produced divided by the 
velocity of circulation. 
Now the state is closely connected to the extension of overdraught 
credit. In many cases, depending on contingent circumstances, it 
underwrites bank loans at given interest rates, manipulates interests 
rates and prints the necessary paper money. This is not to mention the 
role of nation-states in the original collapse of the gold standard. 
Governments also control the regulations relating to the extension of 
credit by companies to final consumers - hire purchase and so on. This is 
the second cause of inflation which took effect roughly from the Second 
World War. Hire purchase (and other forms of credit to private persons, 
e.g., mortgages) reduces down to bank loans to firms, individuals and 
households, and this must increase the money supply,(24) 
The third cause of inflation is direct and indirect "injection" of 
money into the economy by the state, other than through private banks. 
This also took effect from the Second World War. Some Marxists writers 
attribute inflation solely to government military outlays, but this is 
not a completely satisfactory explanation. The case of New Zealand, for 
instance, which has no military sector, throws doubt on this theory. hrms 
expenditure in imperialist countries must be seen in the context of the 
overall Keynesian strategy which most modern governments have adopted, 
W. Rosenberg was quite correct to point out that Keynesian policies 
aim to create demand. But he goes on to argue that inflation results from 
the creation of excess demand which leads to a rising market-price in 
accordance with the laws of supply and demand. On the one hand, however, 
it is not necessary for governments to create "excess demand" in order 
for commodity prices to rise, on the other hand, "excess demand" is not a 
sufficient condition for commodity prices to rise steadily over a number 
of years given the formation of a general rate of profit and the mobility 
of capital. If we assume that commodity values remain roughly constant, 
then all that is necessary for their prices to rise is an expansion of 
the money supply. Monetarily effective demand need not be in excess. If 
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government expenditure increases the quantity of money in circulation, it 
causes inflation ipso facto. 
The overall Keynesian strategy attempts to ride out the recession by 
"stimulating" effective demand. This is done by several means. First, the 
government can simply buy the commodity itself. This is the case with 
considerable quantities of meat and wool in New Zealand. In the U.S.A. 
this tactic has been taken to extraordinary lengths. Not only does the 
government stockpile mountains of agricutural produce, but in certain 
lines it maintains demand whilst allowing the farmer to forego the 
formality of actually producing the product! Such is the case in parts of 
the grain producing industry. Second, the government can set up 
bureaucracies or industries in non-competitive sectors of Department I, 
buy all the commodities itself, and generate demand among its workers. 
Such a possibility conditioned the growth of the arms industry in the 
imperialist countries, and of the "Think Big" projects in New Zealand. 
Third, the government can underwrite selected investments of firms and 
sectors (the selection process having lower order, conjuncture! 
determinations) over and above the support of private banks and its 
effects which we have already seen. Fourth, contracts may be let to 
industries in Department I for public works. The third and fourth tactics 
are clearly illustrated in the growth of the Fletcher-Challenge 
corporation in New Zealand.(25) An alternative tactic to the third and 
fourth possibilities is the _guaranteeing of profitable conditions for 
foreign investment. However, where a substantial local capital exists, 
this must be used selectively so as not to drive local business bankrupt 
and destroy the reason for stimulating demand. In less developed 
countries with a smaller bourgeois class, the proceeds from foreign 
investment may be sufficient to maintain a higher standard of living for 
a few. (26) 
Ultimately, the Keynesian strategy conditions the rise of the modern 
phenomenon of deficit financing, as I have explained (Chapter IV, Section 
3) and in sucessive cycles the ratio of credit (debt) to domestic product 
grows. On the basis of credit, the only security from recession is 
further credit, which means creeping, then galloping inflation. 
If inflation means paper money is devaluing, but at the same time its 
quantity grows proportionally, where is the harm in it? In the first 
place, inflation is a bad effect not a bad cause. That is, it signifies 
the continuing stagnation of the economy through the continuing need for 
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credit money, Only when we recognize that it usually signifies a 
continuing need to artificially prop up the economy can we truly grasp 
its significance, Inflation is an expression of more deep-seated 
tendencies. In the second place, however, inflation itself can, at a 
certain stage of the crisis, in combination with other factors, produce 
bad effects. Quite apart from being caused by high costs, it now pushes 
costs up which militates against the purchase of new means of production. 
This prolongs stagnation, and keeps the rate of profit down such that 
savings and entrepreneurial hoards are invested unproductively, Money 
borrowed from banks is used as working capital or turned to speculation. 
Wages become "sticky" in the Keynesian terminology, and will not fall 
without long struggles. Finally, the destruction of capital does not 
occur, and a new boom cannot get under way.C27) 
The objective function of crises is to valorize the total capital by 
the massive devalorization of particular capitals. The more highly 
developed the credit cycle, however, the greater difficulty the laws of 
capitalist production have in expressing themselves in this way, The 
longer the crash is put off, the more credit is required, and the greater 
are the inflationary tendencies. The Keynesian policy, being a policy for 
national economies, is aimed at maintaining the national capital until 
the world economic recovery, With the floating of one national economy, 
though, another must sink doubly low for sufficient devalorization to 
occur. Hence, with a highly developed world economy this strategy may 
succeed if only one .Q£ ~ few countries did it. But when the bulk of the 
developed nations follow this pattern, the crisis cannot take full 
effect; hence a full recovery cannot take place, as insufficient capital 
has been destroyed. This is clear, for example, in the New Zealand 
government's stockpiling of agricultural goods. The idea is to release 
these goods on to the market in times of recovery, But which market? The 
U.S., for instance, has its own stockpiles many times larger. As world 
stockpiles are released, the market becomes glutted again, and the 
recovery is curtailed. Underconsumption does not automatically halt the 
new overproduction as capitals and countries are competing for what may 
be their last chance to remain viable. The industrial cycle thus becomes 
flatter and less violent for the world as a whole, and its internal 
oscillations become sharper and more catastrophic for some particular 
countries, Although industrial cycles themselves are less marked, 
successive cycles are articulated on a downward trend - into depression. 
As credit accumulates over several cycles, the over-accumulation of 
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capital (unrealized value) grows, and inflation must increase to support 
this through the next slump. 
There are basically two means of escape from this downward spiral: 
there must either be a boom without a crash or a huge crash to facilitate 
a boom. A boom without a crash could be supported only by a huge 
extension of markets (penetration of capital into non-capitalist areas, 
sectors and countries) or a new technological revolution producing a new 
source of surplus-profits. Failing this, a decent crash is needed in 
which substantial capital is destroyed. The political (inter-nation and 
inter-class) repercussions of what would be the biggest crash in the 
history of capitalism, would be considerable. If we consider the major 
imperialist countrie Japan, u.s., and the E.E.C. nations- then a portion 
of these to near the value of excess capital would have to be destroyed 
economically. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V 
1. T.E. Weisskopf: 'Marxist Perspectives on Cyclical Crisis' In Us. 
Capitalism in Crisis Union of Radical Political Economics 1978 pp.2l1=~u 
2. The total company income is figured to be the total wage packet 
plus profit. The assumption is that tfie wages of workers plus Department 
li profits must flow back into the consumer-goods sector before it can, 
in turn, make purchases from Department I which thus realizes the 
profits of the producer-goods sectors. If the exchanges which realize 
this income are on average at value, then income must correspond in value 
terms with output. 
3. ", .. the theo~ is predicated upon changing conditions of 
production which affect the ratio of productive capacity to capital 
stock, rather than changing conditions of consumer demand, which affect 
the rate of capacity utilization1" (T.E. Weisskopf: 'Marx1st Perspectives on Cyclical Cr1ses' In US Capita ism in Crisis. QQ.cit. 1978,) 
4. It would be misleading to consider only industrial countries here, 
for the bad effects of capitalist development are moved on to 
underdeveloping countries as far as is possible. 
5, The long-term cycle, or 'long wave', is a topic we cannot, 
unfortunately, give expl1cit considerat1on to. For further references see 
Mandel: Late Capitalism Chapter 4. 
6. Marx (1978) Capital Vol.I p.596. (I suspect that Marx would be 
prepared to acknowledge a greater number of concrete mechanisms here.) 
7. Ibid p.596 (emphasis added) c.f. ",,,the rate of accumulation is 
the independent£ n9t the dep~ndent, var~able; the rate of wages, the dependent, not he 1ndependent, var1able. - p,581 
"Relative surplus-population is therefore the pivot upon which the law of 
demand and supply of labour-power works. It confines the field of action 
of this law w1thin the limits absolutely convenient to the activity of 
exploitation and to 't'fie dommation of cap1tal." - p,S9-s- -- --
8, The quoted text comes from Marx (1978) QQ.cit. Marx thinks he 
finds the rational kernel in this theory: "The above economic fiction 
confuses the laws that regulate the general movement of wages, and the 
ratio between the working-class- i.e., the total labour-power- and the 
total social capital with the laws that distribute the working 
population over the ditferent spheres of production." - p,598 
9. Marx (1978) QQ.cit. p,596 (emphasis added) 
10, See note 6 above 
11. This was originally planned for Volume VI of Capital, and is 
included in the 1857 outline of the workf but is absent trom the 1866 
outline. See Rosdolsky (1980) The Making Q£ Marx's 'Capital'. pp,10-12. 
12. Marx (1978) Q2.cit p,593 
13. In the presentation, and part of the content, of the phases of the industrial cycle here I owe a debt to the work of E. Mandel. This mode of 
presentation of "successive" phases of the industrial cycle is a 
simplifying device which breaks up the industrial cycle in both the 
historical a logical sense, but does not preclude the recombination of 
the elements from each phase in the explanation of a real case. Mandel's 
presentation of the subject is one of the clearest accounts I have come 
across. See his Marxist Economic Theory. Vol.I. Chapter 11, 
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Under the heading of 'Recovery' I also borrow from Mandel since my own 
studies have been mainly concerned with the crises and not the up-turns 
in the capitalist economy, 
14. See below, Section 3 
15. The task of adjusting output to demand would by no means be easy 
in itself. The capitalist has an intimate knowledge only of his own 
business and cannot necessarily judge 1) if demand has been exhausted, 2) 
if his falling profits indicate overproduction or a diminishing market-
share based on below-average product1vity 3) if his rising or stable 
rate of profit indicates anything other than a continuing expansion of 
the market, 
16, See below, Section 3, 
17. That is, stocks and shares move resources into other spheres where 
they may act as capital. 
18. See Chapter 4. 
19. This is discussed further in the next section. 
20. A concise overview of these theories can be found in Samuelson et 
al. (1975) Economics pp,840-45. 
21.!. "The word "inflation" is now generally accepted as denoting simply 
a tenaency for prices to rise on the average, The represents a departure 
from its original meaningL whicn refered to increases in the money supply 
or, in some contexts, ~o increases in the money supply in excess or 
increases in the amount of gold in the count~. The link between the 
original and the present meaning is to be found in the traditional view 
that prices were determined[! - read regulated] chiefly by the money 
~VP~ly . Ih~s, pre7Keyne~jan economist~ felt able to use the .t~rm 
' 1ntlat1on to descr1be both increases 1n the money supply and r1s1ng 
prices, Modern usage, however, separates and fact of rising prices from 
1ts causes and reserves the word "mflation" fOf'"The former. (Samuelson 
et al. (1975) QQ.cit pp,839-840) 
22. Rosenberg, W (1978) The Coming Depression p.28. 
23. " ... the gold standard, ,operated in its purest form in the half-
century before 1914. It was d1srupted by World War IL partly restored in 
the 1920s, abandoned in the depression, revived af~er 1933 and - in a 
greatly modified form- continuea after World War II." (Samuelson et al. 
Econom1cs (1975) p, 738). --
24. Private indebtedness should not be underestimated. Mandel, for 
instance, puts the total private debt (including mortgages) as a 
percenta9e or the total disposable income of u.s. households at 93% -
Late Cap1talism p,448 
In New Zealand the Christchurch Press carried the following report on 
the first of December 1982: "Hire purchase advances for the three months 
to September this year were 18.1 per cent up on the comparative figure 
last year.... For the September quarter th1s year advances were worth $201,7 million. In the June quarter this year the figure was $216.1 
mill1on. In the September quarter last year the figure was $178,4 
million ...• Advances in the lafest quarter on motor buses, trucks, and 
tractors increased 29 per cent over the September 1981 quarter. Cars, 
motor-cycles~ and caravans increased 11.1 per cent; planf and machinery 
increase 25.~ per cent; and household and personal goods, including 
television sets, increased 16.1 per cent," 
25. See Jesson, B (1980) The Fletcher Challenge 
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26. A fifth tactic, which is hardly specifically Keynesianl is to seek 
export markets. In New Zealand we need export markets from tne start, to 
realize the surplus-value of Department II. But in crisis, export markets 
become even more important. Here we have the peculiar s1tuation of 
continual overvaluation of the New Zealand dollar on the world market to 
encourage the. i'mport of means of prodvction, Thi~ tends to decr~ase 
export potent1a , and so the government 1ntervenes w1th export incent1ves (New Zealand Export/Import Corporation established 1974). These, too, are 
inflationary. 
27. Thus, the rational kernel of the cost-push and demand-pull 
theories can be seen in the real, though secondary, effects of inflation 
once it has been set in motion in the way I have aescribed, No wonder we 
arrived at the cost-push tautology that inflation causes inflation! 
Economists are prone to these tautologies because 1) they do not look 
beyond the market and its laws of supply and demand, and thus increasing 
pr1ces follow from increasing demand, 2) this is confirmed for them by 
the operation of Keynesian~ demand-creating policies, 3) once set in 
motion inflation does in ract have bad effects which require further 
credit and thus produce further inflation. Eventually, the case is 
completely turned around to the point where inflation is used to explain 





The foregoing analysis has offered a conception of capitalist 
production and on that basis derived or conceived of economic crisis. I 
believe the logical steps between the capitalist basis and its economic 
crises are valid. In this case, therefore, we treat the capitalist system 
of production itself as the explanans for the crisis. Crisis is thus 
conceived as a natural aspect of capitalist production. 
In order to elaborate the system of causation which operates between 
the capitalist basis and the real crises of capitalism, four mechanisms 
through which capitalist development periodically expresses itself in 
crisis were outlined, They are the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall, disproportionality, underconsumption and over-accumulation. 
again helped to define the elements between which they mediate: 
These 
the 
fundamental laws of capitalism upon which the incipient crisis depends, 
and the phenomenal forms of this crisis which capitals experience. In 
those sections of the thesis which were concerned with the role of the 
state in crises I also discussed the crisis at the level of the nation-
state, i.e., so far as it can be conceived as a national crisis. I will 
now summarize these different levels of analysis and their relations. 
6.1.1 The capitalist Basis 
As far as the explanation of crisis is concerned, three integral 
aspects of capitalism are of essential interest to us. The first of 
these, the law of value (which has both logical and historical priority), 
is fundamental to commodity exchange. The law of value states that the 
ratios in which commodities exchange, or their values, are determined by 
the socially necessary labour-time for their production, With this law we 
put the circulation of commodities on a more or less rational basis, 
whereby the exchange of commodities is determined by their values. 
The second aspect is fundamental to capitalist circulation, and that 
is the drive to accumulate. Wherever material resources act as capital, 
their circulation yields a greater value than was originally thrown in. 
Capital is value in search of expansion, and thus thirsts for accretion. 
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Now, it is clear, on the one hand, that given the equal exchange of 
commodities (i.e., in accordance with the law of value), the drive to 
accumulate can express itself as profit only if the circulation of 
commodities increases the socially necessary labour-time for their 
production. It is equally clear, on the other hand, that a commodity by 
its circulation cannot effect the labour-time expended in its own 
production. To yield a profit under these conditions, commodity capital 
must not only circulate but also produce a new commodity of greater 
value. Thus, production must be a phase in the circuit of capital, where 
the value of labour-power consumed is less than the new material value it 
creates in the new commodity, i.e., it creates surplus-value, When the 
law of value which governs commodity exchange is joined by the drive to 
accumulate which governs the circulation of capital, i.e., where 
commodities begin to circulate as capital, this must give rise to 
production in the capitalist mode. This type of production depends 
primarily on the private ownership of the means of production or, where 
these are already commodified, on the ownership of money. Where private 
property prevails, a class of person arises which has no access to the 
means of producing their material life, and therefore no access to means 
of subsistence, except through the sale of their labour-power to the 
owner of capital. From that point, production may yield a capitalist 
profit. 
The privatization of productive resources as capital, however, not 
only opposes the owners of capital to the non-owning classes, but it 
naturally opposes one private owner to another. The total social capital 
is thus applied as a single social force only in a limited sense, and we 
may more readily perceive the third fundamental aspect of capitalist 
production - the anarchy of production. 
The anarchy of production refers to the unco-ordinated and haphazard 
way in which social production is matched to social demand under 
capitalism. Where each capital is applied as an independent force to 
further the private accumulation of wealth, the result will be the 
movement of capital wherever profit beckons. But since this is an open 
invitation, many hungry capitals will crowd into a branch of industry, 
increasing production above demand and the rate of profit will 
consequently fall. Over time, and across society, this flux shows the 
limits to the rationality of production on a capitalist basis. 
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6.1.2 The Causes of Crisis 
Now these three essential underlying elements of the capitalist system 
of production (the law of value, the drive to accumulate and the anarchy 
of production) periodically express themselves as growth, progress and 
prosperity, and periodically as contraction, regression and poverty. It 
is not the case that something has interfered with the system when 
prosperity turns to decline. Rather, the phase of prosperity lays the 
ground for decline, and vice versa. We now come to the mechanisms 
through which the underlying laws of capitalism express themselves as 
crisis. The first of these mediating processes is the tendency for the 
rate of profit to fall. 
On the basis of the law of value and the private ownership of the 
forces of social production, the drive to accumulate must express itself 
as a constant tendency for the development of the forces of production. 
Where the value, and ultimately the price, of a commodity is determined 
by the labour-time socially necessary for its production, the interest of 
each capital lies in the reduction of the labour-time expended in the 
production of its commodities as far as possible below the average. In 
this way, the cost-price of the individual commodity falls below its 
socially recognized value, and the margin of profit is expanded. The 
reduction of the labour-time expended in the production of the individual 
commodity depends on the productivity of labour in a given capital being 
better than the social average, This again depends on the improvement of 
means of production in one case as measured against the average. 
However, since all capitals face each other as adversaries, none has 
any interest in allowing another to retain superiority in the 
productivity of labour. Therefore, as one improves its means of 
production, others follow, and the result is a general development of 
productive forces, As the more and more advanced means of production are 
introduced, the proportion of the value of the total capital advanced 
that goes to constant as opposed to variable capital increases. Marx 
calls this the rising organic composition of capital. The diminution of 
the labour-power component of production reduces the basis of surplus-
value extraction. Regardless of whatever counter-valencies may arise to 
temporarily, or permanently, allay the falling rate of profit, there is 
always a tendency for the rate of profit to fall. This pressure must be 
averted at all times (e.g., by raising the rate of surplus-value), and in 
times of crisis when other pressures bear heavily, the ability of capital 
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to maintain the rate of profit is severely strained, Where the rate of 
profit falls, the "natural" 'tendency of the rate of profit to fall' is 
always a contributing factor, 
The second mediating process is the disproportionate development of 
the two departments of social production. The possibility of unbalanced 
growth arises from the anarchy of production, The particular way in which 
the rates of accumulation of the two departments is related over time is 
determined by the drive to accumulate, 
The structural relation of the two departments is of great importance 
in reproduction. First, Department II purchases means of production from 
Department I. Second, the workers of Department I purchase consumer goods 
from Department II, including that portion corresponding to surplus-
value, Now, while the logical requirments of the system include the 
articulation of the departments according to this schema, and an 
interlocking input-output structure, the disarticulation of the capitals 
in the different departments, and therefore of the departments as a 
whole, due to the anarchy of production, prevents this departmental 
balance, Even given the desire to fulfil the functional requisites of the 
system, the privatization and accompanying fragmentation of social 
production would make this a matter of chance and accident. 
In reality, no such 'desire' exists. The governing principle is the 
drive to accumulate, which expresses itself in the movement of capital 
into whichever department is momentarily more profitable, Now, if 
Department II is expanding, business confidence is high and turnover is 
good, the orders will flow to Department I at an ever-increasing rate. 
The production of Department I at this time corresponds to the productive 
consumption of Department II in the next turnover period, Department I 
therefore expands more rapidly than Department II and capital will flow 
in here, This will mean that the· labour army of Department I is 
expanding, and this will expand the market for consumer goods. However, 
when the production of consumer goods gathers pace, it inevitably 
outstrips the consumer power of the working class (more on which below), 
and so production slows, competition intensifies and prices drop. Orders 
to Department I also decline. Because it is producing means of 
production for the next, expanded round of accumulation, the contraction 
experienced in Department I as a consequence of this is greater than that 
in Department II. Therefore, as orders for means of production contract, 
the buying power generated among Department I workers declines even more, 
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Capital now evacuates Department I and is moved partially into Department 
II, partly turned to speculation, and some of it provides credit to 
either capitals who intend to carry on, or consumers who wish to continue 
buying consumer goods. 
When the consumer good market is eventually cleared, Department I is 
at its lowest level. As Department II expands again, it buys up means of 
production which were unsold in the recession. As these stocks run out, 
Department I production again falls below demand, there are shortages, 
prices rise and capital flows in. 
The third mediating process is underconsumption. This effects the 
realization of the value produced in Department II. Where the law of 
value operates, it is clear that surplus-value can arise only when the 
labourer is set to work for a longer period than is necessary for the 
reproduction of his or her labour-power. Hence, the total value produced 
in Department II cannot be realized without the consumption deriving from 
Department I workers. However, if we introduce anarchistic production and 
a profit motive, which raise tho organic composition of capital in the 
way described above, then the demand generated by Department I will fall 
as against its production of means of production. The extra means of 
production produced in the increasingly labour-efficient Department I 
will themselves have the potential to produce more goods with loss 
labour, and thus, as production grows, demand for consumer goods must 
shrink relatively, 
In order to maintain consumption, the expansion and capitalization of 
Department II must proceed more slowly than the expansion of Department 
I, as this latter department will have to expand exponentially to 
generate additional consumer demand arithmetically. Such is the situation 
in the period of economic boom. However, the very motive which would 
recommend this, i.e., the profit motive, pre-empts its actualization 
under conditions where each capital stands opposed to the others. Each 
capital knows that if it regulates its expansion it will be left behind, 
and it would rather suffer underconsumption alongside all the others. 
The fourth mediating process is the over-accumulation of capital. 
Where the mis-matching of production and demand is the norm, there will 
usually be an oversupply or a shortage of any given commodity. The fact 
that all capitals, and capital as a whole, strive to accumulate means 
that there is a greater likelihood of over-production than under-
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production at any given time. In this way, production for private 
accumulation tends to outstrip social demand. When demand falls below 
supply in Department II, the rate at which commodities can be profitably 
produced declines. More capital has been accumulated than can now be 
profitably employed. This over-accumulation occurs because each capital, 
independently seeking profit, has sought consistently to expand and 
increase its labour productivity such that the aggregate capital now 
lacks opportunity for valorization. 
So Department II has too many means of production. This simultaneously 
signifies that Department I will have difficulty in realizing its 
produced value, or selling its produced means of production, and, pro 
rata, that it too has accumulated too much capital. The three forms of 
means of production -means of production of Department II, unsold 
products of Department I, and means of production of Department I -are 
all in excess. Hence, value existing in all other forms must also now be 
in excess if it is applied as productive capital, and will only worsen 
the over-accumulation of means of production. 
6.1.3 The Expressions of capitalist Crisis 
There are many symptoms of the crisis at the level of the 'community 
of capitalist enterprise'. The following are only the most characteristic 
and unmistakable results of the causes described above. 
The first is the falling rate of profit. The general rate of profit is 
probably the most significant phenomenon in the capitalist economy. It 
indicates the rate of accumulation and thus the general health of the 
system. We have seen that there is a tendency for the rate of profit to 
fall under capitalism. This is expressed as a trend of falling profit in 
the longer-run. The reconstitution of capital from which imperialism 
(1890) and late capitalism (1940) emerged brought about historical 
revivals in the general rate of profit through the discovery of new 
sources of surplus-profits necessitated by the falling trend. 
In the shorter term, fluctuations in the rate of profit have more 
obviously combined causes. These fluctuations signify changes in the rate 
of accumulation and in this way describe what has been termed a regular 
industrial cycle. We saw in Chapter V how this is determined. Briefly, 
underconsumption hits Department II for the reasons set out in the sub-
section above. This causes contraction, which sets up a disproportion in 
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favour of Department I. At this point the rate of profit is falling in 
Department II. The over-accumulation of capital in that Department means 
that orders going out for means of production decrease, and this leads to 
problems of realization and then valorization in Department I. The over-
accumulation of capital here, now swings the disproportion in the 
opposite direction as Department II carries on business with existing 
means of production (albeit at a very slow pace), whereas Department I 
cannot now sell its products to the contracting Department II. At that 
point the rate of profit in Department I has fallen to its lowest level, 
below that of Department II. Contraction in the capital goods department 
means unemployment and thus the reduction of aggregate wage-demand, while 
the per-person wage, and thus the rate of surplus-value, has not had time 
to adjust to the crisis (wages should fall, raising the rate of surplus-
value). This again keeps the rate of profit low. 
In line with the changes in the rate of profit, the second expression 
of crisis is the contraction of industry and industrial output, and this 
means, thirdly, redundancies and the expansion of the reserve army of 
labour. 
In a crisis, then, we see, fourthly, the pressure for wages to fall in 
line with the needs of capital. The rate of wages is regulated through 
the expansion and contraction of the reserve army of labour, and so as 
this grows, wages must fall. This law, however, works itself out in the 
class struggle at the wage-bargaining table, on the picket line and at 
the barricades, which colours the period of crisis. 
Fifth, capitals experience problems in realizing their produced value. 
This appears as stock piles of unsold commodities. This is partly due to 
underconsumption (Department II), partly to over-accumulation (causing 
realization problems in Department I), and partly to general 
overproduction, i.e., that portion of overproduction present in both 
departments even in expanded reproduction. 
Sixth, idle capital arises directly from over-accumulation. This may 
take the form of idle means of production, plant closures, or the 
withdrawal of capital and its movement into, for instance, gold bullion. 
Alternatively, the excess material goods of an unprofitable sector may be 
bought up cheaply, or the whole capital annexed by a more powerful 
company. This leads to the concentration and centralization of capital, 
and its various market appearances, e.g., takeover bids on the stock 
exchange. 
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Seventh, in a serious recession, such as the current one, instead of 
falling with the rate of expansion, interest rates stay high. This 
signifies that credit expansion has become the basis of stagnation, and 
is the only thing preventing decline and destruction of capital. 
Finally, with continuous credit expansion, the devaluation of currency 
produces rising prices. Couple this with declining profit, and the result 
is increasing credit-need. Couple rising prices with credit expansion, 
however, and it is clear that inflation, once present in the economy, 
develops on a spontaneous basis. 
6.1.4 The National Crisis 
These expressions of the crisis are felt by capital generally. They 
are perceived as equally pressing problems by all capitals, capital as a 
whole, and capitals in different countries. Another set of closely 
related problems faces the state, which looks over the flock of national 
capitals in each country. The 'national crisis' is a specific composite 
expression of the capitalist crisis. 
Just as the low level of the rate of profit signifies that the general 
health of capital is poor, so its expression at the national level, 
little or no 'economic growth', indicates the status of the national 
economy. When the rate of profit is low, economic growth is retarded. 
Primarily, this indicates that insufficient capital is completing its 
circuit, and this cannot be reinvested at the normally expanded rate. In 
addition, however, it may also mean that the money which is available 
will not be invested because of a lack of confidence in its profitable 
return. The level of busisness confidence never determines the rate of 
accumulation; it is, rather, the dependent variable. 
Two further expressions of the crisis at the national level involve 
the inability if the national capital to realize its produced value, They 
are the need to improve the balance of trade situation, and the growing 
unemployment problem, Where stagnation results from pver-production and 
glutted markets, the improvement of foreign trade is an obvious release 
for the swollen values which clog the circuit of local capital. The role 
of the state in marketing exports and fostering marketable export 
production comes to the fore in crisis. The markets at which the 
government aims are in those countries whose 'natural' rate of 
accumulation is above average, At home, of course, the larger the reserve 
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army, the smaller the number of labours employed, the further aggregate 
wage-demand declines, The state tries to ensure that demand sits at a 
certain level with special work schemes, About 37% of the reserve army in 
New Zealand, for example, was on special work in December 1983,(1) 
The state also mediates the general law that wages move inversely to 
the size of the reserve army of labour. Thus, negotiations and disputes 
between the state and unions increase and intensify, 
The major means of dealing with the crisis which the state uses are 
Keynsian policies of expanding the money supply to support the national 
economy until the rate of profit picks up independently and allows a new 
round of accumulation. These may lead to two final difficulties. The 
first is a balance of payments problem. When the level of credit support 
in the national economy is such that repayment is deferred for several 
years or several cycles, without an upturn, loans and interest accumulate 
and must be refinanced. This continuous expansion of credit is 
inflationary, and this is the second problem. As credit expands, more 
businesses are kept afloat without more capital completing the circuit. 
At the same time, the inflationary effects of this raise prices, which 
strains the ability of firms to stay in business, which necessitates 
further credit, and so on. 
6,2 WHERE TO NOW: SOCIETY? 
The linkages drawn from the capitalist base to the other levels of 
social reality, and the phenomena which occur at each, constitute the 
connecting thread that explains the crisis on a capitalist basis. Once we 
have an idea of the causes of crisis, it is possible to see its function 
in the general development of capitalist production. When the function of 
crisis is understood, the conditions of recovery may also be derived, and 
the likelihood of these developing can be evaluated. 
The crisis of capitalist production expresses itself as contraction. 
This is because of the over-production of goods under capitalism, which 
becomes a cause of crisis. Accompanying the contraction of production are 
two correlated expressions of the crisis - falling prices and 
bankruptcies. Both of these phenomena help to mitigate over-production. 
Lower prices help to clear markets, and bankruptcies reduce the potential 
to keep them saturated or to glut them again. 
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Falling prices and bankruptcies are phenomenal forms of the 
devalorization of capital. That is, they are ways in which the market 
presents the wastage and anihilation of socially produced value - valllo 
which will never be socially recognized, The valorization of capital is 
the transformation of commodity capital into a new commodity of greater 
value in the capitalist production process. Devalorization is the 
undoing of this process. It is the loss of value, destruction of values 
and the inability of capital to act as such, Falling prices and 
bankruptcy are not the only expressions of this. Others which I have 
already dealt with include idle capital and depreciation of means of 
production through weathering, 
The devalorization of capital is the underlying meaning of these 
phenomena. The fact that many of the phenomena of crisis should serve the 
process of devalorization is not surprising, for we saw in Chapters IV 
and V that both the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the 
imbalance of departmental growth rates persist even in the recovery, The 
crisis essentially consists in the over-accumulation of capital and the 
inability of the working class to increase consumption (monetarily 
effective demand) at the same rate as accumulation. These are the two 
sides of over-production which lower the rate of profit, retard 
accumulation and necessitate the devalorization of excess capital in the 
crisis. The destruction of capital is thus the objective function of 
crisis, 
The recovery from the crisis would involve the raising of the rate of 
profit and thereby the achievement of higher rates of accumulation. 
First of all, this will require that the commodity stocks are cleared, 
and this will in turn mean that production must have contracted and 
prices fallen, Under these conditions stocks should be moved, and as 
production continues to contract, it will eventually fall below demand. 
Or will it? If production is declining, then unemployment is growing 
and aggregate wage-demand is falling. The less products that are made, 
the less the demand for them, and the smaller the absolute demand for the 
stockpile of a prescribed size. Under these conditions the excess 
production cannot be dissipated through the normal channels, and so part 
of the excess capital must be destroyed, and here is the role of the 
devalorization of capital. 
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With the expansion of the reserve army of labour, there develops 
downward pressure on wages. This seems at first paradoxical, since wage-
demand would thereby suffer independent of unemployment. But this 
reduction in wage-demand is accompanied by a pressure for the rate of 
profit to rise as the rate of surplus-value improves. Therefore, it 
simultaneously induces not merely devalorization but ruin of a percentage 
of firms, on the one hand, and tends to raise the profit rate of the 
survivors, on the other. In this way, the weaker firms are weeded out, 
and the stronger go from strength to strength. The surviving firms are 
not affected by the additional unemployment because it represents a 
smaller demand than the bankrupt capitals' supply. Indeed, the addition 
of further unemployed forces wages further down, and the rate of surplus-
value further up, This whole process will continue until general supply 
falls below general demand. 
At the point where demand exceeds supply, the remaining capitals with 
a higher rate of surplus-value can begin to expand production again. The 
productive base is now trimmer as prices begin to rise. As more capital 
gradually employs more workers, wage-demand grows and may for some time 
run in advance of production, for it has a head start. Demand for money 
has been low, and now increases to finance new investment. With this 
investment-demand, Department I begins to expand, and the general 
recovery is on its way, 
The foregoing covers the general case of crisis and recovery, and 
treats the problems of capital in general. Now we must take several 
complicating factors into account to understand the possibilities of the 
current crisis in New Zealand. 
The recession of 1974-75 was the first generalized recession seen in 
the capitalist world since the Second World War. During the long post-War 
boom, individual countries suffered fluctuations in their economic 
indicators, or even in some cases stagnation. But these phenomena were 
never synchronized, and were certainly not general. 
Where a series of national economies is experiencing periodic, 
unsynchronized recessions, Keynesian economic policies can act well in 
the national interest, or the interest of national capital. When over-
production occurs and the rate of profit falls, the state expands the 
money supply to create consumer and investment demand. In this way none 
of unemployment, wage reductions and devalorization need stand out as 
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corrolaries of the clearing of the market. When the market is cleared, 
and the real rate of profit begins to pick up (the nominal rate of profit 
has remained high), the additional money is pulled out of circulation 
through the repayment of bank over-drafts, mortgages and loans, hire-
purchase, and through taxation where government inputs were direct, e.g., 
purchase of excess commodities, subsidies and grants, etc. Through the 
whole of the crisis, it is likely that trade would be maintained or even 
increased since the national down-turns are unsynchronized. This again 
helps to disperse the force of the crisis as the valorization of export 
industries helps to prevent the devalorization of capital partially or 
totally geared to the domestic market. 
Now when considering the general case of crisis I ignored the division 
of production into national capitals. When recessions are unsynchronized 
between nations, they appear as exclusively national in character and 
significance; they are internal events, and the intervention of the state 
is inevitable. However, where the recession is generalized, it is 
conceivable that both the underlying crisis and the recovery might lie 
totally outside a country, while only its effects are felt at home, i.e., 
through the contraction of trade. This requires, in the first place, the 
existence of a world market which reaches saturation. Whether or not a 
given cr1s1s can be conceived as external depends, secondly, on whether 
other countries bear the brunt of the crisis, or whether this country 
provides its share of the capital to be destroyed. It does not matter 
which capital is devalorized, only that sufficient capital be 
devalorized. So it is conceivable that the capital of one country may 
survive at the expense of another national economy. 
The national capital is thus thrown into an endurance race with other 
countries, where the state is the coach, cheer-leader and water-boy. 
This situation arises because it is not necessary that each nation suffer 
its fair share of devalorization, and so each tries to put it onto 
others. This is done by: 1) propping up one's own economy with credit, 
and 2) erecting trade barriers. 
When conditions of generalized recession came into force, the New 
Zealand government continued with its Keynesian policies. But conditions 
had changed. First, the revalorization of capital required the clearance 
of the world market, which meant that recovery did not necessarily follow 
from stimulation of the national economy. Second, since there was a 
general excess of commodities, export trade could not be counted on to 
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provide investment demand, employment, or any other form of national 
economic growth. Third, the stimulation of investment demand would be 
particularly fruitless because with no market at all, investment could 
not possibly conjure accumulation as it seemed to have done before. 
Rather, the generalized recession signifies that there is little or no 
accumulation to warrant investment. 
In other words, the generalized recession signalled that all efforts 
to tide over the national economy were doomed, for there would not be, 
and could not be on the basis of such policies, anything to tide it over 
for. It has degenerated, in fact, into a test of endurance, with each 
nation trying to outlast the others on the slide to poverty, misery, 
instability and uncertainty. When enough countries have 'gone under', 
i.e., had their surpluses rot, destroyed by war, etc., then the surviving 
countries may experience a rise in the general rate of profit. This, 
anyhow, is the consistent goal of the capitalist nation-state. 
The current crisis in New Zealand must be understood in the context of 
the inability of Keynesian-type policies to contribute to the mitigation 
of the 'national' crisis as they did in the long boom, primarily because 
the crisis is now a world-wide capitalist crisis. 
Since there is nothing to tide the national economy over for, credit 
expansion is objectively merely a means of maintaining stagnation! The 
result is therefore 'stagflation'. This has perverse effects on the 
national capital, as rising costs must be sustained on the basis of zero-
growth or worse. That requires more credit, and so on. Hence, inflation 
begins to develop itself spontaneously in a cost-push spiral. 
In the case of capital in general, we saw that unemployment in the 
crisis is of no particular concern. Unemployment, in fact, is only a 
concern to the state, and then only in a generalized recession. Where a 
nation stands opposed to other nations, it wants to maintain a large 
percentage of its capital. It does not want to stick to the scenario of 
contraction, unemployment, falling wages, bankruptcies, and higher 
surplus-value for the survivors. It wants the country as a whole to 
survive, which means it wants to minimize contraction and keep employment 
and demand up to ensure the valorization and realization of the greatest 
possible capital by the 'normal' means. Of course, this requires credit 
for the capitals and special work for the unemployed. 
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With a large reserve army of labour, there is pressure for wages to go 
down. Yet, again, the reduction in the rate of wages only serves to prop 
up the flagging rate of profit, does not reduce demand or knock out 
national competitors, and cannot assist the international devalorization 
of capital nor, therefore, the clearance of the market and the 
valorization of capital as a whole. It does not serve a positive role; it 
merely serves to draw the devalorization of the national capital out 
longer, and in so doing forces other nations to follow suit. 
Finally, we come to the rate of interest. The normal credit cycle 
associated with the ups and downs of the system peaks where expansion is 
greatest, and money is needed to purchase means of production. At that 
point the rate of interest peaks, with demand. When a crisis is deep and 
drawn out, as the present crisis is, demand for credit tends to be more 
steady over the cycle, as credit money is now used, not only for 
expansion, but primarily to finance survival and stagnation. This means 
that at the beginning of an expansive phase in the cycle the rate of 
interest has not fallen to its lowest level and may even be above the 
rate of profit. Therefore, where trends in accumulation should stimulate 
bona fide productive investment, the owner of money tends to become a 
lender, turning this money into stagnation-supporting credit 
(stagflation). If he becomes a producer, he will have to borrow funds to 
expand, which would mean paying a rate of interest higher than the rate 
of profit, rather than receive it. 
Now we must distinguish between the short and the longer-run 
possibilities of the New Zealand economy in a generalized recession of 
the capitalist world economy. Short-term possibilities are presented by 
the fact that the industrial cycle continues throughout the generalized 
recession, although it seems less marked. The causes of the industrial 
cycle must still operate, but in a limited way. Some portions of the 
market are cleared, some capital is devalorized, wages in certain sectors 
fall. As some domestic markets clear, the rate of profit may begin to 
rise in these sectors. Certain international markets may also free up; 
more money thus becomes available, and international trade begins to pick 
up. To receive the advantages of an up-turn in the industrial cycle, a 
nation-state must manipulate three crucial variables: 1) the rate of 
interest, 2) wages, and 3) the rate of inflation. 
The object of the state in the short term is to ensure that a round of 
investment coincides with the up-turn in the cycle. Under 'normal' 
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conditions, the clearing of markets would lead to a rise in the rate of 
profit and the rate of accumulation. This would encourage investment, 
which would be profitable and would lead to expansion. In a generalized 
recession where nations stand opposed, however, things are different. 
The first important difference is that portions of the market have been 
cleared without corresponding devalorization of capital because, put 
simply, the government has propped firms up. Second, the pattern of wage 
movements is no longer straightforward because unemployment is not as 
great as it would 'normally' be, special work is extensive, and 
redundancies are unevenly distributed between sectors. Wages must 
therefore be depressed in selected sectors, almost artificially by the 
state. . There may be difficulties in this, as it is precisely the 
expanding productive sectors where wage-cuts are desirable. These two 
factors, trends in devalorization and wages, mean that the rate of profit 
does not pick up in the normal way when the market is cleared. 
The third important difference is that falling prices are no longer 
the general trend. Prices now fall only where capitals are on the verge 
of bankruptcy or in other extraordinary cases, e.g., where a monopoly 
breaks down. The general trend is one of price inflation. Hence, where 
the market is clear, new means of production are not cheaper than they 
have been, but dearer. This tends to discourage investment. This is 
particularly damaging to expansion when coupled with the fourth factor -
high interest rates. Not only is the increase in the rate of profit 
slight and the cost of re-tooling high, but on top of this it is hardly 
worth borrowing money to purchase means of production. 
The short-term possibilities for recovery thus depend upon the ability 
of the state to reduce wages, lower the rate of interest and hold 
inflation - all in selected· and correctly related sectors at the same 
opportune time. There is every indication, in my opinion, that the 
current New Zealand government and the opposition Labour Party, are aware 
of these requirements and can more or less contribute their part to the 
realization of the short-term possibilities of the New Zealand economy. I 
discussed in the body of the thesis how the 1982-84 wage/price freeze, 
1983-84 interest rate regulations and negotiations, implimentation of 
youth rates, changes in the state pay fixing procedure, the Industrial 
Law Reform Act ("voluntary unionism") and, one might add, the projected 
renegotiation of general wage-bargaining procedures, were the most 
unmistakable results of this. I have no doubt that under the present 
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management the New Zealand economy can achieve its short-term potential, 
such as this is. 
The particular forms of state intervention relating to short-term 
recovery are determined by the longer-term policies of the state flowing 
directly out of the generalized nature of the current recession. 
Regulation of interest rates, wages and inflation all become necessary 
because their 'natural' adjustment in the industrial cycle is pre-empted 
by the longer-term anti-devalorization policies of the state. 
As far as the longer-term prospects for New Zealand are concerned, 
they are at best uncertain. This applies to all capitalist countries. 
When I say 'uncertain', this does not imply that the analysis has failed 
to find the determination of economic events. On the contrary, in the 
longer term it is clear that the capitalist economy will stagnate and 
continue to run down. Countries will begin to suffer ruin, poverty and 
misery where it was not present before. But this economic certainty 
signifies political unpredictability, or at least has political 
implications not revealed by the economic analysis as such. It is clear 
that the material life of social groups, national populations and 
humanity as a whole cannot decline beyond a certain point without 
provoking epoch-making events on a national and international scale. 
There is, moreover, firm historical precedent for this view. As capitals, 
capitalist nations, blocs and the world system grow weaker, everything is 
"up for grabs" in the political arena. These struggles over the control 
of the state, and thus economic resources, may take the form of inter-
imperialist war, civil war, tendencies to dictatorship, national 
liberation struggles and revolution. The outcome of these events is 
another story, 
6.3 WHERE TO NOW: ANALYSIS? 
Once we had seen the general explanation of crisis in Chapter IV, I 
turned in Chapter V to some more specialized issues. The first of these 
was the periodicity of crisis under capitalism, which gives a cyclical 
appearance to the trends in the rate of accumulation. I tried to show why 
the development of capitalist production should present itself as an 
industrial cycle. Once we had an idea of why this is the case, I began to 
look at some factors involved in the determination of the frequency, 
amplitude and shape of industrial cycles and trends over several cycles, 
for example, of successive cycles sinking into depression. 
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There are two aspects in this which come to the fore in anticipating 
further work on the topic of capitalist crisis. The first is the 
development of a conception of cycles which arise in relation to the 
industrial cycle. We have already come across the credit cycle, and 
others are discussed below. The second is the study of the articulation 
and trends in successive cycles which relates to longer-run economic 
movements 
The industrial cycle in its normal, uncomplicated form can be summed 
up as the periodic over-production of goods and over-accumulation of 
capital which must be cut back to the point where demand exceeds supply, 
where profitable investment may resume. 
When the capitalist economy was released from the gold standard, a 
credit cycle arose which was articulated with the industrial cycle, 
peaking in the expansion where the demand for money to finance investment 
was greatest. In the generalized recession, the credit cycle has become 
disarticulated from the industrial cycle, and the demand for money 
persists in the low part of the cycle as capitals seek 'bridging 
finance'. The state decides to allow this in the interests of the nation, 
and stagflation results. The rise and fall of the credit cycle is thus 
the theoretical base from which to understand the historical development 
of inflation, stagflation, deficit financing, late modern fiscal policy, 
fiscal crisis, state regulation of banking, foreign-exchange crises - in 
short, all monetary policy and regulation of the state. 
Since New Zealand capital is primarily located in one department -
Department II - inter-departmental exchange occurs mainly through foreign 
trade. This means that New Zealand capital must realize its surplus-value 
on export markets and that the overseas funds realized in this way should 
ideally go to the importation of means of production. Thus, over-
production for New Zealand capital is relevant to its share of foreign 
markets or the world market. When trade is good, New Zealand capital can 
expand. If foreign markets contract, New Zealand capital contracts. In 
this way, the industrial cycle in New Zealand is transformed into a trade 
cycle, which coresponds, not to national departmental disproportions, but 
to the status of the capitalist world market. The determination of this 
'status' is a much more complicated problem than the calculation of 
national disproportions where the ups and downs of trade are incidental. 
The trade cycle is, 
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in the first place, articulated with the 
industrial cycles of our major trading partners. In the long boom when 
recessions were not generalized, all the combinations of the ups and 
downs of our major trading partners would have produced a multitude of 
possible outcomes for New Zealand. The articulation of the industrial and 
trade cycles is further complicated by time-lags in covariance of 
national rates of accumulation and the size of markets in other 
countries, by travelling times of goods, and by the lag between the 
contraction of trade and the restriction of output at home. 
In the generalized recession, the trade cycle evokes opportunism in 
the sale of commodities on the world market. Outlets are sort wherever 
incidental fluctuations raise the buying power of a potential trading 
partner above average. The decimation of the trade cycle in generalized 
recession is the basis from which to explain the development of trade and 
the rate of accumulation in New Zealand. 
The analysis of the development of capitalism in New Zealand becomes 
even more specialized, however, because of the large proportion of 
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exports consisting of agricultural produce. This transforms the trade 
cycle into a fourth, and final, type of cycle -the agricultural cycle -
which is affected by the ups and downs of the food-producing branch of 
industry on a world scale. Trends in the production and over-production 
of the world's food supply are thus major variables in the analysis of 
New Zealand. 
The setting out and drawing together of these four cycles is a 
complicated task that could not be attempted here. This thesis was 
couched at a more general level, but on its basis the analysis of cycles 
will yield a fuller understanding of the short-term developments in the 
New Zealand economy. 
In the longer-term, it is not the characteristics of any particular 
trade cycle which are of interest to us, but the trends in these. The 
articulation of successive industrial cycles into, for instance, a 
depression or a long boom must have determinants which stand outside and 
over the determinants of any particular cycle. 
The most fruitful approach to this problem it seems to me, lies in a 
body of literature on the 'long waves' of capitalist development, 
including such authors as N. Kondratief, L. Trotsky, and latterly, E. 
Mandel. A brief history of the theory, and further references can be 
found in Mandel's Late Capitalism, Chapter 4. 
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The analysis of long waves tries to come to grips with the longer 
period of oscillation in the rate of accumulation of approximately 50 
years. The explanation of long waves must be in terms of elements of the 
analysis which are involved in the turning of the industrial cycle, but 
which are not totally mitigated at each turn, and accumulate over several 
cycles. These might include the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, 
the over-accumulation of capital as finance capital over several cycles, 
the credit extended by the state, the decreasing turnover time of 
capital, etc. If such factors were worked out and synthesized, an 
explanation of long waves could be attempted, which was too big to 
attempt here. 
Finally, we must return to the official view of capitalist development 
and compare it with the conclusions reached here. This will reveal 
another field of inquiry which follows from this thesis. 
In the first quarter of 1984, the recovery of the capitalist economy, 
which only crawled through 1983, seems to have finally realized itself in 
Britain, the U.S.A, as well as in New Zealand, judging by the latest 
reports. 
On the 14th of March the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr 
Lawson, read a budget which " ... he said would stimulate business, reform 
the tax system and give the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, fresh artillery 
in the war against inflation."(2) According to a report from London the 
British government had just released figures showing that industrial 
production was at its highest level in four years. The budget can thus be 
interpreted as an attempt to ensure that investment coincides with an 
improvement in the rate of accumulation. The budget is reported to have 
kept credit sparse to hold inflation, eliminated special allowances for 
investment and insurance plans and stimulated directly productive 
investment by halving a stamp tax here, exempting corporate bonds from 
capital gains tax and abolishing a surcharge on investment income.(3) 
This programme of stimulation might follow from the analysis of the 
short-term situation presented in this thesis. 
The report makes no prediction about the longer term. The furthest Mr 
Lawson would go was to plan a reduction in corporate taxes in the 1986-87 
period, so he expected accumulation to continue at least until then. 
Thus, almost the sum total of the budget was short-term. 
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At the same time, the Americans were experiencing a bigger up-turn, 
and were very optimistic about the future: 
"It. is clear to us th~t tht;l nation is set on a strong 
econom1c course for 1984, Wh1te House spokesman Mr Larry 
Speakes said. "We are poised for economic expansion of the kina. 
that puts to work and sets the country on a proper economic 
course."(4) 
The report from Washington made the following predictions: 
The latest economic news also demonstrated that a long 
awaited business spending boom had finally occurred, setting a 
record7high level for investment in modernization and 
expans10n. 
The increase in housing starts was bouyed by two other major 
reports ~hawing adyances in industrial capacity use and in 
personal 1ncome dur1ng January. 
These figures provide new evidence that the components of 
last year's solid upturn remain in place. Strong consumer 
demand has been provia.ing the impetus for boosts in production 
and as this cont1nues the capacity for utilization moves ahead. 
This paves the way for the next stage of the recovery -
fuelled by increased investment in production and plant by 
businesses, as demand continues to outride supplies and eat 
into the already-low inventories kept during the recssion 
years.(5) 
Thus, it seems that the same upturn in the trade cycle was being felt 
in both the u.s. and Britain. The jubilance of this news report belies 
the fact that it really concerns itself only with the current year. No 
mention or prediction is made for next year, 
development is ignored. 
and the long-term 
In New Zealand the most dramatic recent announcement was the decline 
in the rate of unemployment, including those on special work, in 
February. The figures fell from 131,723 to 118,433, a drop of 13,290, or 
more than 10%. At that rate, there would be no more unemployment in nine 
monthes time. This reduction in unemployment was related to an increase 
in business confidence according to the Minister of Labour, Mr Bolger.(6) 
If this is the case, we would expect it to be related, in turn, to an 
increase in the rate of accumulation. 
The striking thing about all of these reports is that they accept the 
heavenly gift of economic resurgence but have no explanation of it or any 
idea of future developments. Why are these questions avoided? 
The primary reason is that official science poses only such problems 
as it can solve. This set of questions is growing smaller and smaller as 
bourgeois economics must increasingly ignore evidence of the type of 
analysis offered in this thesis. Politically, it would be an intolerable 
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conclusion that, aside from incidental fluctuations, the future holds a 
continuing downward trend bringing misery, poverty, uncertainty and 
helplessness to the great majority of the world's population, including 
the majority of those in advanced countries, so long as capitalist 
development continues, Where material life hangs in the balance the 
stakes are high, and people recognise this, There is no alternative for 
bourgeois science but 'to disappear' these facts with silence, 
From this point of view a whole new set of questions arises, Once we 
go beyond the short-term account of economics we find no long-term 
solution to the current crisis. That is, there is no solution that 
emanates naturally from capitalism as the crisis does. The solution to 
the crisis will not be economic in nature: it will be essentially 
political, and it may involve a fundamental revolution in human society. 
There seem to be at least three possibilities in the long-run. The first 
is the forcible destruction and reconstitution of capital, which we have 
seen will not occur automatically, The second is the destruction of human 
civilization, and its degeneration into barbarism. The third is the 
rising of the working class in international socialist revolution. 
The immensity of these possibilities indicates the need to develop a 
political analysis of social development on the basis of our economic 
analysis. The latter should continue to provide the guiding thread for 
this specialized work, as it is the economic questions from which we 
start. As economic problems become more pressing, however, the political 
analysis should begin to develop on a spontaneous basis, with the object 
of gaining power in order to put in force an alternative economic 
organization of which crisis is not a natural aspect, 
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION 
1. In December 1983 the registered unemployed numbered 81,062 and 
those on job creation schemes (both public and private sector) 47,478. 
The latter as a proportion of the total amounts to 36.9% - Monthly 
Employment Operations published by the Department of Labour, Wellington. 
Dec, 1983. 
2. New Zealand Herald 15 March, 1984. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Auckland Star 14 March, 1984. 
5. Ibid. 
6. New Zealand Herald 14 March, 1984. 
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